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Abstract
The Privatization of Standardization:
Enclosure of Knowledge and Policy in the Age of Digital Information
Timothy D. Schoechle 
Ph.D., Communication 
University of Colorado, Boulder, 2004
Dissertation directed by Professor Stewart Hoover
This is a study of the standardization process and establishment of technical standards 
that define virtually every artifact of the modem world. In the information and 
communication technology field, such standards specify everything from the prongs 
on plugs to software protocols that make the Internet work. Historically, standards 
have been set largely by volunteers in committees operating within a range of 
environments, institutional rules and social practice, but they generally have espoused 
traditional principles of accessibility, democratic deliberation, public accountability 
and balanced stakeholder representation.
A recent trend that has prompted much discussion is the increasing privatization of 
standardization activities under various corporations, trade associations, and 
consortia. This trend is far removed from the traditional, and, as claimed, more 
“open” and “democratic”, practices of voluntary consensus committees. Because 
standards play a powerful role in shaping technologies and their diffusion into 
society, the trend raises significant public policy issues about how the public interest
may be represented and served in today’s digital information age that is increasingly 
dependent on technical standards.
Within fields of law and public policy, an oppositional discourse has emerged 
concerning the privatization or “enclosure” of ideas—analogous to the land enclosure 
movement in 16th century England—and on the expansion of intellectual property 
rights, resulting in the “fencing off’ of the intellectual commons. Since 
standardization practice can be viewed as a collaborative effort in idea formation—an 
intellectual commons—this study uses the enclosure discourse as a framework for 
examining the debate over the privatization of standards.
This study, which draws upon a theoretical perspective of political economy and 
theories of the public sphere, applies methods of discourse analysis and 
historiography in examining the quest for legitimization by consortia and arguments 
for their inclusion in the international standards system. Furthermore, the study seeks 
to clarify the discourse on standards and standardization by showing how the ideas 
and arguments that form, apply, and justify policy decisions rely on symbols, beliefs, 
and ideologies that are rhetorically constituted. It is further argued that key terms 
used in the discourse, i.e., open, public, and private, are often ill defined and 
conflicting.
Keywords: commons, consensus, enclosure, discourse, open, policy, 
privatization, public sphere, rhetoric, standards, standardization.
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1He who controls trade controls the world’s wealth, and 
therefore the world itself.
—Sir Walter Raleigh, c. 1600
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
This project is a study of the process of standardization—of establishing the 
technical standards that define nearly every artifact of the modem world. In the field 
of ICT (Information and Communication Technology)1 such standards are documents 
that specify everything from the prongs on plugs and cables to the software protocols 
that make the Internet work. Technical standards and standardization play a vital role 
in trade and commerce—and increasingly in economic and cultural globalization.
Historically, these standards have been set largely by volunteer participants in 
committees that operate within a wide range of environments, institutional rules and 
social practices, but in general these groups have espoused a traditional commitment 
to general principles of democratic deliberation, public accessibility and balanced 
stakeholder representation. The historical practice is now being challenged by a 
variety of forces including newer, more private organizations that do not necessarily 
have a commitment to the same principles.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this study is to establish an overall framework, that of Digital 
Enclosure, a concept borrowed from legal, economic and public policy discourse, for 
understanding important, contentious and interwoven current issues in the global
standardization system. These issues include the rise of new standards-setting 
“consortia” and the challenge they pose to the traditional standardization process, 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), competition and anti-trust policy, business and 
commercial strategies, the Open Source movement, geopolitics, and technical 
innovation.
This study will begin by problematizing the Enclosure of standards and its 
relationship to notions of intellectual property, of the concept of the “public,” and of 
public goods. It will then suggest some forms of Enclosure and some of the counter 
movements and institutional responses and adaptations to Enclosure. In particular, it 
will seek to explore and understand the consortia phenomenon by analyzing the 
discourse around it to ascertain the cultural meanings that drive related policy 
decisions by corporations, governments and institutions. Finally, it will consider 
Enclosure with respect to technical innovation and competition. Primarily, the 
purpose here is to establish the terms of the discourse around standardization and 
consortia, their meanings of such terms, and to provide a framework for further study, 
analysis, and informed debate.
1.2 The problem
The central focus of this study is on the practice of technical standardization 
as a form of public discourse and idea production within a technical culture. In 
particular, it focuses on the discourse around a recent general trend toward the 
privatization or “enclosure” of standardization activities under various corporations, 
trade associations and consortia, and away from the more traditional, and possibly, as 
often claimed, more open and more democratic voluntary consensus committees.2
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The distinction between the traditional formal system3 and the newer consortia is one 
of legitimacy based on accreditation, on adherence to certain principles and rules of 
process, and on custom. The public or open nature of the traditional voluntary 
consensus bodies was already somewhat problematic in various respects, given their 
institutional history their economic importance, and the variety of interests they have 
served. Now the system is possibly being further enclosed. The central issue that 
emerges in this study from the standards discourse is that of legitimacy.
These standards are technical specifications that play a powerful role in 
shaping technologies and how they are diffused into society. Often such standards 
are incorporated into law or form the basis for administrative policy and rulemaking. 
Enclosure raises significant issues of public policy concern and questions about how 
the public interest may be represented and served in a digital information age that is 
increasingly dependent on technical standards and on the experts that create them.
The basic problem is: how can decisions made in private serve the public? In any 
case, such decisions affect the public interest and their basis of legitimacy is a matter 
of valid public concern.
Technical standards are documents comprising agreements that establish a 
vast array of processes, practices and procedures vital to the functioning of modern 
society and the market economy. These standards address diverse needs such as 
communication protocols and systems; languages and data structures; accounting 
procedures and practices; manufacturing processes and quality; and product and 
process conformity assessment and certification. Many of these standards cross over 
from the technical into the public policy arena by setting specifications that impact
3
public issues and concerns. A sampling of such issues includes privacy, security, 
access to networks and information, the digital divide, social equity, societal 
cohesion, patents, trademarks, copyrights and fair use, freedom of speech, technical 
innovation, regulation, industrial policy, monopoly and competitive markets.
Originating within the field of law and public policy, an oppositional 
discourse has recently emerged around the theme of the privatization or enclosure of 
ideas4—analogous to the land enclosure movement in 16th century Britain5—and 
addresses the expansion of intellectual property rights and a resulting general 
“fencing o ff’ of the intellectual commons. Since open standards and standardization 
practices can be viewed as a form of group collaborative idea generation—an 
intellectual commons—this study begins by using the Enclosure discourse as a 
framework within which to examine the privatization of standards. The Enclosure 
discourse (including its focus on intellectual property) is not only relevant but also 
central to the study of standards and standardization because the commons historically 
has been an essential concept of standardization:
1.3 Rationale and Approach
This study approaches the problem of Enclosure of standardization by 
applying the following rationale. The Enclosure discourse is about ideas and the 
public domain—and about the intellectual commons. Standards and standardization 
are public goods and have always inhabited the public domain (at least partially), and 
they have been seen as constituting an intellectual commons (including its essential 
publicness, however it might be flawed or limited). Therefore, the general discourse 
on Enclosure may be relevant to and applied to the specific problem of
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standardization. Since the Enclosure of standards and standardization is discursively 
constructed, the terms of that discourse are therefore important and determinative of 
material consequences.
The problem is therefore established and approached using the following 
logic: 1) an oppositional6 enclosure discourse asserts that an enclosure of the 
intellectual “commons” is increasingly occurring that deeply affects the future of 
ideas; 2) this oppositional discourse deals principally with real and potential negative 
material outcomes for society—about technical innovation, wealth generation and 
equity—and therefore it is important; 3) this oppositional discourse comes from a 
perspective of law, policy and economics, but does not explicitly address the general 
field of technical standards and standardization in any detail; 4) standardization is a 
form of collaborative group idea generation and deals with the same sort of ideas as 
does the Enclosure discourse (e.g., “code,” architecture, intellectual property, etc.); 5) 
a discourse on standards and standardization argues for and against the ascendancy of 
alternative enclosed standards bodies and their legitimation and incorporation into the 
global standards system; and therefore 6) it is proposed here to logically extend and 
apply these oppositional enclosure arguments to the discourse on standards and 
standardization, including concepts of production, innovation,“code,”7 architecture 
and intellectual property rights, to see how they might fit.
Enclosure may take a wide variety of other forms. For instance, standards 
may be viewed as a form of intellectual property ,8 or as being made into intellectual 
property in a number of ways: 1) standards are often viewed as the intellectual 
property of the committee, body, or sponsoring institution to sell, publish or
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otherwise distribute and control (e.g. open source GPL (General Public License), 
consortia, traditional bodies, etc.); 2) standards may be viewed as the partial 
intellectual property of inventors (intellectual property incorporated into a 
standard—deliberately and knowingly by the standards body) under a RAND 
(Reasonable And Non Discriminatory) licensing policy; and 3) standards may be seen 
as targets of strategic manipulation or stealth practices and subject to intellectual 
property claims or control (intellectual property incorporated into a 
standard—unwittingly and unknowingly by the standards body) (e.g., the Rambus 
case, an EEE (Embrace, Extend and Enclose)9 strategy, etc.)
From the perspective of the oppositional enclosure discourse, the general 
hypothetical problem may be stated as follows:
The public nature o f  standards as a commons is being challenged. 
Privatization for the benefit o f  certain specific interests may have deleterious 
consequences on society as a whole, including the impairment o f access to 
information and communication networks, o f competition and o f technical innovation.
1.4 Research Questions
It is important to understand what are the meanings of these terms and how 
such meanings are constructed, including the conditions of the discursive practice.
For example, some questions suggested by the above include: What is meant by 
“public” and “private”? What is the meaning of “open” and how is its meaning 
constructed and applied? Can a standard developed in a closed committee be an open 
standard? What are the views on the effects of open/closed processes of standards
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making? What is the basis of legitimacy of such standards and related decisions 
made on behalf of the public?
1.5 The Discourse on Enclosure
A body of literature has emerged about the nature of technical innovation and 
markets, and about the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the 
intellectual “commons.” Lessig (1999) maintains that network architectures and 
software “code” (which, it is asserted here, are largely defined by technical standards) 
represent de facto policy decisions about who is to benefit from ICTs, and emphasizes 
the derivative nature of intellectual creation, which he calls ideas, and the importance 
of preserving a commons for innovation. (Lessig 2001) Boyle (2001) likens the 
increasing emphasis on IPR and the privatization of ideas in the present digital 
economy to the land enclosure movement of the 16th century. This enclosure 
discourse is centered on a classic debate of market economics—whether the 
generation of wealth in society is better served by holding property publicly (in the 
commons) or in private hands. (Boyle 1996, Lessig 1999) Benkler (2001, 2002) 
describes alternative modes of production outside of the market model, including 
“peer” production and collaborative authorship in the digital information economy, 
including the Open Source movement. Litman (1990) describes the derivative nature 
of creation and the process of authorship (standards committees are authors). Van 
Houweiling (2002) describes forms of enclosure applied to standards and proposes 
extension of land ownership models into the realm of IPR.
The terms of this discourse include such words as free, open, public and 
private—terms that are deeply problematic and loaded with rhetorical and ideological
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significance. The Enclosure discourse focuses on how ideas and IPRs are formed and 
dealt with in society in general, but this discourse does not apply enclosure directly to 
the problem and practice of standardization, except by implication. It is here 
proposed that standardization is an important form of social idea generation, and 
perhaps a form of IPRs creation (although the term IPR is also itself somewhat 
problematic). The first step here will be to relate the Enclosure discourse to the 
discourse on standards.
1.6 The Discourse on Standards
The emerging field of standards research is beginning to produce a 
significant body of literature on standards and on standardization processes. This 
literature seeks to establish the theoretical underpinnings for the longstanding practice 
of standards making; and it takes two basic approaches: 1) economic and social 
theory applied to standards; and 2) case studies of standardization projects and related 
controversies. This literature will be described in more detail in Chapter 3.
Some of the standards theory and case study literature deals with the relative 
contrasting roles of traditional SDOs (Standards Development Organizations) and 
newer industry private consortia. A highly polarized debate has formed around the 
recent ascendancy of these consortia, pro and con, and it is couched in terms of the 
discourse mentioned above, as well as that of market vs. democracy. Cargill (2001, 
2001a) and Egyedi (2001) advocate recognition of consortia as legitimate standards 
bodies.10 Sherif (2001) and the Deutsche Institute fur Normung (DIN 2002) argue 
against such recognition. The discourse is largely centered on language and claims 
for legitimation and market relevance vs. language and claims of openness and
8
democracy. Both sides claim to best serve the public interest. I will seek to pry these 
arguments open by critically examining the discursive practice as well as its 
discourse, language, and embedded meaning.
1.7 Methodological Approaches
The primary theoretical framework for this study is public sphere theory and 
political economy. This study applies methods of discourse analysis and 
historiography, and draws upon a perspective derived from political economy and 
theories of the public sphere. The above methods are then applied to an examination 
of the quest for legitimation by consortia and the arguments for their incorporation 
into the international standards system. It seeks to clarify this standards discourse by 
arguing that many of the ideas and arguments that form, apply, and justify related 
policy decisions rely on symbols, signs, beliefs and ideologies that are rhetorically 
constituted, and that the terms of the discourse are often problematic, ill-defined, and 
conflicting, and sometimes perhaps purposefully so.
The primary method of inquiry employed here will be discourse analysis. The 
problem of Enclosure is complex, and the approach taken here is only one of many 
possible approaches. No single approach is complete. Discourse reveals prevailing 
ideological commitments that lead people to interpret the same data in conflicting 
ways. Analysis of the discourse will identify the variety of meanings or 
interpretations found in the various embedded symbols, myths and ideologies. Such 
an analysis may lead to a better understanding of policy implications and responses.
It will be argued that reliance on uncritical, incomplete, inconsistent, and
9
contradictory notions concerning the practice of standardization and its products 
constrains policy options.
1.8 Scope of the Study
As previously stated, the purpose of this study is to establish an overall 
discursive framework—Digital Enclosure—within which the evolution of the global 
standardization system can be analyzed and clarified. This is not intended to be a 
history, but the study must rely on historical perspectives in order to understand the 
basis of the present system and its conflicts. Much cultural meaning is embedded in 
the institutions and practices of the standardization system, and therefore, this study 
visits enough history to establish the meaning of the important terms of discourse.
The various forms of Enclosure are many, and they are only briefly surveyed 
here in order to put the topic in perspective and to map the general landscape of 
standardization and of its Enclosure. One particular form of Enclosure, that of the 
emergence of private consortia, is the primary focus of this study. This is a 
qualitative study, which attempts to identify representative sample documents and 
discourses for detailed analysis, guided by the experience of the researcher. Such 
discourses are chosen because of the influential nature of their authors and/or their 
audiences and because they address key issues. They are not chosen because of any 
statistical or proportional representation of opinion in the field. This study does not 
seek to provide final answers or policies, but to be exploratory and guiding in its 
conclusions, and to identify issues and improve clarity for those concerned with 
policy-making in the standards arena.
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1.9 Structure of the Dissertation
The study will begin in Chapter 2 with a broad historical background on 
standards and standardization practice. This history will begin with a broad overview 
based on historical practice, provide a definition of standards, offer a description of 
the structure of the international system and how it emerged, and finally focus on the 
U.S. system and its significant structural and ideological divergence from the 
European and international standardization system.
In Chapter 3, the study will review the literature and discourses that inform 
the study, pertinent to its central questions, including the relevant discourses on 
Enclosure and on standards and standardization. These discourses establish the key 
concepts, terms and arguments that will be later explored.
In Chapter 4. the paper will then examine the theoretical and methodological 
approaches taken in the study. This examination will include discourse analysis, as it 
is to be applied here, the relationship between theory and method, relevant discourses 
and social practices, theoretical perspectives on discourse and on the public sphere, 
theories of rhetoric and discourse, and political economy. The basic research 
questions are then established.
In Chapter 5, the study will situate the discourse and identify and attempt to 
establish meanings for certain essential terms of the discourse—namely, public, 
private and open. From the perspective provided by examining such terms and their 
meanings, the paper will, in Chapter 6, review the institutional history of the principal
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international organizations that form the basis of the traditional global standardization 
system, the ITU, ISO, and IEC.
In Chapter 7, the paper will then proceed to an analysis of certain actual 
discourses and argumentation around standardization and consortia. Finally, in 
Chapter 8, the study will state its results, draw conclusions, make recommendations, 
identify its limitations, suggest areas and paths for further research, and make several 
observations.
1.10 T arget audience
This study is intended to help elucidate the debate over the role of standards 
institutions and their reform. By examining the discourse around enclosure and 
standardization, it may be possible to bring a deeper understanding of the arguments 
and their terminology. Hopefully, this analysis will be useful to those engaged in 
standardization practice and in public policy discourse, including policy makers, 
industry leaders, and academic researchers. Also, it is hoped that the study can make 
a contribution to the expanding field of standards research. In particular, this study 
seeks to establish the term enclosure and Enclosure Theory as a framework for 
further study and analysis in this field.
1.11 Perspective of the researcher
This researcher has undertaken this study from a perspective of twenty years 
of active personal involvement in the standardization process as an engineer, and of 
having served in various capacities from participant to committee chair and secretary 
in various standards bodies. This involvement began in 1983 when I started
12
participating in the EIA (Electronic Industries Association)11 CEBus Committee 
(Consumer Electronic Bus), a project to develop and standardize a low-cost 
communication network for the home. Initially, my involvement was out of 
commercial motivation—the need to establish technical standards in order to build a 
business. Over time, however, the process became an object of personal interest and, 
ultimately, a focus of academic research.
This interest was due to many factors. One was the rich forum standardization 
practice provided among technical peers for the exchange of ideas and as a window 
on advancing technology. Another was the exposure that participation provided to 
other cultures and to other ways of thinking. Most importantly, however, were the 
insights that it gave me on the process of interpersonal, inter-organizational, and 
cross-cultural communication and decision making. A striking factor was a 
recognition of the importance of standardization as a form of industrial decision­
making and public policy formation. But, in spite of its importance, it is practiced in 
relative obscurity, out of all proportion to its influence in shaping technology and to 
the high stakes it holds for businesses, consumers and society as a whole.
Throughout my experience, I have observed significant changes in 
standardization practice and have been disappointed in some recent trends that 
suggest a risk to or abandonment of the basic principles of openness and democracy 
to which the more traditional standardization process aspired and attempted to 
institutionalize. Although these principles may never have been fully realized in 
practice, at least they were memorialized and available to serve as a reference model 
for policy-making and analysis. Recently, I have seen short-term economic priorities
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and market logic progressively erode financial support for the practice within the 
United States, while others have been able to turn the practice to their own beneficial 
purposes on a global scale.
My “insider” perspective has enabled me to access key elements of the 
discourse, both verbal and written, and to contextually assess their relative 
importance in ways that an outside observer could not. I was able to make use of my 
own knowledge, familiarity and contacts to get past many of the barriers that exist for 
outsiders conducting such a study. For example, I was privileged to participate in 
candid discussions that guided my research and analysis for the study in a manner that 
would not have been available to an outsider.
1.12 Conclusion
The title of this study, The Privatization o f Standardization: The Enclosure o f  
Knowledge and Policy in the Age o f Digital Information, seeks to reflect the 
intersection of one body of discourse with another in the context of the current digital 
age. But the title is somewhat problematic in itself, and is intended to be provocative. 
What is privatization? What is meant by standards? This is an attempt to better 
define these terms. This study assumes a discursive position and then attempts to 
identify any consequences and implications.
Enclosure is a reference to the oppositional discourse about a commons or 
public domain that is at risk of being enclosed. Digital is a reference to the digital 
age—the age of ICT—where the term digital economy refers to an economy based 
more on knowledge and information than on physical assets. Schiller uses the term in
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this meaning in his book, Digital Capitalism. (Schiller 2000) And, for different ends, 
Negroponte in Being Digital makes a similar usage. (Negroponte 1995) Digital is also 
a reference to the 2nd enclosure movement as a metaphor of the earlier land or spatial 
enclosure, to contrast the present digital (knowledge or idea) enclosure with the 1st 
spatial (land) enclosure12.
In other words, the 2nd enclosure is the Digital Enclosure—enclosure in the 
digital age. It is a reconfiguration of the spatial logic of the 1st enclosure movement 
into the digital or information age where ideas and knowledge become privatized, 
compelling entry into a particular social relation, preempting alternative spaces (i.e., 
the commons), and where capitalism establishes proprietary access to information 
which can be accumulated.
Discourse reflects cultural values. Culture shapes technology. Discourse 
shapes policy decisions. This project seeks to explore and understand a specific 
current issue, that of standardization privatized by consortia. It undertakes this 
exploration by looking at the discourse and language—the words and their culturally 
embedded meaning—and the conditions of the discourse—the institutional setting in 
which the discourse proceeds—in order to establish how meaning in this particular 
debate is rhetorically constructed. It also seeks to cast this debate within a broader 
social and economic context—to bring greater clarity to standards and standardization 
within society.
1 Although this study focuses mainly on standardization within the field of ICT, the principles 
and issues explored here are applicable generally to all other fields. The ICT field, being fast moving 
and contentious, is where some o f  the stresses on the standards system have been the greatest.
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2 Voluntary consensus means 1) compliance with the standard is voluntary, and 2) a consensus 
process was used to establish the standard. In the context of the United States standardization system, 
the term voluntary also implies a non-governmental institutional basis.
J “Formal” institutions and practices here refers to established non-governmental or quasi- 
governmental national, regional and international standards developing organizations (SDOs) and SDO 
accrediting bodies; these formal institutions include such organizations as ANSI (American National 
Standards Institute), ISO (International Standards Organization), ITU (International 
Telecommunications Union), IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission), and many others.
4 The term ideas is borrowed from Lessig (2001) and is used in a broad sense. It encompasses 
any product or manifestation o f human intellect including texts, writings, musical compositions, art, 
artifacts, inventions, and technical standards and specifications.
5 The analogy to land enclosure is drawn by Boyle (2001).
6 The discourse is oppositional because it challenges the prevailing dominant discourse about 
ideas, ownership, and the relationship between innovation, property and market based production; and 
about the nature of the commons, freedom, openness, the free market and intellectual property rights.
7 The term code is borrowed from Lessig (1999).
8 The term intellectual property is deeply problematic, as will be expanded further later in this
study.
9 The EEE situation has been described by Van Houweiling (2002) and will be further 
discussed later. It describes how standards may become a takeover target by private corporations 
(private appropriation); standardization can also be a takeover target—suggesting the question; what 
assurance is there of “openness” if there is no accountability or no legitimation?
10 These particular documents were selected because, based on the experience o f the author, 
they represent influential and respected sources, and they provide articulate expressions of the basic 
rhetorical arguments.
11 Subsequently renamed the Electronic Industries Alliance
12 The use of spatial metaphors in the digital information economy can be complex, 
challenging and problematic. For an interesting discourse on this topic, see the recent and related 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (TPRC) papers by Hunter (2002) and Lemley
(2002).
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In tracing the theoretic history of weights and measures to their 
original elements in the nature and the necessities of man, we 
have found linear measure with individual existence; superficial, 
capricious, itinerary measure, and decimal arithmetic, with 
domestic society; weights and common standards with civil 
society; money, coins and all the elements o f uniform metrology, 
with civil government and law; arising in succession and 
parallel progression together.
—John Quincy Adams, 1821
CHAPTER 2 
Standards and Standardization Practice
Technical standards have always played a vital role in the development of 
industrial society. Historically, standards can be traced to origins in the invention of 
currency and in early human activities such as warfare, trade and printing—and in 
societies as diverse as ancient China and Rome. For example, Venetian war galleys 
were mass produced: The size, fittings, ropes and even oars were all standardized and 
interchangeable. (Cargill 1997, p. 18) Through history, standardization evolved as a 
social practice and it tends to reflect the particular political and economic culture 
involved.
The key to the process was that there was a substantial economic 
advantage to be gained from creating and using a standard. One would like to 
believe that somewhere there was someone who sat down and thought this 
out, but it probably occurred over several generations. (Cargill 1997, p. 16)
Although a detailed history of standardization practice1 is beyond of the scope of this 
treatment, this chapter will attempt to briefly acquaint the reader with the historical
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context, taxonomy, terminology and present landscape of the global system of 
technical standardization.
Beginning from a broad sense, the term standard may be defined as:
... something established by authority, custom, or general consent as a 
model or example, . . .something set up and established by authority as a rule 
for the measure of quantity, weights, extent, value or quality. (Webster’s 
1977, p. 1133.
Upon further examination, however, numerous other specific definitions may 
be found, depending on one’s disciplinary perspective or purpose. Of particular 
relevance here is a more strict sense of the term determined by the nature of the 
authority mentioned above and the legitimacy thus conferred. Formalists will assert 
that standards are distinct from specifications (which have less legitimacy). For 
example, a formal international standard definition of “standard” is a:
“ .. .document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized 
body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for activities for their results, aimed at the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order in a given context. (ISO/IEC 1996, sec. 3.2)
Variability in the meaning and precision of the term standard is an important 
factor in how the entire topic is discursively constructed and how various interests are 
served by its use—an issue recognized in an OTA (Office of Technology 
Assessment) study.
The choice of definitions has major policy implications. How the term 
“standards” is used in this study, for example, determines the terms of the 
debate and the range of government options developed for dealing with 
problems in the standard setting process. (Congress 1992, p. 5)
In any case, it is important to recognize that technical standards are not value- 
free— a n  idea that technologists may be often remiss or reluctant to acknowledge. It
has been noted that, “...we do not discover a problem ‘out there,’ we make a choice 
about how we want to formulate a problem. That choice reflects certain values and in 
turn constrains the realm of possible solutions.” (Cheit 1990, p. 150)
2.1 Overview of the Standardization System
Today, the world of technical standardization is a global but arcane and 
diverse societies of experts and various interests engaged in setting standards for 
virtually every aspect of our modem industrial/information society. Standardization 
engages tens of thousands of individuals that travel widely and confer on a vast range 
of issues. These issues are mostly technical, but more and more often bridge into the 
policy realm as society moves into an increasingly technology-dependent social and 
commercial environment (e.g., issues such as privacy, security, quality, 
environmental management, consumer policy, etc.).
Standardization however, is wholly a social practice that has gradually 
developed through pragmatic commercial and social necessity, not through any 
theoretical impetus. It found its modem origins in the demands of trade, commerce 
and manufacturing brought on by the industrial revolution. Metrology standards 
(e.g., weights, measures, etc.) were a necessity of early exchange, transportation and 
trade, and the introduction of mass production depended completely on industrial 
standardization of components, measurements and materials.
Standards have also been used for political and economic purposes of 
exclusion, domination or protection. Eastern European railroad gauges were 
deliberately chosen to be incompatible across certain borders for the strategic purpose
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of impeding potential military invasion. In modern times, television broadcasting 
standards were deliberately chosen to stake out trade blocks and avoid domination by 
outside manufacturers or transmitters. An even better illustration may be the choice 
of telephone and electrical plugs that were designed to protect national manufacturing 
industries. The telephone signaling and the electrical distribution systems were 
designed to be compatible, but the plugs and connectors were gratuitously 
incompatible. (Farance 2002)2
Today, the globalization of economic and industrial production and the 
dramatic acceleration of the pace of technoloical development have severely stressed 
the conventional institutions and formal practices3 upon which standardization 
practice was previously based. These institutions, traditionally dependent largely on 
income from publishing standards, have found their economic basis undermined by 
the Internet and the ascendancy of electronic document distribution. They have also 
found themselves somewhat eclipsed, particularly in certain industries such as 
information technology (i.e., computing) by private consortia and forums that have 
been able to move more rapidly and more responsively to the demands of accelerated 
competitive markets, mobile capital and shortened product lifetimes. Another stress 
exacerbated by globalization has been certain regional cultural and institutional 
differences in views and traditions about the basic role of standardization in a market 
economy. As a European Commission official expressed this conflict, “In Europe 
Standards are not just documents thrown into the market to compete with each 
other...as if they were merely a ‘product’.” (Vardakis 1998)
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2.2 Taxonomy of Standards
Standards
I------------------------- -^----------------------------- 1
Technical Standards Metrology Standards
I -^------------------------ 1
de facto (market) de jure (process)
f I I
Regulatory Formal Informal
(government) (accredited) (consortia)
Figure 2.1—Taxonomy of Standards
An overview of a taxonomy of standards is shown in Figure 2.1. Standards 
can be divided into metrology standards and technical standards.4 Metrology is the 
science of measurement. Such standards were initially developed to support systems 
of weights and measures for purposes of trade and commerce. Metrology standards 
often involve basic science5 (e.g., physics, chemistry), which can be quite expensive 
to establish, and thus were typically developed by scientific institutes funded by 
national governments. Responsibility for the government to “fix the standard for 
weights and measures” is embedded in the U.S. Constitution.6 In the United States, 
the National Bureau of Standards (presently NIST—National Institute for Standards 
and Technology) was established in 1901, as was the British Standards Association 
(predecessor to the present BSI— British Standards Institution). Although commerce 
benefited tremendously from the work of such organizations, the primary impetus for 
their creation was from science and engineering professionals and from 
government—not business.7 In Germany the Normalienausschus fur den
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Maschinenbau (predecessor to DIN— Deutsche Institute fur Normung) was 
established in 1917. The French may trace their standardization tradition back to 
Napoleon, but the Association Franqaise de Normalisation (AFNOR) was formally 
established in 1918.8 In more recent times, the role of these national institutions9 has 
changed and they have become more involved in technical standardization, the 
primary focus of this study.
Technical standardization, in contrast to metrology, has typically developed in 
a closer relationship with industry, including both manufacturers and users. 
Standardization tends to involve standards for product conformity10, interoperability, 
compatibility and adaptability, rather than for basic measurement. Once basic 
measurements were established, industry then needed to solve a set of problems more 
closely related to markets and product interoperability. In the United States, such a 
role fell primarily to private trade associations.11 In this country, the evolution of 
standards practice became heavily influenced by cultural and historical factors.
The current U.S. standards process was adopted at the turn of the century, 
as the Nation entered the industrial age. Its form reflects American political 
culture and the manner in which industrialization took place in the United 
States. In contrast to many other countries, where unified national standards 
bodies were established in conjunction with the State, standards development 
organizations in the United States first emerged in the private sector, in 
response to specific needs and concerns, [emphasis added] (Congress 1992, p. 
39)
The emphasis on the private sector and its specific needs and concern, has 
significant consequences, as will be seen in subsequent analysis, for the present 
discursive construction of standardization practice in the United States, and on its 
tensions with the rest of the world. American political culture firmly embeds the 
belief that the best way to serve public needs is through fostering private commercial
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interests. This approach is maifest in policy traditions such as “public interest, 
convenience, and necessity,” found in U.S. regulatory practice from its inception. 
(Rowland, 1997).
Technical standards can further be divided into regulatory, de facto, and 
consensus categories. Regulatory standards are those set directly by government and 
usually have to do with health, safety or other areas where legislators believe 
regulation is necessary—usually areas of a public good.n There is an increasing 
trend for government to rely, where possible, on standards set by standardization 
bodies, and then codified by regulatory agencies into administrative law. De facto 
standards are those set simply by usage or success in the marketplace. Usually they 
are first established in the form of some successful product or system by a dominant 
firm or organization in the market place, rather than by some formal process. 
Examples include Microsoft Windows™ or the VHS™ video cassette recording 
format standards. The term de jure  refers to those standards established by some 
formal process or procedure. Consensus standards are developed—agreed upon by 
negotiation— in what is generally referred to as the voluntary consensus process13 
under the auspices of formal standards bodies, either based in industry, trade, or 
professional associations, or in traditional international institutions. Consensus is 
defined as substantial agreement, not majority rule or unanimous agreement. What 
constitutes consensus is a topic that will receive further consideration later.
Consensus standardization can be further divided into formal or informal, 
depending on the legitimacy of the standardizing body. The formal bodies are often 
referred to as SDOs (Standards Developing Organizations) and informal bodies are
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referred to as SROs (Standards Related Organizations). This distinction is made 
largely by those in SDOs in order to claim superior legitimacy over non-SDOs. What 
confers such status of legitimacy is usually “accreditation” by a national body whose 
legitimacy is in turn usually conferred by a national government. In the case of 
certain international institutions (which may be considered a class of NGO—Non 
Governmental Organization), legitimacy rests upon tradition, acceptance and 
longevity. The issue of legitimacy and its conferral will be of central importance in 
the analysis of the discourse later in this study.
2.3 The International Landscape
While the national institutions were being established, an international 
framework of institutions was also developing. The oldest international standards 
institution is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which was 
established in 1886 in Geneva, Switzerland, and is now part of the United Nations.
The ITU, perhaps the first international intergovernmental organization, was founded 
as a treaty organization. Its initial purpose was primarily related to interconnection of 
telephone networks and radio communications—new technologies at the time. Until 
the 1980s, the telephone industry was dominated by nationally owned (or regulated, 
in the case of the United States) monopolies, and technical standardization served a 
quasi-governmental function, with participants acting as national government 
representatives. This situation has dramatically changed with the recent trend toward 
the privatization and deregulation of the telecommunications industry, the 
development of new technologies, and the convergence of telecommunications (i.e., 
telephony) with IT (Information Technology, i.e., computers). Such changes have
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dramatically affected participation in and processes and subject matter of ITU 
standardization. But, nevertheless, although perhaps ostensibly more open, the new 
processes still engaged primarily the former participants (e.g., governments and 
manufacturers) due to the substantial cost of participation and the need for specialized 
expertise.
Two other institutions are important features on the international landscape of 
standardization: the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) founded in 
1906, and the ISO (International Organization for Standardization) formed in 1947 as 
the post-World War II successor to the ISA (International Association for 
Standardization) founded in 1926. The IEC standardizes electrical and electronic- 
related topics and the ISO standardizes everything else. According to the ISO 
website (1999), the organization “ ...deals with the full spectrum of human activity 
and know-how, ranging from the specifications of dimensional characteristics of 
screw threads to the essential features of environmental management systems in 
companies.” The ISO estimates that 30,000 individual technical experts participate in 
its work in 2,850 various technical committees, subcommittees and working groups, 
and that “.. .there are, on average, a dozen ISO meetings taking place somewhere in 
the world every working day of the year.”(ISO 1999) The ISO and IEC are 
essentially sister organizations that share the same building in Geneva, located across 
the street from the ITU building.
With the development of computing and the need to standardize an increasing 
variety of interfaces and software functions, the ISO and IEC formed a joint 
organization in 1986 known as the JTC1 (Joint Technical Committee 1) for
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information technology standards. JTC1 took over management of all computer 
related ISO (e.g., software) and IEC (e.g., hardware) standards work. Now, with the 
convergence of telecommunication and computers, the complexity of coordinating 
work among the ISO, IEC, JTC1 and ITU has become additionally challenging. All 
four organizations operate under different organizational structures and different 
governing directives.
Additional forums on the international landscape are the regional institutions, 
particularly in Europe. CEN (Comite Europeen de Normalisation) and CENELEC 
(Comite Europeen de Normalisation Electrotechnique) were formed in 1965 with the 
intention to mirror ISO and IEC work,14 but are limited to European participants. The 
CEN encompasses not only official national bodies, but also certain trade associations 
such as ECMA (European Computer Manufacturers Association). In 1988 the EC 
(European Commission) established ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute) to focus on telecommunications and IT standardization. The ETSI differs 
significantly from other such bodies in that its membership is more heterogeneous, 
providing for multiple classes of membership, including manufacturers, 
administrations, phone network operators, users, and researchers. It operates in some 
ways like a consortium, funding and staffing its own technical work rather than 
relying entirely on volunteers.
Some other regional groups, although more loosely organized than in Europe, 
are PASC (Pacific Area Standards Congress) and COPANT (Pan American Standards 
Commission). The ITU, ISO, and IEC will be examined in more detail in a later
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chapter. The European national and regional system as well as the international 
systems stand in contrast to the system that evolved in the United States.
2.4 Divergent Systems and Cultures
Standardization practice developed in a much different direction in the United 
States than did those in Europe and the rest of the world. This difference has been 
attributed to a variety of cultural, political, and economic factors. On the lower levels 
of standardization activity (i.e., the working group or technical committee level), both 
Europe and the United States adopted a consensus approach, with standards being 
negotiated in a relatively open process among various experts and interested parties, 
usually in face-to-face meetings. On the higher levels, however, U.S. and European 
practices diverged dramatically. One reason was economics. In the period of rapid 
industrial development, the United States enjoyed a domestic market that was large 
enough to sustain mass production, while Europeans were dependent on inter-country 
trade to support any large scale production. “From the beginning, therefore,
European standards organizations were viewed as part of the industrial 
infrastructure...and geared their operations toward trade promotion. Moreover, 
European governments generally pursued active industrial policies.” (Congress 1992, 
p. 61) Thus, the economic merges with the cultural. Meanwhile, the aversion in the 
United States to anything that smacks of industrial policy has it roots deep in 
American political culture. Katzenstein (1985, p. 19) notes:
...America’s national debate on industrial policy betrays the strength of a 
liberal ideology. We conceive of the political alternatives that confront us as 
polar opposites: market or plan. The biases of our ideology are reinforced by 
a veritable national obsession with Japan, a country that American
28
businessmen in particular view as a statist antidote to America’s ideological 
celebration of market competition.
Our political debate typically pits the proponents of government against 
the advocates of market competition. Fundamentally the debate concerns the 
character of state involvement in the economy.
In American standards discourse, this indicates how economic policies are 
reflected in cultural beliefs. In regard to industrial policy, it not unusual to hear 
references to the commonplace that government should not “pick winners and losers,” 
presumably because this ought to be the sole domain of the “market.” Such rhetoric 
puts standardization on the defensive, insofar as it lies somewhere between the 
government (or public) and the market.15 Setting standards might be seen as picking 
winners and losers.
In contrast, Katzenstein characterizes German standardization as a 
“corporatist” approach (1985, p. 19):
Democratic corporatism is distinguished with three traits: an ideology of 
social partnership expressed at the national level; a relatively centralized and 
concentrated system of interest groups; and voluntary and informal 
coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political bargaining 
between interest groups, state bureaucracies and political parties. These traits 
make for low-voltage politics.
Another point of higher level divergence is the tendency for European 
standards to take on a quasi-legal character. Once established, they tend to later 
acquire the force of law as if they were regulatory standards, and thus may become 
mandatory rather than voluntary. Hence, one finds much in American standards 
discourse about the voluntary consensus process, in juxtaposition with the European 
process, although Europeans will often protest, insisting that their standards are also 
voluntary.
The American aversion to industrial planning is not merely drawn from a 
belief in competition and markets, but also from a deep-seated mistrust of 
government. In his seminal study on American culture, American Exceptionalism, 
Lipset finds America, “...much more individualistic, meritocratic-oriented, and anti­
statist than peoples elsewhere. Hence the values which form the context for public 
policy are quite different from those in other developed countries” (1996, p. 22)
American politicians generally profess some level of mistrust of government. 
Lipset traces this recurring theme to America’s roots as a society bom in revolution, 
and, citing Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci, to an ability “...to avoid the remnants 
of mercantilism, statist regulations, church establishment, aristocracy and the 
emphasis on social class that postfeudal societies inherited.” (p. 54)
Lipset’s analysis also helps to explain American aversion to socialism and a 
reluctance to support social welfare programs or a strong labor movement. (Steinmo 
1994) In American policy discourse, a sharp dichotomy is drawn between the public 
sector and the private sector, where public sector means government, and private 
sector is everything else. As will be examined later, this prevalent rhetorical 
dichotomy is superficial, limiting, confusing and problematic, yet mythically 
pervasive.16 In popular political discourse, it is often said the most important thing 
that the public sector can do is to “stay out of the way” (of business, commerce, the 
economy, etc.). It is ironic to note that in spite of such mythic rhetoric, the 
government has actually played an enormous role in American economic life and has 
done so through de facto industrial policy in almost every major infrastructure such as
the development of the railroads, the oil industry, aviation, telephony, highways and, 
most recently, the Internet and its initial technical standards.
Another point that may be taken from American Exceptionalism is the 
American propensity toward a winner-take-all approach in the structuring of the 
country’s political and economic system. Standardization is basically a cooperative 
enterprise directed at the creation of a public good or a commons, and may likely be 
displaced in any perceived contest with market competition, individualism or 
freedom.
2.5 The U.S. Standardization System
The above-mentioned cultural factors have contributed to the creation of a 
standardization system in the United States that is based on private industry 
associations and professional societies, with only a minimal role for government. The 
formal system is structured around ANSI (American National Standards Institute), the 
self-appointed “private sector” membership association (now referring to itself as a 
“federation”) that was founded in 1918. It accredits all other standards bodies, 
publishes standards and coordinates U. S. representation internationally in the ISO 
and IEC (although not in the ITU where this function still formally resides with the 
Department of State). This celebrated commitment to a private vs. a government 
leadership role sometimes obscures the fact that ANSI was initially formed by a 
combination of government agencies and engineering societies. Government- 
established policies, meanwhile, played a major role in shaping ANSI and the 
voluntary consensus process. Although today ANSI has no formal relationship with 
the U.S. Government, it does in a sense act on its behalf and does receive some
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funding.17 ANSI, in this quasi-public role, administers and accredits a system of 
international TAGs (Technical Advisory Groups) that meet and develop “U.S. 
Positions” to be represented at international meetings of the technical committees and 
working groups for ISO, IEC and JTC1. (ANSI 2001a)18
An important factor shaping the structure of the U.S. voluntary consensus 
system and validating the legitimacy of the ANSI accreditation role was the NTTA A 
(National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act) signed into law in 1996.
(NIST 1998) This legislation enabled and encouraged government agency 
participation in accredited standards committees and encouraged the use of such 
standards as an alternative to regulatory rule-making and in government procurement 
processes (ANSI 2001, p. 10) This factor has become a focus of rhetoric in the 
discourse on further enclosure of standardization that will be considered later in this 
study.
The role of accreditation is particularly important. ANSI does not create 
standards— it accredits other standards bodies, i.e., SDOs, by maintaining a set of 
principles of conduct and detailed procedures to support them. These principles are 
contained in a recent ANSI annual report:
Open—any materially affected and interested party has the ability to 
participate
Balanced—The standards development process should have a balance of 
interests and participants from diverse interest categories shall be 
sought
Due Process—All objections shall have an attempt made towards their
resolution. Interests who believe they have been treated unfairly shall 
have a right to appeal.
Consensus—More than a majority, but not necessarily unanimity. (ANSI 
2001, p. 4)
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2.5.1 Principles
The above principles are codified by ANSI and by its accredited bodies in 
documents generally called “procedures” (ANSI 2002a) and there is a great deal of 
similarity among them, although there are many variations in procedure. The 
procedures are also very similar to those used by the ISO, IEC and JTC1, where they 
are codified in operational “directives.” Generally speaking, the ANSI principles 
mentioned above are operationalized in the following way:
Openness—Meetings are “open door” and any “materially interested,” or 
"materially affected” party may attend (if they pay their own travel expenses) whether 
or not they are members of the sponsoring trade association or group. Some meetings 
ask attendees to pay nominal fees to help cover meeting expenses (duplication, 
catering, hotel meeting rooms, etc.). Meeting notices, agendas and any important 
working documents must be publicly distributed and/or posted well ahead of the 
meeting date. Minutes of meetings must be distributed in a timely manner.
Committee documents are posted on websites and may or may not be password 
protected. This practice varies widely, but if passwords are required, they are often 
provided to anyone (materially interested) that asks.19
Balance—A variety of interests should be involved in the activity, particularly 
competing interests, and the committee must make an effort to engage such broad 
participation. For instance, participation should include not only manufacturers, but 
also users, consumer representatives, relevant government agencies, and academic or 
scientific institutions, depending on the subject matter involved.
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Due Process—All views are considered. When committee documents are 
distributed for balloting, all negative votes must state a reason for opposition and also 
state what is needed to reverse a negative vote. Subsequently, the committee must 
consider and answer all negative comments, even if sufficient supporting ballots 
(always significantly more than a simple majority) are already available to consider 
the document approved. Any party that believes it has been adversely affected by the 
final outcome must be provided with a right and procedure to appeal.
Consensus—Decisions are reached by group consensus or general agreement, 
sometimes called “substantial agreement,” a process described in the ISO/IEC Guide
2 as
.. .characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues 
by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that involves 
seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile 
any conflicting arguments. (ISO/IEC 1996, sec. 1.7)
2.5.2 Accreditation
A benefit of the legitimacy conferred upon standards bodies by ANSI 
accreditation is a substantial protection from potential anti-trust challenges for their 
participants in standardization activities, and their cooperation with competitors. 
Accredited standards committees are one of the few forums where competitors can 
legally collaborate and exchange information, as long as certain topics are not 
discussed—notably pricing. This opportunity suggests another benefit of 
participation in such committees. It can provide participating individuals with a 
window on new technological developments and perhaps some indications of 
competitors’ future plans and directions (sometimes called technical or business
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intelligence). Conversely, non-accredited activities may run a higher risk of an anti­
trust challenge.
2.5.3 The Sectoral Approach
The U.S. system is organized on a vertical model around specific industry 
sectoral trade associations rather than on a horizontal national or regional body model 
that is found almost everywhere else. In other words, ANSI accredits hundreds of 
trade associations that actually sponsor the standards work through thousands of
committees the institute organizes to deal with defined problems in specific industry
20sectors. This structure stands in contrast to that existing outside the United States, 
where the organization of standardization activity crosses industry sectors and 
attempts to standardize on the basis of general principles. For example, in the United 
States, noise standards might be set separately by the associations of various machine 
manufacturers or users (e.g., chain saws, milling machines, motorcycles, and fire 
alarms), whereas in Europe, such standards might be set by a general environmental 
noise level committee or a safety committee. In another hypothetical example, meat 
processing standards might be established independently by poultry producers, 
fishing equipment manufacturers, or beef growers, whereas in Europe, such standards 
might be more centralized in a single or among a smaller number of committees that 
deal with meat processing as a whole.
Simply put, it is generally understood that the U.S. approach prefers to deal 
with the specific needs and problems of a given industry sector, whereas the 
European system seeks to address standardization needs on the basis of overriding 
principles. This difference may also be characterized as application vs. principle; or
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results vs. system. In cultural terms, it may be viewed from a commercial vs. societal 
perspective. In any case, this difference has become a central issue o f conflict 
between the United States and other, particularly European, countries. The arguments 
are based on deeply embedded cultural beliefs and practices. This issue and the 
sectoral approach discourse w ill be examined more closely later. In general, it is 
interesting to note there is a recurring American tendency to focus on targeted 
solutions rather than on overriding principles. This tendency can be found in the 
realms o f  standardization, regulation and legislation. (Schoechle 1998) The sectoral 
discourse is brought forward prominently in a broad policy document, ANSI’s 
National Standards Strategy fo r  the United States. (ANSI 2000)
2.5.4 National Standards Strategy
Insofar as U.S. industry has any formal standards-setting policy, it is 
embodied in a very carefully crafted fourteen-page paper known as the National 
Standards Strategy fo r  the United States. The document was developed by a 
consensus o f  the ANSI membership and adopted by the ANSI Board o f Directors in 
August 2000. A detailed analysis o f  this discourse will be made later, but it is 
interesting to note that the document reveals on its first page the confusing usage of 
two different meanings for the word sector: public sector vs. private sector, meaning 
government and non-government or industry sector or market sector. In such context 
the document includes the statement, “Most standards are related to specific sectors 
(e.g., information technology, automotive) and are not applicable to other sectors.” 
Although this is a problematic claim  at best, it is a key to understanding some o f the 
current divergent discourse on standardization.
\The National Standards Strategy sets forth a fairly coherent set of policies and 
ideals to address the future of the U.S. standards system both domestically and 
internationally. Along with its 2001 annual report, (ANSI 2002) ANSI issued an 
Implementation Report on the National Standards Strategy. Furthermore, at its 
annual conference, the institute positioned this Strategy document as one of its most 
significant recent accomplishments21. The original Strategy and its subsequent 
Report provide a basic discursive re-construction of the U.S. standards system and 
offer important clues to the meaning of many of the words, phrases and policies that 
have become problematic or confusing.
In a sense, ANSI is caught in a quandary. Its constituents do not believe in 
industrial policy but are reluctant to provide adequate market-based support for their 
own common good. ANSI membership is declining, as are its publishing revenues.
This latter consequence threatens its basic mission which urges the broadest possible 
distribution and use of technical standards documents. At the same time, ANSI is 
pursuing an increasingly crucial international mission on behalf of U.S. industry in 
the global economy as it faces a strong, coherent, standards-based European industrial 
policy. The U.S. government, it should be understood, provides minimal financial 
support because of an historical commitment to a free market ideology. As a result, 
the Strategy might be seen as an effort to reconcile these conflicting factors (i.e., 
balance both a public and private agenda) and to gently coax its members into the 
beginnings of supporting an industrial policy. For this reason alone, the two ANSI 
doucments are an interesting piece of rhetoric and object of analysis.
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A driving force behind ANSI initiatives as well as adaptation of the global 
standardization system, is the process of globalization, the integration of economic 
and cultural practices that is a result in large part of the commercial and 
organizational application of information and communication technologies, including 
the global Internet. One of the most influential manifestations of this force has been 
the WTO (World Trade Organization) and its policies regarding Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT). The interdependence of economics, trade, and financial markets has 
made it virtually impossible for any country or government to act unilaterally, and 
admission to the global trading club requires conformance with WTO rules.22 TBT 
policies require the dismantling of often long established practices of sustaining non­
tariff trade barriers in the form of national or regional technical standards that limit 
foreign competition. Discourse about TBT played a prominent role at the recent 
ANSI annual conference, in part because it introduced a relatively new dimension of 
standardization—that of Conformity Assessment (CA) and certification processes— 
to demonstrate and facilitate TBT policy compliance. TBT policy also plays a visible 
role in the discourse because various standards bodies, both national and regional, 
have reacted in differing ways.
One interesting example is the Peoples Republic of China. The Chinese have 
moved with remarkable speed to embrace WTO policies and to bring themselves into 
the realm of global standards practice. It has been noted recently that in Beijing, local 
bookstores stock literature on ISO and IEC standards, and taxicabs commonly display 
ISO 900023 compliance advertising on their seat-backs.24
2.5.5 IT vs. Telecom Standardization and the Rise of Consortia
The final (and for this study most germane) phase of the structuring of 
standardization practice in the United States and globally was the emergence of a new 
institutional paradigm, the consortia, sometimes referred to as MDCs (Market-Driven 
Consortia). To understand the cultural roots of consortia, it is useful to briefly 
examine the history of the Telecom and IT industries.
Telecommunication standardization is one of the oldest institutionalized 
industrial practices. It developed in a culture of highly regulated monopolies within a 
relatively slow-moving and non-competitive utility industry dedicated to the 
provision of reliable voice telephony service and primarily concerned with issues of 
network stability. This involved negotiated pricing, quality of service and the 
interoperability of national networks. In the United States until the early 1980s, 
technical standards were set by AT&T (i.e., Bell Laboratories) and then negotiated 
internationally by the ITU. With the divestiture of the Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (RBOCs) from AT&T in 1984, Telecom standardization was opened to 
the voluntary consensus process. Concomitantly, the Committee T l25 was established 
for network standards and the TIA undertook primary responsibility for setting 
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) standards. Both of these were ANSI accredited 
bodies.
In contrast to Telecom, IT standardization grew up in the computer and 
semiconductor industries, a fast moving and highly competitive (traditionally 
unregulated) industrial culture. Although the industry was dominated initially by 
IBM Corporation, and de facto  standardization prevailed, technological advances and
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entrepreneurs overtook IBM’s dominance by the early 1970s by introducing the 
minicomputer and then the microcomputer. One might contrast the cultural values of 
the Telecom and the IT industries as that of cooperation vs. competition, monopoly 
vs. market, stability vs. change26, and interoperability vs. differentiation.
As this new culture sought to break away from IBM’s de facto standards and 
pursue its own “open systems”27 standardization (Cargill 1997), the new culture was 
never very comfortable in the bureaucratic and politically defined Telecom standards 
regime. Nor was it very comfortable in the relaxed culture of other industry’s 
traditional standardization practices where markets were stable and the pace of 
technological change was relatively slow. As a result, new organizations began to 
form outside of, or on the doorstep of the formal structure. They became known as 
“private forums or consortia.”28 The cultural motivation for this change is colorfully 
portrayed by Cargill (1997, p. 69-70) who was an active participant.
The current standardization model, especially that used by participants in 
the SDOs, is fundamentally broken. The current model is based upon a myth; 
[like the one] which is part of French national folklore, ...captured in the 
Chanson de Roland, written in the eleventh century...which became a 
powerful agent for coalescing [the] movement [that established] the French 
King. .. .Roland served as an ideal for concepts of loyalty to a king, as well as 
the dues and obligations of both warriors and the king.
In a similar manner, the concept of “Open Systems” has become a 
convenient icon to express all that is good about computing and the promise 
that computing can hold. It, too, has undergone significant shifts in its 
meaning,...[now, yet another] new iconic meaning is emerging.
Such new meaning ultimately took the form of a divergence into a broad array of 
groups and institutional practices that are now variously referred to as SROs, MDCs, 
forums, and/or consortia. Some examples of such groups are the IETF (Internet 
Engineering Task Force), W3C (World Wide Web Consortium), ATM Forum
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(Asynchronous Transfer M ode), UPnP Forum (Universal Plug 6n Play), and the Open 
Group. The rules, procedures and practices under which these groups operate 
(including their publicness) varies widely. The only commonality they share is that 
they lie outside the formalist domain described earlier, where they strive to claim and 
enclose their own, more private, realms. They purport to answer the problems o f  
obscurity, com plexity, im plem entation difficulty, and, above all, slowness o f  the 
traditional system.
2.6 Conclusion
It is within this dynam ic and rapidly changing global historical, cultural and 
institutional framework o f  standardization practice that this study proceeds. In 
particular, this inquiry seeks to explore and understand the rhetorical construction o f  
legitim acy by the diverse set o f  new  institutions and organizations known as 
consortia. Their discursive interaction with their predecessors. In order to do so, it is 
useful to survey in the next chapter the literature and discourse on enclosure and on 
standardization, and on the historical and econom ic context within which these 
discourses are conducted.
1 Interesting historical treatments on standards may be found in Congress (1992), and Cargill
(1997).
2 In an operational sense, within standards development, harmonization is the removal of 
gratuitous incompatibilities. (Farance 2002)
3 Formal institutions and practices here refers to established non-governmental national, 
regional and international standards developing organizations (SDOs) and SDO accrediting bodies; 
these formal institutions include organizations such as ANSI (American National Standards Institute), 
ISO (International Standards Organization), ITU (International Telecommunications Union), IEC 
(International Electrotechnical Commission), and many others.
4 This is actually the distinction between measurement standards and normative documents.
Measurement standards are also technical. English uses the same word, standard, for both. In French,
etalon is a measuerment standard and norme is a normative document. A similar situation exists in
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Russian. (Farance 2002) In common English usage, however, the term technical standard has become 
established in this regard. Technical Standard is defined in the basic law covering Federal 
Procurement with respect to standardization: Public Law 104-113, the National Technology Transfer 
and Advancement Act o f1995. The applicable section of PL 104-113 is Section 12 (d) Utilization o f  
Consensus Technical Standards by Federal Agencies; Reports, The fourth subsection, 12 (d) (4) 
provides a definition of standards as: “the term ‘technical standards’ means performance-based or 
design-specific technical specifications and related management systems”.
Technical standards (normative documents) also can involve basic science (ISO Guide 31— 
Quantities and Units). A more basic distinction between the two is that metrology standards involve 
laboratory practice, while ISO Guide 31 involves knowledge of industry and scientific practice. 
(Farance 2002)
6 Section 8, Clause 5.
7 Engineering professionals (employed in part by business) were the people that faced the 
technical problems (particularly in the rapidly growing electrical industries of the day); and 
governments saw standards as a “public good.”
8 Other national institutions include Denmark’s DS (Dansk Standardisenngsrad), The 
Netherlands NNI (Nederlands Normalisatie Instituut), Italy’s UNI (Ente Nazionale Italiano di 
unificazione), Greece’s ELOT (Hellenic Organization for Standardization), Belgium’s IBN (Institut 
Beige de Normalisation) and Norway’s NEK (Norsk Elektroteknisk Komite).
; The United States is an exception. While these national institutions evolved to undertake 
sponsorship of domestic standards activity, legitimation of standards bodies and representation of 
national interests internationally, the United States drew a sharp distinction between government and 
private activity. Standardization leadership responsibility fell to an industry association, ANSI 
(American National Standards Institute). While NIST remains more focused on science and 
metrology, it is actively engaged as a participant in technical standardization activities. See 
<http://www.ansi.org/> and <http://www.nist.gov/>.
10 Conformity is closely associated with the term conformity assessment, which often also 
involves measurement. (Farance 2002)
11 As will be discussed later, the term private and public are highly problematic in the 
discourse. It is interesting to ask: are trade associations private or public?
12 Such regulatory standards might include pharmaceuticals, auto safety regulations, food 
classification standards, agricultural inspection standards, electromagnetic emission limits and 
spectrum allocations. The term regulatory actually refers a distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary compliance requirements. (Farance 2002)
Voluntary consensus means 1) compliance with the standard is voluntary, and 2) a 
consensus process was used to establish the standard.
14 Some complain that this flow actually works the opposite way, with ISO and IEC work 
often mirroring CEN and CENELEC work. According to Tony Flood of the Canadian National 
Committee o f the IEC, CENELEC has a program to aggressively promote its work worldwide and 
frequently the “ ...CENELEC mantra overpowers everything else.” (Flood 2002)
15 A rhetorical irony: in ancient Greece, the marketplace was the agora, which was the 
essence of the public place. But in America, the market is a private place and the government is called
public.
16 Part of the problem is the way that contemporary discourse confuses the terms private and 
public. We speak of public schools, meaning government funded and operated, but we also speak of
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public broadcasting, meaning privately operated but funded by public contributions (with or without 
government help) or public houses (“pubs”) which are privately owned and operated, but open for 
patronage to the general public (in contrast to private clubs).
17 According to the 2001 ANSI Annual Report, out of $15 million in revenues, it received 
approximately $500,000 in Government (NIST) grants (primarily for international activity), and it paid 
over $1.5 million to ISO and IEC in annual dues.
18 ANSI doesn’t actually act formally on behalf of the U.S. Government. ITU is a treaty- 
based organization, so its members are countries, as represented by governments (although this 
membership structure is changing, as will be discussed later). ISO and IEC are non-treaty-based 
organizations, so its members are represented by nations. For many countries, there is no distinction 
between the government position and the national position. Forlhe United States, the State 
Department represents the government position in international fora, and ANSI represents the national 
position (i.e., industry) within international fora. (Farance 2002)
19 Access to working documents and websites, and the attitudes of participants and sponsors is 
an interesting topic in respect to what defines “open.” This will be explored in more detail later in this
research.
20 Some such associations are the EIA (Electronic Industries Alliance), TIA 
(Telecommunications Industry Association), ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigerating 
and Air-Conditioning Engineers), ITI Council (Information Technology Industries), ATIS (Alliance 
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions), SCTE (Society of Cable Telecommunications 
Engineers), ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials), ASME (American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers), IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), and NFPA (National 
Fire Protection Association).
21 The ANSI annual conference was held October 15-16, 2002 in Washington, DC.
22 The role of WTO and TBT should not be underestimated. A relevant reference is as
follows:
1. The following principles and procedures should be observed, when international standards, 
guides and recommendations (as mentioned under Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement 
for the preparation of mandatory technical regulations, conformity assessment procedures and 
voluntary standards) are elaborated, to ensure transparency, openness, impartiality and consensus, 
effectiveness and relevance, coherence, and to address the concerns of developing countries.
2. The same principles should also be observed when technical work or a part of the 
international standard development is delegated under agreements or contracts by international 
standardizing bodies to other relevant organizations, including regional bodies.
Source: “ANNEX 4, Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of 
International Standards, Guides and Recommendations, WTO TBT Triennial Review, WTO Committee 
on TBT, G/TBT/9; 11 November 2000, p. 24.
23 ISO 9000 is a family of standards for manufacturing quality management systems. It is a 
member of a relatively new class of standards known as technology management system standards, in 
contrast to technical standards for similarity, compatibility, interoperability, or adaptability. Another 
example of management system standards is the ISO 14000 family (environmental management
systems).
24 Comments made at the ANSI annual conference (October 15,2002) and personal 
observations of the author.
25 Committee T1 is now administered by ATIS (Alliance for Telecommunications Solutions).
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"6 Standards may be regarded historically as either agents of stability or as agents of change. 
(Cargill, 1997)
"7 Thus the term open became prominent in standards discourse, establishing a meaning that 
could be paraphrased as, “liberated from IBM’s proprietary de facto standards practice,” but still vague 
in other respects. Farance (2002) disagrees, commenting, “...open (even in the days of 1970's IBM 
mainframes and non-IBM disk drive vendors) means well-documented, i.e., a normative document (a 
standard or specification) that describes interfaces, interoperability, behavior, compatibility, etcT
It is interesting to note that in ancient Rome, a forum was the marketplace or public square 
of a city, the center of judicial and business affairs and a place of assembly for the people; or it was a 
public court or tribunal or other assembly for the discussion matters of public interest (Random House 
1967, p. 559)
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It’s the architecture, stupid!
—Lawrence Lessig, 2002
CHAPTER3 
The Global Context of Standardization
The purpose of this chapter is to situate this study in a global economic and 
social context, and to review the literature and discourses that inform this study and 
identify its objects of analysis. The discourse on enclosure and its key concepts is 
examined in some detail. The discourse on standards and standardization is briefly 
surveyed, but detailed analysis is left for later in the research and analysis covered in 
Chapter 7. The study is couched in an immediate discursive context and then in a 
greater economic, social, and historical context. Finally, the key relevant discourses 
are examined.
3.1 Immediate Context of the Study
One of the defining characteristics of the modern age is the uneasy and 
ambiguous dichotomy between the public and the private. Although contemporary 
policy discourse relies on these terms, it invariably fails to define them in any 
consistent or meaningful way. Habermas (1962) and Arendt (1958) in particular, 
have dealt with these terms and traced their historical usage from ancient Greece. A 
thorough treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this study, but it is important 
to visit the general topic and notice the conflicted and conflated use of the terms and
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underlying concepts, particularly how such use shapes and constrains thought and 
discourse.
One of the common ways of thinking about public and private, as noted 
earlier, is by spatial metaphor. The Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas1 grappled with 
this notion in the field o f urban design within the context of globalization, 
commercialization, and commodification.
The city used to be something that you get for free. It’s been a public 
space, and it enables the citizens to assemble in a kind of collective sense, but 
basically through the process, [sic] effects of the market economy and through 
the withdrawal o f the public sector and the kind of complimentary invasion of 
the private sector, which is expressed through shopping, the nature of the city 
has changed from something that is fundamentally free, to something that you 
have to pay for, so that even in educational establishments, even in religious 
establishments and certainly in cultural establishments there is always this 
kind of commercial presence... [the cathedral, the museum] the economies o f 
these institutions [are] dependent on shopping, [emphasis added] (Koolhaas 
2002).
Koolhaas also notes the difficulty of reconciling public space within a 
“relentlessly commercial environment” and the cultural differences between 
American and European levels o f public “surrender and resistance” to such forces in 
design. It is thus an irony of our modern age that the marketplace or agora—the 
classic form of public space— has become reconceptualized as a privatized and 
enclosed space.
It is interesting to note that when Koolhaas refers to the public sector, it seems 
he is not talking about government, but about public space—something more akin to 
Habermas’ public sphere, a non-governmental physical space where private parties 
may gather. Koolhaas appears to lack the adequate words and is confined by the
public/private sector terminology. A similar problem seems to afflict the discourse 
on enclosure, where the commons is the central issue.
In its immediate context, this study engages and applies what earlier has been 
called the discourse on enclosure. As also mentioned earlier, this discourse can be 
viewed as an oppositional discourse that is a composite of several related elements: 
the relationship between intellectual property rights and the intellectual “commons” 
(Lessig 1999); the derivative nature of ideas, the intellectual commons, and technical 
innovation and authorship (Lessig 2001; Litman 1990); the enclosure of the 
intellectual commons (Boyle 2001); the classic debate on wealth generation and 
alternative modes of production (Benkler 2001, 2002; Lessig 2001a); and forms of 
such enclosure involving standards and standardization (Van Houweiling 2002).
3.2 Greater Context o f the Study
This discourse will be examined more closely, but first it is important to 
briefly step back from the minutiae of legal discourse of case law and theory and 
begin to examine from a broader interdisciplinary and historical perspective certain 
driving forces behind the recent trends in law and standards practice. One such force 
is the notion of intellectual property and the nature and importance of the commons. 
Another force is the process o f globalization and the ascendancy of the ideology of 
free market capitalism and the processes of privatization and deregulation.
3.2.1 Intellectual Property
Intellectual property is information that derives its intrinsic value from 
creative ideas. Such ideas may find their expression in many forms including
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manuscripts, poetry, art, film, music, computer programs, and other works. Western 
legal institutions have a long tradition of granting the creators of such ideas, 
inventions and creative expressions certain rights, thus imbuing their creations with 
the status o f “property”2 in the form of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade 
secrets. It is easier to understand the present situation by looking at the historical and 
cultural roots of these concepts and institutions.
The roots of modern conceptions of IPR are embedded in the enlightenment 
concepts of liberalism, o f individualism and the ownership of property, along with the 
related concepts of freedom and human rights. They all formed the intellectual 
foundations of modem society. One of the most influential political philosophers o f 
the Enlightenment was John Locke.
In 1690, in his Essay on Human Understanding, Locke built an epistemology 
that placed the individual at its center and foreshadowed semiotics, a theory of 
language, signs and symbols, where the creation and communication of ideas became 
the essential task of Science. In his Treatises on Government, he described the 
foundation of private property as the “self owning itself and its labor,” and he sought 
to legitimize both private property and a common realm of “civil society.” Locke’s 
focus was on the processes of the conveyance of ideas from the private to the 
common realm where they could be shared with others. In doing so, he was dealing 
with the fundamental distinction between the private and the common (or public), a 
distinction that remains problematic today. This distinction presented a difficulty for 
Locke, as described by Peters (1989):
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Since Locke has made the privatizing labor of the individual so 
fundamental, he is left with the task of explaining how different people can 
have understandings in common, that is, how they may communicate (a term 
which, of course, etymologically means to make common). Locke’s defense 
o f the individual as a private property holder simply leaves him without good 
ways to talk about the sources of public order or community: whence the 
magical power of communication as panacea. The concept results from the 
failure to theorize the common world.
This failure to adequately theorize the public has returned to haunt us today. 
(Schoechle 2001). Locke’s problem was a political one of his time—how to move 
from the common to the private, or how to establish the individual in an age where 
property and rights were the unquestioned domain of the king or church. The problem 
of IPR in the age of digital communication networks returns us to the problem of 
completing Locke’s account— how to get back from the private to the common. The 
enclosure discourse attempts to begin such a journey.
3.2.2 Globalization and the Free Market Ideology
The process of globalization and the attendant ascendancy of the ideology o f 
free market capitalism have been driving forces behind the trends that inspired the 
enclosure discourse and shaped standardization practice. As recounted earlier, there 
can be little doubt that the dramatic growth and global integration of the economy 
over the past two decades can be traced in large part to the growth and success of the 
ICT industry and its technical innovations, including the Internet, particularly in the 
United States. There can also be little doubt that the privatization and deregulation of 
telecommunications monopolies may have aided this growth in important ways. 
However, one major consequence of such success has been the reinforcement (until 
recently) o f an unquestioned ideological belief system that some critics find
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unsustainable and self destructive—that of the unfettered free market. (Gray 1998; 
Frank 2000; Soros 1998, 2002).
According to historian John Gray:
.. .globalization— which at bottom is nothing more than the spread of 
science and technology throughout the world—goes back at least as far as the 
last third of the nineteenth century, when transatlantic telegraph cables were 
first laid down. Driven by technologies that abolish or curtail time and 
distance in many areas of activity, it is a by-product of the growth of scientific 
knowledge, and therefore a wholly inexorable process...(Gray 1998, p. xiv)
But Gray goes further, drawing a sharp distinction between globalization as an 
historical phenomenon and the free market and other deliberate political and 
economic constructions:
... but, it [globalization] has no tendency to bring about the triumph of any 
specific type of capitalism or political system, to force convergence of liberal 
values, or to promote peace. The global free market constructed in the last 
decade of the twentieth century is only one of the several regimes under which 
globalization has advanced for well over a century, (ibid.)
He also argues that American economic and technological ascendancy over the past 
two decades has promoted an economic ideology that is based on the theory that 
market freedoms are natural and political restraints on markets are artificial, a notion 
he claims is the opposite o f reality. He asserts that, “encumbered markets are the 
norm in every society,” and “ .. .that free markets are creatures of state power, and 
persist only so long as the state is able to prevent human needs for security and the 
control o f economic risk from finding political expression.” (Gray 1998, p. 17). He 
stresses that “democracy and free markets are rivals, not allies.” Part of the power of 
free market rhetoric derives from, the word free, a word with tremendous rhetorical 
force, particularly in American culture. The importance offree in the enclosure
discourse will be considered in the ensuing discussion of Lessig’s and his colleagues’ 
works.
Proceeding with Gray’s argument, the principal effect of free market 
economic policies, propelled by initiatives on all governmental levels, international 
institutions (e.g., the IMF (International Monetary Fund), WTO (World Trade 
Organiztion), World Bank, etc.), and corporations is the externalization of costs. The 
ultimate result is an undermining of civil society and, specifically, the weakening or 
destroying of intermediary social institutions (e.g., trade unions, professional 
associations, churches, cultural organizations, local authorities, etc.) on which society 
depends for cohesion, order, and stability, but whose value is not factored into the 
free market calculus. “In this manner, the innermost contradiction of the free market 
is that it works to weaken the traditional social institutions on which it has depended 
in the past—the family3 is a key example.” (p. 29). Another example, as will be 
argued later, is the standardization system, particularly in the United States, which is 
based in large part on trade and professional and membership associations.
Similar arguments are made by Frank (2000), Soros (1998, 2002) and others4. 
Soros argued in 1998 that unrestricted global financial markets and free market IMF 
and World Bank policies, were bringing about a “lack of social cohesion and the 
absence of government.” (p. x) Furthermore, the policies are making the global 
capitalist system “unsound and unsustainable,”(p. xi) and pose a severe threat to what 
he calls the open society, a notion that Soros has championed" based on the 
philosophical writings o f Karl Popper. (1945) Open is another term imbued with 
rhetorical power, for it plays a major role in the discursive construction of standards
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and standardization. As noted earlier, the financial challenges faced by ANSI, and its 
difficulty in raising private membership support and participation from the very 
elements that could most benefit from its work, are consistent with the self destructive 
tendency of extreme free market policies that Gray puts forward. Standardization is a 
form of intermediary social institution that exists apart from government and whose 
sustenance and functioning depend on mechanisms that are not well accommodated 
within the ideology of free market economics.
It is not the purpose here to argue the validity of Gray’s view or the economic 
outcomes of various ideological constructs, but only to situate this study within the 
rhetorical framework of globalization, market economics, privatization, deregulation, 
the free, and the open. Regardless of their merits, the power of Gray’s arguments and 
attendant discourses, have gained new significance and credibility with the recent 
collapse o f the global economic bubble (Samuelson 2002) and the exposure of 
pervasive and large-scale corporate malfeasance, particularly in the United States.6 In 
writing about recent public protests outside meetings of the World Bank and the IMF 
in Washington D.C., Wall Street Journal columnist Alan Murray refers to the demise 
of “market religion”:
... [free market critics] have won the argument. Capitalism now has the 
black eye they tried so hard to give it. Writing in the Washington Post last 
week, Robert Weissman of Mobilization for Global Justice exulted:
“The era of market fundamentalism is over. Marketization, deregulation, 
and privatization, and the opportunities for market manipulation offered by 
inadequate regulation... all central elements in the rise and fall o f Enron...are 
now discredited in the United States. And in developing countries, where 
their effects have been most devastating, they are the object of widespread 
public opprobrium.”
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A similar tone was struck at a Friday afternoon seminar inside meetings 
o f the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which were the 
targets of the protests. “Market fundamentalism is gone,” said Trevor 
Manuel, finance minister of South Africa. “The ideology is gone, and that’s 
good,” agreed Jan Karlsson, development minister of Sweden.
And even Horst Koehler, managing director of the IMF, enforcer of 
market based practices around the world, said, “We are in the process of 
searching for new policy concepts that make globalization work for all.” Mr. 
Kohler winced each time someone suggested that market fundamentalism 
once held sway at his institution, arguing that his home country, Germany, 
always had recognized that the marketplace had to be tempered with an 
understanding o f the broader needs o f society. So much for the triumph of 
American-style capitalism. (Murray 2002)
It will be suggested later that some of the “new policy concepts” that the IMF is 
seeking may be found in the standardization system, as one of the intermediary social 
institutions that Gray intends. Standardization lives in that hazy realm somewhere 
between the private and the public. It has been increasingly privatized over the past 
decade by the rise of consortia, but also in many respects by the traditional 
institutions, as well as by other means. It is an intermediary institution between the 
people and the market—perhaps a form of regulation, or a substitute for it—or 
perhaps a form o f privatized governance (Mueller 2002). In any case, it is that hazy 
realm that this study attempts to explore. It is within this global economic and social 
context that the literature and discourse on enclosure and standardization is examined.
3.3 Discourse on Enclosure
For a seminal book, Lessig (1999) chose the rhetorically potent title, Code and 
Other Laws o f Cyberspace. The dual meaning of the word code, as computer code 
and as legal code, conveys the basic argument that technical architectures and their 
software implementations embed tacit policy decisions, whether acknowledged or 
not. Although Lessig focuses particularly on the Internet and related network7
technologies, his argument is a far more general one. And while Lessig does not 
focus on the standardization practice, apart from an account of Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), its history and other anecdotal references, this study bases its 
underlying thesis on an extrapolation of his argument, i.e., that standards and 
standardization practice are primary processes by which Lessig’s code is written.8 
This notion of the policymaking force of technical architectures is not new (e.g., 
Winner 1985), but Lessig brings it forward anew in an active and broad public 
discourse.
3.3.1 The Commons
In a second book, Lessig (2001) highlights the more general problem of 
technological innovation and on the increasing encroachment of intellectual property 
rights, law and industrial practice on what he calls ideas, while preserving the 
intellectual commons that he claims is vital to such innovation. He attempts to step 
outside the concept of property that is so ideologically embedded in contemporary 
western and American culture. Moreover, he defines the commons in terms of access 
as a space where no permission is required, and not simply in terms of ownership or 
as public property, (p. 20). He argues that a commons of ideas is fundamentally 
different than real property in that it is non-rivalrous, i.e. not depleted by use.
Language is a commons, though its resource is nonrivalrous (my use does 
not inhibit yours). What has determined the “commons” then is not the simple 
test o f rivalrousness. What has determined the commons then is the character 
o f the resource and how it relates to a community. ...the issue for nonrivalrous 
resources is...enough incentive to create, (p. 21).
Furthermore, he challenges the application o f the myth of the tragedy o f the commons 
9 which describes the inevitable ruin of the unregulated commons and justifies
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imperatives of control o f a scarce resource— often a rationale for regulation, 
privatization, or IPR.
This “tragedy” [of the commons] consumes talk about “the commons.” 
“Ruin” is taken for granted as the destiny of those who believe in the 
“freedom of the commons.” Hardheaded sorts thus scorn the rhetoric of 
undivided resources. Only the romantic wastes time wondering about 
anything different from the perfect control of property.
...As researchers have shown, in many different contexts, norms 
adequately limit the problems of overconsumption. Communities work out 
how to regulate consumption, (p. 22). [emphasis added]
My central claim throughout is that there is a benefit to resources held in 
common and that the Internet is the best evidence of that benefit. ...the 
Internet forms an “innovation commons.” It forms this commons not just 
through norms, but also through a specific technical architecture. The Net of 
these norms and this architecture is a space where creativity can flourish, (p. 
23). [emphasis added]
Thus, Lessig challenges the dominant discourse and its mythological assumptions 
about property and control.10 He asserts the value of an information commons (also 
called a platform), and he attributes its formation to norms and architectures created 
by communities. This study argues that the norms, architectures and communities 
Lessig is referring to all lie essentially in the realm of standardization practice. In 
fact, the Internet’s norms and architecture (i.e., code) was created by a standards 
body (i.e., a community o f interest) that later became known as the IETF (a 
consortium in the context of this study).
Lessig also speaks of the value of the publicness of a resource, and that in 
certain cases, increasing participation and use enhances the value of the activity rather 
than diminishing it:
The value, in these cases, comes from the convergence of many upon a 
common use, or standard, or practice. And in these cases, keeping the 
resource in the commons is a way to assure that that value is preserved for all.
. . .These arguments from tradition are thus grounded in both fairness and 
efficiency, and economists have extended the arguments from efficiency.
[e.g., Schumpeter’s writings , network externalities, interoperability, end-to- 
end architectures, etc.] (Lessig 2002, p. 88)
However, he is also concerned about the motivation to enclose a common resource, 
not merely for immediate economic reasons, but for dominant industries to protect 
themselves from disruptive innovation in their markets. Referring to the Internet as a 
platform for innovation, he said,
Every great idea comes from outside—because the architecture 
guarantees that outsiders have access to the network, not just the dominant 
application providers. Dominant players want to protect themselves—that is 
“fix the bugs.” .. .to corrupt the original architecture to protect their business 
models. (Lessig 2002)11
Standardization practice, depending on how it is organized and managed, can 
be employed to either help or hinder innovation. Lessig worries about consequences, 
“when few can make decisions about what kind of innovation will be permitted.” 
(2001, p. 173) His concern raises the question of the potential for the enclosure of 
standardization to be a significant threat to technical innovation.
Lessig asserts that the commons is vital to innovation in large part because of 
the derivative nature of ideas. He juxtaposes property and control vs. commons and 
innovation (2001, 2002), He also analyzes the ideology of property and control, and 
the logic o f the market, i.e., that “the whole world is best managed when divided 
among private owners.” (p. 13). This notion of divided and privatized resources is 
the central tenet o f free market ideology—that the generation of wealth in society is 
better served by holding property in private hands rather than in common. Boyle 
(1996, 2001) and Benkler (2001, 2002) both challenge this notion directly. The
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derivative nature of ideas is also emphasized by Litman (1990) in the context of 
authorship and copyright.
3.3.2 Enclosure
Boyle likens the increasing emphasis on IPR and the privatization of 
ideas—the increasing perception in society o f information and ideas as an owned 
commodity—to the land enclosure movement of the 15th through the 19th centuries in 
England. He names it the “2nd enclosure movement” 12 (2001). The land enclosure 
movement was an exercise o f state power to transform what had traditionally been 
common land into private property. 13 Although this movement has been celebrated 
as transforming a peasant society into a market economy, some historians regard this 
notion as problematic. (Gray 1998). Boyle begins by presenting both views in respect 
to the land enclosure movement, and then identifies certain parallels and differences 
between the two enclosure movements, proposing arguments consistent with Lessig.
If standardization can be seen as a sort of intellectual commons, it is not difficult to 
draw a parallel with the following enclosure argument: that the products (i.e., 
standards) and the process by which they are made, may be at risk of being drawn 
into a privatized space under the control of and at the service of specific dominant 
interests, justified by economic efficiency.
3.3.3 Production
Benkler, in his paper, Coase ’s Penguin, (2001) extends Lessig’s and Boyle’s 
line of reason, by challenging the economic efficiency argument and the myth or 
“dominant paradigm we have about productivity.” (p. 3) He examines forms of peer
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production (e.g., open source software), an alternative mode of production to 
conventional market-based and hierarchical information production. He argues, 
offering substantial evidence, that peer production may outperform market-based 
production in some information industries, because,
.. .the primary advantage of peer production is in acquiring and 
processing information about human capital available to information 
production projects, and that in this it is superior to both market-based or 
hierarchical managerial processes. In addition to the informational advantage, 
peer production more efficiently assigns human capital to information inputs 
because it does not rely on controlling bounded sets of either factor, (p. 1)
Here Benkler challenges the central rationale for intellectual property law: incentive 
to produce. Intellectual property rights (IPR) were institutionalized in the U.S. 
Constitution, in the form o f copyright and patent rights, which gives Congress the 
power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for a limited 
Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” 14 Thus the Constitution grants not a property right per se, but a 
commercial monopoly to control use for a limited time. Further, it explicitly states 
the purpose o f such a grant— the public good— thus making patent and copyright, 
“...the only types o f property that have an explicitly utilitarian Constitutional basis.” 
(Boyle 1996, p. 226) The grant was not about preserving private rights, but about 
bringing ideas into the public domain (or the commons) and awarding a concession as 
an incentive for doing so. In general, the historic legal basis of IPR has been a 
pragmatic one, emerging from social practice and utilitarian motives rather than from 
notions o f justice or rights, or from social or epistemological theory.15
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Benkler examines in detail various experimental and theoretical works related 
to organizational forms and to collaborative behavior and motivation, but his 
argument against the need for strong IPR is primarily based on two factors:
[1] an important non-proprietary sector that is burdened by, but does not 
benefit from strong intellectual property rights. [2 ]...a cost.. .not previously 
identified, which is especially salient in a pervasively networked society. This 
cost is the loss o f  the information that peer production efforts generate and the 
loss o f productive resources— human capital that could be used productively 
and is not because market-based and hierarchical information production are 
poor mechanisms for identifying and pooling resources, (p. 2)
These same arguments can be applied to standards and standardization. It can 
justifiably be argued that standardization practice is essentially a form o f peer 
production— a form o f collaboration and o f the social construction o f 
technology— and on the technical committee or working group level, at least in part, 
outside either the market-based or hierarchical modes. In addition, the problems 
posed by the assertion o f  IPR in the standardization process have become some of its 
most vexing and intractable issues.
The above enclosure discourse has been challenged. Post (2000) and others 
contest Lessig’s conclusions from  a basic libertarian perspective, standing up for the 
“invisible hand” in the marketplace. Wagner (2002) argues that inherently 
“information wants to be free,” and that concerns o f the enclosure theorists are 
overblown and have become mythological.
Lessig (2001) and Vaidhyanathan (2001) further argue that even the term 
“intellectual property right” is problematic, and that it is largely a recent rhetorical
construction.
It is esential to understand that copyright in the American tradition was 
not meant to be a “property right” as the public generally understands 
property. It was originally a narrow federal policy that granted a limited trade 
monopoly in exchange for universal use and access. Lately, however, 
American courts, periodicals and public rhetoric seem to have engaged almost 
exclusively in "property talk” when discussing copyright. (Vaidhyanathan, 
2001, p. 11)
Vaidhyanathan explores how this property talk constructed a myth that tapped into 
basic American ethical assumptions and cultural habits, including the notions of 
rewarding hard work, recognizing genius and creativity, ensuring wide and easy 
access to information, and encouraging experimentation in both art and commerce, (p. 
4) Such property talk discourse often frames the issues in terms of the interests of 
and justice for inventors and artists, rather than for corporations and cartels, or for 
society and culture, and particularly in terms of incentive and reward vs. theft and 
piracy (Schoechle 2001).
What are the implications of this property talk for standardization? As 
pointed out earlier, standards are being increasingly viewed as a form of intellectual 
property. Standardization practice deals with production of ideas, documents and 
similar intellectual “goods.” If the dominant discursive mode is within the property 
paradigm, then all goods are seen as someone’s property—either private or public 
(i.e., government) property. They must be “owned.” Then, however the commons is 
de-legitimized as a concept because it is not “owned” by anyone. It is not clear, then, 
who owns or should own the standards or the standardization practice, but they are 
being increasingly claimed by various interests, even if only for the publishing 
revenues (i.e., copyright).
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3.3.4 Free and Open
The terms free and open are among the most frequently used in the discourses 
on enclosure and on standardization, but they are also among the most difficult to 
define. Lessig proposes that the question o f how resources shall be allocated in 
society is no longer one o f public (government) vs. private market, but one offree vs. 
controlled. (2001, p. 12). He defines a resource as free if “(1) one can use it without 
the permission of someone else; or (2) the permission one needs is granted neutrally.” 
He explores the difference between free and open, particularly in the context of the 
free or open software movement and the advocacy of its principal founder, Richard 
Stallman, who prefers the term free}6
...Stallman believes that people dilute the insights of the free software 
movement by minimizing its connection to fundamental values...[but still] I 
am partial to the term open—as in open society, I believe it is properly a 
reference to values as well as to licenses under which code is distributed; and 
by “open code” I mean to refer to the values across both technical and legal 
contexts that promote a world where governing structures—code—are 
fundamentally free. (p. 270). [emphasis added]
The term open has become dominant in both open standards and open source (which 
may also be viewed as a form o f standardization) discourse. The literature on the 
meaning o f open is extensive, but Lessig’s definition provides a good place to begin 
and is consistent with that used by Popper (1945) and Soros. The meaning of open 
will be explored later.
A final element o f the enclosure discourse to be considered deals specifically 
with the enclosure of standards. Van Howeiling (2002), building on the preceding 
discourse, has described the standards “pollution problem,” where public domain 
protocol standards are appropriated and made proprietary—enclosed— by a process
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she characterizes as Embrace, Extend, Extinguish (EEE). Lemley (1998) has 
discussed the notion of standards “pollution”, while Lemley and McGowan (1998) 
have referred to “intellectual property ambush,” particularly in regard to the practices 
o f Microsoft Corporation.
Weiser (2001) has moved the useful metaphor of information platform17 
forward into the enclosure discourse18 with a meaning similar to Lessig’s 
commons a standardized base upon which innovation can build—which carries an 
inherent element of public interest. The difference is that Lessig’s commons is 
inherently open or free. Weiser’splatform however, is simply a standardized 
(formally or otherwise) hardware or software base for interoperable services and 
could be open, proprietary or governed by some regulatory regime. A similar notion 
in the realm of technical standards is that of infrastructure. Messerschmitt (1999) 
draws a distinction between applications and infrastructure. He argues that 
standardization should focus on basic infrastructure and avoid trying to standardize 
applications in order to encourage experimentation, lower barriers and increase 
flexibility.
The importance o f  standards as platforms for innovation is frequently 
recounted in standards discourse. One commonly cited case is the Sony Betamax™ 
vs. JVC VHS™ battle over de facto standard recording formats for video tape 
recorders. The struggle delayed market growth until it was resolved by Sony’s 
withdrawal (AFU, 1996). Another classic case is the success of the Global System 
Mobile (GSM )19 standard for mobile telephony, cited by Libicki, et. al. as exemplary 
of the “power of standards over technology.” (2000, p. 8) GSM now dominates the
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global market except in the United States, where multiple standards still compete, 
consumers are still confused, and U.S. industry is still disadvantaged. This case has 
been examined extensively in standards literature from a variety of aspects including 
technical, business, social, political, and economic (Fomin 2001; Bekkers, et. al.
2002; Lehenkari and Miettinen, 2001; Haug, 2002; Rice and Galvin, 1999).
3.4 The Standards Discourse
The literature in the field of standardization is substantial and growing as it 
becomes a recognized realm o f academic research. The purpose is to mention 
specific elements of the discourse that allow exploration of the language and 
embedded meanings, including certain mythological and ideological constructs that 
drive policy decisions, both public and private.
The current academic discourse on standards focuses on technical, curricular 
and instrumental dimensions. It largely focuses on case studies and tends to be 
somewhat anecdotal and highly business sector-specific. Hesser and Czaya (1999, p.
2) have described the current academic debate as concentrating “ ...on standards and 
their implications for competitive policy, international trade and company strategies.” 
The literature of the disciplines o f business management, engineering sciences, 
economics and law have generally treated standards in solely instrumental and 
industrial process-oriented terms.
The literature on standards and standardization relied on for this study falls 
generally into two categories: 1) economic and social theory applied to standards, and 
2) case studies o f standardization projects and related controversies. The economic
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literature referred to includes works by writers such as Lemley (1998, 1998a, 1999, 
2000, 2001), Balto (2000, 2001), Libicki (1995), Libicki, et. al. (2002), Bekkers et. 
al. (2002), Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Demsetz (1967), Shapiro and Varian 
(1999), Vercoulen and van Wegberg (1998), Christensen (1997), Gaynor, Bradner, et. 
al. (2001), and Taschdjian. (2001)20 Much of this literature overlaps disciplines such 
as economics, law, social studies and political science. The literature taking mainly 
social theory, political theory, and policy oriented approaches to standards includes: 
Fomin (2001), Sherif (2001, 2002), Bijker (1993, 1999), Egyedi (1996, 2001, 2001a), 
Egyedi and Loeffen (2002), Cargill (1997, 1999, 2001, 2001a), Williams (1997), 
Williams and Edge (1996), Krechmer (1998, 2000, 2000a, 2000b), Krechmer and 
Baskin (2001), Kahin and Abbate (1995), Streeter (1990, 1996), Schoechle (1995, 
1998, 1999, 2001), and Schoechle et. al. (2002) Case studies are provided by several 
of the authors mentioned above, notably Egyedi (2001), Fomin (2001), Bekkers, et. 
al. (2002), Sherif (2002), and van Wegberg. (2002)
3.4.1 The Private, the Public and the Open
The discourse that provides the principal object of analysis for this study 
comes more from trade and industry, rather than from academia. Krechmer (1998), 
founder and editor of Communications Review, a periodical exclusively devoted to 
reporting on numerous standards committee activities in the ICT field, proposes a set 
of criteria for defining “open standards” and offers a taxonomy for the basic structure 
of standards practice and its processes. Warshaw and Saunders (1995) provide a 
perspective on the issue of defining the public and private interest in standardization, 
both in North America and in the international arena. The OTA report (Congress
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1992) and Cargill (1997) cited in earlier sections, offer additional perspectives on 
defining public, private and open.
j.4 .2  Sectoral and Consortia Discourse
The principal objects o f  analysis in this study are specific reports, policy 
papers, statements, speeches, presentations or personal interviews or conversations.
In respect to the sectoral debate, such discourse is found in recent ANSI Annual 
Reports (ANSI 2001; 2002) as well as in the National Standards Strategy (ANSI 
2000), and by Warshaw and Saunders (1995). Consortia standardization is on the rise 
as described by individuals such as Krechmer (1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c), Vardakis 
(1998, 2002), Gifford (1997), Balto (2000), Sherif (2001, 2002), de Vries, (1999), 
Vercoulen and van Wegberg (1998), and van Wegberg (2002, 2002a). Similarly, the 
discourse supporting consortia standardization published in the congressional 
testimony o f Cargill (2001, 2001a), and in a report to the European Commission 
prepared by Egyedi (2001), are specifically analyzed. Also, discourses against 
consortia standardization are analysed. (DIN 2002; Sherif 2002). Analyses of hybrid 
approaches to standardization, which attempt to combine features of both consortia 
and traditional standardization, are provided by van Wegberg (2002, 2002a), 
Schoechle, et. al. (2002), Gifford (1997), Krechmer (1998, 2000, 2000a, 2000b) and 
Lim (2002).
3.5 Discourse on Social Construction of Technology
The social science disciplines o f sociology, philosophy, political science and 
communication studies have, until very recently, almost entirely overlooked the
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phenomenon of technical standardization per se. (Schoechle 1999) One example is a 
developing body of discourse from sociology known as STS (variously as Studies of 
Technology and Society; or earlier, Science, Technology and Society; or, most 
currently, as Socio-historical Technology Studies). (Bijker 1993, 1999; Williams 
1996; Williams and Edge 1996) One focus o f STS is on the social construction o f 
technology the notion that although inventions may often be an act of individual 
creation or inspiration, their implementation, commercialization or diffusion into 
society always involves many other individuals and institutions. The lone inventor 
working in his or her garage is a powerful myth in American culture. The original 
invention may ultimately be reshaped in ways that the inventor would not recognize. 
Standardization is one o f  the principal processes o f the social construction of 
technology, but is only recently being recognized among STS scholars.
Hawkins provides a summary of the various disciplinary paradigms and 
approaches:
Thus for political scientists, the standardization problematique is most 
closely related to systems of law and governance. Their primary interest is 
focused on situations in which standards assume regulatory functions, or 
where they have implications for the conduct of international relations. On 
the other hand, for sociologists/historians/philosophers of science and 
technology, questions about standards stem largely from concerns about the 
creations and sustenance of social power structures. From their perspective, 
the primary questions tend to focus on institutional processes of 
standardization, and on the nature of inputs into those processes. 
...Economists have tended to concentrate primarily upon the effects that 
standards have upon the behavior of buyers and sellers of technological 
products in the marketplace...the realm of information economics—the 
dynamics o f market relationships... network effects and issues o f technical 
compatibility. (Hawkins, Mansell and Skea 1995; p. 3-4)
Mansell has studied the institutional nature and role of standardization from a 
political economic perspective. (Mansell 1993; 1995; Mansell and Silverstone 1996)
She considers that standards-making institutions provide the “institutional glue” that 
links technical and institutional change (1995, p. 214). Much of Mansell’s analysis is 
consistent with the perspectives of Benkler and Lessig on innovation and on technical 
choices embedded in standards. Hawkins interestingly traces the very early 
recognition that standards are never value-free:
In the mid 19th century, for example, Joseph Whitworth [writing in 1882], 
one o f the earliest architects of institutionalized standards-making, observed 
that for all of the objective technical orientation, choices in standards-making 
were never purely free o f subjective criteria—an observation that remains at 
the heart o f most studies of standards of our time. (Hawkins, Mansell and 
Skea 1995; p. 4)
3.6 Institutionalization
Codding and Rutkowski (1982) have provided a detailed account of the 
history structure and practices o f the ITU, which they assert is the oldest international 
intergovernmental organization. Cerni (1984) has provided an account of the history, 
structure and practices o f the ITU, IEC and ISO, from the perspective of the U.S. 
government as a participant.
Wagner (1999) has provided a theoretical and methodological framework on 
institutionalization, bringing together the fundamental work of Veblen (1919/1990) 
and Innis (1972). Their theories are applied in works by Streeter (1990) and Mansell 
(1993, 1995, 1996). These writers provide a useful perspective on the role of 
discursive practice within institutional settings in the shaping of technologies and 
policies.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to situate this study in a global economic and social 
context, and to review the literature and discourses that informed the study and 
provided its objects of analysis. The discourse on enclosure has been examined in 
some detail to grasp the salient concepts that relate to standardization. The discourse 
on standards and standardization has been briefly surveyed. Finally, some of the 
relevant literature on social construction and institutionalization has been discussed.
A further step will be to examine the traditional institutionalization of 
standardization practice as embodied in the oldest bodies, the ITU, IEC, and ISO. 
With a view of the relative openness of past institutional practice, and from the 
perspective of the enclosure discourse, it is possible to analyze the standards 
discourse, to find what might be the relevant meanings and implications for policy. 
But first, before either such institutional history or discourse analysis can be 
undertaken, it is necessary to propose a theoretical and methodological perspective 
for the study and then to examine some if the basic terms of discourse, including what 
is meant by “open” and “public.”
1 Koolhaus is an urban designer and teacher and a winner of the Pritzker prize. He is noted for 
innovative architectural designs including buildings, shopping centers, and other urban spaces.
2 Not fully the same as property, a problematic notion that will be discussed later.
3 Gray emphasizes the importance of the destruction of the family as a social institution and 
lays it at the door of the free market. He argues that by undermining the role of work and social 
cohesion, and by bringing labor into a world of declining health care, childcare, wages, etc., along with 
uncertainty, flex-time, forced mobility, and the loss of other intermediary social institutions, the family 
has been sacrificed to the market. It is ironic that much free market populist rhetoric comes from the 
religious right, a group that celebrates the “family” as an important institution while supporting 
economic policies that undermine it.
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4 Similar or related arguments are made by Greider (1997), Phillips (1994), Gowan (1999), 
Brenner (1998), and Albert (1993).
Soros has established and funded, through the Soros Foundation, a global network of 
philanthropic institutions around the mission of “Building Open Societies,” with a total annual budget 
of over $500 million.
According to various news reports, by August 2002, nearly $2 trillion had disappeared from 
the U.S. economy since March of 2000, along with 500,000 jobs; leaving $1 trillion in debt 
outstanding. An August 12 Wall Street Journal article under the rubric, “Dialing for Dollars,” titled, 
Before Telecom Industry Sank, Insiders Sold Billions in Stock: As They Cashed Out Shares, Many 
Executives Touted Sector’s Growth Potential.” The story goes on to describe Vincent Galluccio, 
former top executive of Metromedia Fiber Networks, Inc., now retired and sitting on his tractor in his 
new Chardonnay vineyard. The article quotes him as saying, “My father taught me that when you play 
a hand, put half in your pocket and walk away from the table.” He walked away with $27 million, 
leaving Metromedia in Chapter 11 while the SEC investigates the company’s accounting practices. 
Ironically, a pervasive theme of the business discourse of the time was the management mantra of 
“build shareholder value” as justification for externalizing costs.
The word network has dual meanings. As the engineer designs networks of communicating 
computers, the economist speaks of network effects, meaning the exponentially increasing economic 
value of having an increasing number of nodes or users connected to a network. In the same sense, 
economists also use the term network externalities and engineers refer to Metcalfe’s Law (attributed to 
Bob Metcalfe, inventor of the Ethernet protocol, standardized as IEEE 802.3).
8 Lessig acknowledges the importance of standardization practice, but considers the matter too 
complex and arcane for him, “as a lawyer” he charged this author to delve into it. Personal 
conversation at (Lessig 2002).
9 Tragedy o f the Commons is Garrett Hardin’s classic allegory about the tendency to exploit a 
common resource in situations of unregulated self interest. (Hardin 1968).
10 Lessig stresses the danger of using metaphorical models like the Tragedy as a foundation 
for policy decisions. He cites the extensive literature on the commons and its comedies, tragedies, 
fallacies, etc. (Lessig 2002. p. 271-272).
11 Similar arguments are made by Christensen (1997) in examining the difficulties that 
successful or dominant firms have in dealing with technical innovation in general, and technical 
standards in particular (2002).
12 Although Boyle’s paper (2001) carries this title, he credits usage of the term to others 
including Ben Kaplan, Pamela Samuleson, Yochai Benkler, David Lange, Keith Aoki and Hanibal 
Travis.
13 Gray also mentions the Enclosure Movement, describing it as an appropriation that 
“...tilted the balance of ownership in England’s agrarian economy away from cottagers and yeoman 
farmers toward the great landowners of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.” (1998, p. 8). Gray 
emphasizes the role of political power in this process and questions the generally attributed historic 
role of economic efficiency.
14 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.
15 Lessig also cites Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the principal architect of the U.S. patent and 
copyright system, and his arguments against the notion of patent protection as a natural right. (Lessig 
2002, p. 94-95).
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Lessig (2002, p. 279-280) acknowledges the difficulty in keeping the terminology straight 
regar mg open vs. free, o f closed vs. proprietary, and what is intended by open source (e.g., license 
under General Public License (GPL) or other variations).
The term platform is commonly used in the software industry to mean a standardized base 
(proprietary or open) for related, compatible or interoperable applications, constituting an element o f
infrastructure.
18 This was accomplished in part by organizing a conference on the topic (The Regulation of 
Information Platforms, University o f  Colorado, January 27-29, 2002) that included presentations by 
Lessig (2002) and others mentioned here.
Originally Groupe Speciale Mobile, the standards body that created it.
A comprehensive survey o f  the economics literature on standards has been provided by 
Techapalokul, Alleman, and Chen (Techapalokul 2001).
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...a spurious syllogism may... be based on the confusion of the 
absolute with that which is not absolute but particular. As in 
dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what-is-not is, on 
the ground that what-is-not is what-is-not...so also in rhetoric, a 
spurious enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some 
particular probability with absolute probability.
—Aristotle, 336 BC
CHAPTER 4 
Theoretical and Methodological Approaches
The primary theoretical perspective and framework of analysis for this study 
are public sphere theory and political economy. Although standardization is a social 
practice that springs from tradition and not from any theoretical grounding, it is 
situated and institutionalized in a public but non-governmental setting that could be 
seen as a public sphere as described by Habermas (1962). Public sphere theory 
provides a focus on publicness and on the discursive process that are relevant for 
analyzing and understanding standardization practice. Political economy provides an 
approach to understanding the various interests being served by the social practices 
that are relevant to this study, and to the underlying reasons for their establishment.
The primary research method employed in this project is discourse analysis}  
Furthermore, this study takes a view o f standardization as a social practice.
Discourse analysis provides a method of extracting the meanings in any social 
practice, which may be defined as the symbolic means by which people negotiate and 
share their realities. In the case o f standards-making, standardization practice is a 
recurring ritualized and institutionalized group interaction and its discourse includes a
wide array ol oral, written, procedural, and symbolic acts. Standardization as a social 
practice may be operationally defined as a combination of how standards and 
standardization are discussed and the settings within which that discussion proceeds. 
In other words, practice includes the way meetings are conducted (i.e., rules, 
procedures, order of business, agendas, etc,), who participates or does not, what is 
discussed and what is not, the language used, documents produced, and the terms of 
discourse and their underlying assumptions, all these elements taken together, 
constitute standardization as a social practice. In this study, much of the discourse 
under analysis is a meta-discourse, or a discourse about the standardization discourse 
and practice.
The adapted analysis relies on a definition of social practice offered by 
MacIntyre (1981) as a cooperative social activity pursuing and systematically 
extending internal and external goods and standards of excellence. The practice of 
standards-making is such a cooperative social activity seeking to establish community 
goods (e.g., communication protocols, product interoperability, certain specialized 
markets, etc.) by a voluntary consensus process conducted under well established 
procedures, protocols, and rituals.2 In MacIntyre’s terms, such goods (i.e., the 
technical standards) produced as outcomes of the practice would be considered 
external. Things like cooperation, rational deliberation, practices, procedures, 
standards of excellence, and other elements inherent to the process itself (including 
discourse about the practice) would be considered internal.' Taking this approach of 
standardization as a social practice recognizes that both the standards and the practice 
by which they are achieved are human constructions formed by shared activities that,
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in turn, form social habits and are fundamental to social processes. Other social 
theorists, including Bourdieu (1990) and Craig (1996), have provided further 
perspectives on social practice along similar lines.
The problem of enclosure described earlier is complex, and the approach 
taken in this study is only one possibility. In this inquiry, other theoretical 
perspectives could have been used and other methodological approaches could have 
been taken. No single approach by itself is complete. In this case, the study of 
rhetoric offers a starting point, providing both theory and method together. For 
example, a common rhetorical device found in discourse is the enthymeme, an 
incomplete syllogism that persuades not by logical force of argument, but by reliance 
on pre-existing beliefs and assumptions in the mind of the reader/listener/participant.
It also relies on preceding discourse and on the context of that discourse. Discourse 
analysis is a valuable approach because standardization practice is inherently 
discursively constituted through words and meanings. Essentially, discourse analysis 
digs out such meanings and assumptions.
An analysis of discourse can reveal prevailing ideological commitments that 
lead people to interpret the same data in conflicting ways. Analysis of a discourse 
offers to identify the variety o f meanings or interpretations found in the various 
symbols, myths and ideologies that are embedded in the discourse, and could lead to a 
better understanding of the policy implications or responses. In particular, this study 
applies the constitutive paradigm of rhetorical analysis that distinguishes between 
logical and ideological argumentation. These theoretical perspectives provide a
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framework within which to analyze and understand the meanings found in the 
practice.
Secondarily, this study applies an historiographic method in looking at 
existing texts (e.g., scholarly journal articles, congressional testimony, government 
reports, public speeches, published interviews, and other documents). Furthermore, it 
employs ethnographic field methods in acquiring examples of the discourse in various 
standards committees, conferences, meetings and other gatherings, as well as in 
personal interviews. These methodological choices are driven by the author’s 
encounter with bodies o f discourse considered in this work, and by the pressing need 
for a better understanding of them and of their institutional origins, and because no 
such analysis has been recorded.
In summary, this study is an analysis o f standards discourse. This is achieved, 
not in the linguistic sense, although those methods are employed, but as a social 
practice and a discursive interaction within a public sphere of certain established and 
evolving institutions. It is an effort to tie rhetorical analysis with social practice in a 
public sphere. To the ancient Greeks, rhetoric was the instrumental art of persuasion. 
To some, the content was relatively unimportant, yet to others, it became an integral 
part o f the development o f  democratic institutions and citizenship. This research has 
very much to do with the content of contextual arguments. Consequently, the 
analysis is grounded in actual social practices situated in existing institutions, and 
framed as a public sphere and in relationship to political and economic power.
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4.1 Discourse as Theory and Method
It is useful to begin by defining the term discourse. The intent is to use the 
term as both a verb and a noun, as both a practice and a text resulting from that 
practice. This duality is important because the language constructs found in the texts 
must be understood not simply as objects of analysis in themselves, but together with 
the situated process that produced it. As described by Hartley, (1994, p. 93) discourse 
is .. .the social process of making and reproducing sense(s).” The usage here of 
discourse comes from traditions of structuralism, post-structuralism and semiotics, 
and relies on concepts developed by Saussure, Barthes, Althusser and Foucault. This 
study relies on the belief that “discourses are the product of social, historical and 
institutional formations; and meanings are produced by their institutionalized forms.” 
(Hartley 1994, p. 93)
More specifically, this study borrows from the concept of discursive practices, 
described by Streeter as “ ...concrete instances of discourse with practical outcomes, 
or as ways o f doing things with words.” (1986, p. 17-18) Streeter’s sense of 
discourse and practice apply directly to this study:
The word “rhetoric” often carries the undesired connotation of “mere 
rhetoric,” i.e. of contentless verbiage, while “discourse” connotes substance as 
well as form. In the less derogatory use of “rhetoric” common to the field of 
that name, the word is typically based on the model of the public speech, 
which tends to focus attention on the situation of the individual speaker. 
“Discourse” connotes the more collective model of a language in use, which is 
more appropriate in this context. The word “language,” however, is too static, 
lacking the necessary sense of words in context. “Practice” is the most 
adequate for reference to the behavior of telecommunications institutions in 
their social context, (p. 17, footnote 17)
Also, as in the case of Streeter s study of the cable industry, the setting for at 
discourse is the set of institutional, economic, and social relationships distributed 
among government, industry, trade associations, engineering societies and standards 
bodies that define the technologies and architectures on which the industrial system 
depends. Standardization cannot be reduced to either an institution or a discourse, but 
is a combination of both. (p. 207)
4.2 Relevant Discourses and Social Practices
Two bodies of discourse are objects of this study: 1) a discourse about 
enclosure of ideas and counter arguments forming a dialectic, and 2) a discourse and 
social practice about standards and standardization.4 Through analysis of these 
discourses and the institutional frameworks or conditions of discourse within which 
they proceed, this work attempts to show how the enclosure of ideas shapes and is 
reflected in the standards discourse. It also reveals how assumptions about 
intellectual property rights and markets are shaping the standardization process. This 
work attempts to explain how the dialectic is being resolved in the minds of standards 
participants since such resolution will have significant material and economic 
consequences.
4.2.1 Arguments
Reflected in these discourses are two competing theories or overriding 
perceptions about the creation of wealth in society. Both theories are couched in 
terms of the common good: 1) intellectual property rights (held in closed [private] 
space), versus 2) intellectual commons (held in open [public] space). This
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competition includes not only the ideas generated (i.e., the standards), but the 
conditions of the discourse that establishes them, (i.e., the conduct of the 
standardization process as a discursive practice). The competing theories exhibit a 
fundamental conflict between the perceptual frames of the public (i.e., the common) 
and the private and claims about which of these may result in greater economic value 
for society freedom of ideas or ownership of ideas (including proprietary rights to 
ideas and privatized discourse about them).
4.2.2 Method
The discourses are examined through documents, through narrative accounts 
and through participation in actual gatherings were a given discourse is conducted. 
Documents, including historical records, seminal papers, speeches and constitutive 
documents (i.e., charters, procedures manuals, institutional directives, membership 
agreements, white papers, position papers, policy statements, etc.) help to establish 
the initial terms of the discourse. Many are problematic (e.g., free, open, balanced, 
public, private, etc.).5 Narrative accounts by participants and informed observers, in 
the form of correspondence or interviews, and direct observations at gatherings help 
to reveal the individual and group perceptions that help form the discourse and shape 
its outcomes.
It may be argued that the influence of enclosure, as a discursive condition, 
shapes the character of a discourse so that enclosure is becoming less and less 
contested. The intent here to show how the discourse encourages a mode of thought 
with specific implications for policy. Part of what is proposed is an analysis of the
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attitudes that “openness” and “privatizaton” induce and the acts that such attitudes 
encourage.
In summary, the method o f this study is to:
1. Examine the enclosure discourse and identify the operative terms ot enclosure 
(external definitions) and posit a hypothesis (i.e., that standards and 
standardization are being enclosed).
2. Examine the standards discourse and apply the above terms to establish
internal definitions.
3. Examine specific representative cases to find how these terms are being
applied in order to test the hypothesis.
Simply put, the above hypothesis is developed as follows: 1) enclosure asserts 
that ideas are being enclosed; 2) standards are ideas; and therefore, 3) some of the 
standards may be being enclosed. The general hypothesis is:
The public nature o f  standards as a commons is being challenged 
P riva tiza tion  fo r  the benefit o f  specific interests may have deleterious consequences 
for society as a whole, including the impairment o f  access to information and 
communication networks, o f  competition, and o f  technical innovation.
4.3 Theoretical Perspectives
The theoretical perspectives that guide this stud, include primarily those of 
Habermas and his concepts o f the public sphere, communicative action, and practical 
discourse-, o f  discourse as s o c i a l  practice, and o f political economy and cenain 
closely related institutional cultures. Also contributing both theoretically and
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methodologically to this study are concepts o f semiotics and signification, which 
come from communication theory, and theories o f rhetoric.
4.3.1 Habermas
Political philosopher Jurgen Habermas seeks to restore the enlightenment 
rationalist tradition. In his theory of discourse ethics and of communicative action, he 
draws a sharp distinction between strategic action and communicative action. He 
emphasizes the concept o f the public sphere, presumably the realm of communicative 
action and discourse ethics. He sees rhetoric as strategic action, a distorted form of 
communication.
In his model of, discourse ethics, Habermas (1995) finds a dialogically 
derived middle ground between 1) the universalistic and rationalistic, but monologic, 
Kantian ethics, and 2) the situational/contextual Aristotelian ethics which are based 
on social practice and pursuit o f  desired virtue. The essence of discourse ethics is that 
universal ethical principles and the relation between the justification and application 
of norms can be socially constructed from rational discourse based on language. In 
this model, Habermas extends the enlightenment project, committing to the 
proposition that negotiated norms of truth and good can be determined through 
consensus and group will. This is especially so if procedural principles of rational 
discourse, which include what he calls “ideal speech,” can be adhered to. These 
notions bear an interesting resemblance to the ideals embodied in the guiding 
principles o f some forms o f standards practice.
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In his theory of communicative action, Habermas (1991) further develops 
these above mentioned ideas. He proposes to resolve the conflict between private and 
public autonomy (i. e., individual rights v.v. collective rights), which he attributes to 
individual and collective subjectivity, by introducing the concept of inter subjectivity 
whereby the conflicting subjective interests are worked out through a discursive 
formation of public opinion which recognizes the equal validity of public and private 
rights. Habermas measures democratic legitimacy not in terms of majority decision­
making, but by the discursive quality of the process of deliberation that lead to such 
decisions. In standardization practice, in contrast to lawmaking and usual democratic 
governance, simple majority decision is not considered adequate. Only a consensus 
can result in a viable standard. In this sense, standardization practice is potentially 
one of the more significant examples of an attempt to apply communicative action 
within in modem society. Standardization thus provides an interesting case for 
testing Habermas’s models o f communicative action and of the public sphere.
Habermas’s term for the rational discursive process by which normative 
disputes are resolved to mutual satisfaction is “practical discourse.” He proposes 
three sets o f rules that apply to three levels o f argumentation on which practical 
discourse depends: 1) participants must speak the same natural language and adhere 
to the same general conventions, 2) participants must desire to reach agreement and 
must defend only what they believe to be true, and 3) participants must offer only 
arguments that command assent and not merely seek a desired behavior or outcome.
In the third rule, he draws the distinction between strategic action concerned only 
with external outcome (e.g., possibly employing rhetoric, political influence, threats,
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bribes, coercion, etc.) and communicative action concerned with a prevailing “force 
of the better argument. Strategic action introduces distortions into the ideal speech 
process. Standardization practice has long sought to institutionalize rules of 
argumentation similar to Habermas’s ideal speech and practical discourse, with 
varying measures of success. It should be noted that Habermas’s reliance on ideal 
speech and rational argumentation as the primary model for practical discourse is 
contested. Hauser argues that "‘Habermas dampens the range o f appearance for 
controversy an inherent feature of all public spheres—by excluding rhetorical 
discourse in favor of the rationalistic argumentation of philosophy.” (Hauser 1999, p. 
53) This study examines precisely this issue, and seeks to identify the rhetorical 
dimensions of standards discourse and how it may depart from a rationalistic 
idealized model. Farrell (1976, 1993) endeavors to extend Habermas’s project to 
incorporate or consider elements of rhetorical discourse. Hauser’s and Farrell’s 
arguments in this regard will be considered further below.
The formal standardization process today is constituted around a set of rules 
and procedures that essentially mirror Habermas’s concept of ideal speech and his 
rules o f argumentation. The operational directives o f the international standards 
bodies and most national or regional bodies embody similar principles o f fairness, 
adherence to procedures o f due process, reasonable notice, openness, inclusion of 
stakeholders, and decision by consensus that are consistent with Habermas's model o f 
ideal speech and practical discourse. In this sense, formal standardization practice 
has been characterized as potentially a form o f revitalized public sphere within the 
context o f  modem technological/industrial society. (Schoechle 1995; Froomkin 2002)
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The concepts described above are further integrated and developed by 
Habermas in his more recent works including Between Facts and Norms (1996) 
where he examines the structure and processes o f judicial, legislative and political 
institutions from the philosophical perspective of discourse theory, ethics, the public 
sphere, and communication. These vital social institutions and processes are 
concerned with establishing what “is” and what “ought to be”, as are the institutions 
and processes o f standardization.
4.3.1.1 The Public Sphere
The practical focal point of Habermas’s work for purposes of exploring the 
consequences of the discourse on standards, are grounded in his concept of the public 
sphere. The public sphere, as Habermas sees it, is that conceptual public space where 
private individuals come together to engage in rational discourse on matters of mutual 
concern. It is essentially the forum for discourse ethics and depends upon his 
principles o f ideal speech, practical discourse, and rules of rational argumentation. 
Such principles include freedom of access, equal rights to participation, truthfulness 
on the part o f participants, absence o f coercion, etc. (Habermas 1991, p. 31) 
Essentially, Habermas provides a central framework for modeling and evaluating the 
standards practice and its discourse, including openness. Inherent in the idea of the 
public sphere is the notion that, given the principles of ideal speech, reasonable 
individuals will be able to reach a common consensus or substantial agreement on 
issues of mutual interest. Inherent in this notion is a required willingness to be 
objective and to step outside o f  one’s own tradition, and frame of reference—a 
problematic assumption. Nevertheless, Habermas contributes a perspective of a
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public and a model of discursive practice that can be applied to standardization 
practice and is relevant to many of its underlying assumptions.
4.3.1.2 Critiques and Extensions of Habermas
Fraser (1990), while recognizing the importance of Habermas’s idea of the 
public sphere, challenges it as having too limited a conception o f a public in several 
respects. She calls for a conception of the public sphere as a multiplicity of publics, 
asserting that Habermas’s valorization of the bourgeois public sphere leaves out 
marginalized groups o f society that ought to also be considered as publics. She also 
finds his use of the term private and public as somewhat problematic, or at least in 
need of clarification as she identifies several possible meanings for both “publicity” 
and “privacy.” (Frazer 1990, p 71) The problematic nature of the terms public and 
private is a recurring theme in standardization discourse, and one that is extensively 
explored in this study.
Hauser also raises the issue o f the multiple publics and public spheres, going 
further and introducing the term reticulate public sphere, a term referring to a 
networked or dispersed civic conversation occurring within and among multiple 
diverse social groups. (1999, p. 76) This rhetorical model may have particular 
relevance in the transnational, multi-institutional and diverse world of standardization 
practice. Peters (2002) offers a critique of Habermas’s focus on rational discourse, 
asserting that dialog is not democratic but elitist because others must be quiet; that 
formality and procedure can obscure context; that forced discourse may not be 
productive; and that the act o f leading discourse is not necessarily tyranny, but could 
be service. Finally, an important critique o f Habermas that is particularly useful in
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this study comes from Farrell (1993), as noted earlier, who proposed to extend 
Habermas s project to incorporate or accommodate elements of rhetorical discourse.
Farrell begins by noting that “Habermas’s project on discourse ethics, together 
with his practical placement o f the public sphere, offers a basis for synthesizing the 
normative component o f practical wisdom and a rhetoric goaded by emancipatory 
reason, (p. 188) That being said, he then contends that rhetoric’s contribution to 
coherence in discourse practice is not an accidental feature or a deformation of 
ordinary discursive practice. Rather he suggests that:
.. .rhetoric is an inherent potential of any shared discourse practice. In 
making this suggestion, I am further distancing myself from specifics of the 
[Habermas] universal pragmatics position— in particular, its decontextualized 
privileging of cognitive-centered claims to truth in what Habermas calls 
“practical discourse.” (1993, pp. 233-4)
This presupposition of modernity is essential to Habermas’s entire 
orientation to communicative action. While a cooperative principle seems 
necessary for full reflection on validity claims, the fact remains that such 
reflection is in order because Habermas envisages communication as having 
to overcome a problematized distance between subjectivities, (footnote 5 p 
346)
Farrell further notes that because the discourse is situated in a discursive 
context, utterances, unlike propositions, are contextually embedded episodes, and 
their privileged claims, i f  any, are to plausibility rather than to truth. Thus situated, 
rhetorically interdependent discourse becomes a mediation among subjectivities, 
allowing emergent dimensions o f conventional meaning that would otherwise be 
overlooked or subordinated, (ibid.)
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Farrell sees that Habermas, in grounding his brand of pragmatics in 
universalizable presuppositions, has left the door open to an extension of 
communicative action into the territory of rhetoric.
As with many o f Habermas’s labors, there is a stunning insight here... that 
the very background o f our “taken-for-granteds” in the linguistic turn contains 
a potentially universalizable normative content. This discovery becomes the 
procedural scaffolding for the Habermas vision of communicative rationality. 
(P- 190)
Finally, Farrell offers a model of discourse based, in part, on Habermas’s 
grounding of the normative validity claims associated with three types of 
performative utterances: locutionary (communicative action), perlocutionary 
(strategic action), and illocutionary (symbolic action). As Habermas explains,
It seems to me that strategic action (oriented to the actor’s success— in 
general, modes o f action that correspond to the utilitarian model of purposive- 
rational action) as well as (still insufficiently analyzed) symbolic action (e.g., 
a concert, a dance— in general, modes of action that are bound to non- 
propositional systems o f symbolic expression) differ from communicative 
action in that individual validity claims are suspended (in strategic action, 
truthfulness; in symbolic action, truth). (Farrell 1993, p. 193)6
For the analytical purposes o f this study, the locutionary, illocutionary, and 
perlocutionary distinction provides ways of singling out identifiable things that 
speakers do with the same utterance. This model will be developed further and 
applied to the standards discourse.
4.3.1.3 Democratic Legitimacy
One theoretical perspective that merits further mention here is one that is of 
central importance in the discourse on standardization—the notion of democratic 
legitimacy. Weber (1921 -2) has proposed various types of legitimate authority, all of 
which rest basically upon belief-—i.e., an authority is legitimate if it is perceived or
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believed to be legitimate by those it governs. Habermas has developed this idea 
further, resting it upon practices of rational discourse and democratic deliberation in a 
free, open and fully informed environment. (1975, 1984) Chambers (1996) argues 
that it is often easier for people to agree on what action is right than on why it is right, 
and that the issue is most often resolved by agreeing on a process rather than on moral 
validity.
The argument here is that what we mean by moral truth is highly 
contested but what we mean, generally speaking, by political justice and 
democratic legitimacy is not. A just system is one that regulates society fairly 
and in the general interest. The democratic legitimacy of a just system means 
that citizens freely consent that their institutions indeed do regulate society 
fairly and in the general interest, (p. 144)
The global standardization system is particularly dependent on the discursive 
construction and perception o f its legitimacy because often its institutions do not rely 
on direct government validation, particularly in the United States.
4.3.2 Discourse as Social Practice
In recent times, the study of communication has increasingly challenged 
earlier objectivist epistemological assumptions about society and its communication 
processes. These assumptions and processes viewed discourse as data that could be 
observed, collected and theorized independently o f the observer or the content. 
Increasingly, communication is being re-conceptualized as a human social 
construction situated in and emerging from specific social practices. In this 
constructivist concept, the study of rhetoric assumes a role in finding a theoretical 
understanding of how such constructions are developed and how meaning is
established. This conception o f the constitutive nature of social practice is seen in its 
epistemological consequences as characterized by ethnographer Clifford Geertz:
The concept o f  culture I espouse.. .is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, 
with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be 
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in 
search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social expressions on 
their surface enigmatically. (1973, p. 5.)
Another view o f discourse as social practice is expressed by Burke. (1950)
One o f his principal themes is the determinative role of language and symbols, or 
how we are invented by our symbols.” He has developed a notion o f action and 
motion that finds form in his theory of dramatism and the pentad. Burke’s pentad is a 
method for visualizing humans as narrative actors in a drama, and he decomposes the 
drama into elements o f purpose, act, scene, agent and agency. He emphasizes the role 
o f ambiguity and looks for the strategic spots at which ambiguity arises. It is through 
interpretation of such ambiguity that meaning is constructed by the players. He 
defines a “grammar o f motives,” (Burke 1950) where motives are sets of rules of 
usage or the joining o f words that lead to meaningful utterances and can be 
conceptualized as situations or situated action. (Mills 1940) As noted earlier, Burke 
proposes that identification, as an alternative to persuasion, builds on shared 
properties and creates new ones. He claims that we already have a multiplicity of 
identities and the task is to locate both identities and divisions. In summary, Burke’s 
primary contribution to rhetoric is to shift from method to symbol, or, in other words, 
to move rhetoric from practical art to social practice. Farrell (1993) relies on Burke in 
bringing symbolic action into the realm of discursive practice and in attempting to 
extend Habermas’s notion o f communicative action to include forms o f rhetoric, (p.
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202) The result is the creation of an audience-centered approach to establish a 
method of invention where everyone is a potential rhetor. Standardization evolved as 
a social practice and Burke’s approach is useful in understanding its discourse, 
particularly on the lower technical committee or working group level in terms of 
identification and situated action.
An account o f the constitutive possibilities of discourse would not be 
complete without mentioning Mikhail Bakhtin. He sees human experience entirely in 
social terms, whereby consciousness is based on symbolic meaning derived through 
individual and group experience specifically situated in time and space. Rejecting 
psychological or cognitive approaches in favor of a sociological one, he defines 
consciousness within a Saussurian semiotic context of signs, myths and ideologies. 
Ideological signs, including common sense, are seen not only as a reflection of 
reality, but also as part o f the reality itself. Bakhtin notes that:
Every phenomena functioning as an ideological sign has some kind of 
material embodiment, whether in sound, physical mass, color, movements of 
the body, or the like. In this sense, the reality of the sign is fully objective and 
lends itself to a unitary, monistic, objective method of study. A sign is a 
phenomena of the external world. (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990, p. 929)
In this sense, both the real world and the individual consciousness of it are 
comprehensible as products rather than sources o f language and signification. To 
Bakhtin, the reality of these signs creates a chain of ideological creativity and 
understanding, moving from sign to sign and then to a new sign. He continues,
This ideological chain stretches from individual consciousness to 
individual consciousness, connecting them together. Signs emerge, after all, 
only in the process o f interaction between one individual and another. And 
the individual consciousness is itself filled with signs. Consciousness becomes
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consciousness only once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, 
consequently, only in the process o f social interaction, (p. 929)
Bakhtin faults philosophy and psychology for localizing consciousness and 
ideology within the individual, asserting that taken apart from society, consciousness 
itself becomes a fiction and an improper ideological construct. Within the individual, 
language or the word” is the semiotic material o f inner life—the medium of 
consciousness and it is created only through social interaction. In a sense, Bakhtin 
goes beyond Burke’s later project toward a materialist view of rhetoric, continuing 
the shift from method to symbol and he places the audience at the center, constituting 
a reality. Farrell calls on Bakhtin in his project to bring both conversation (dialectic) 
and rhetoric into the realm o f  communication practice. (Farrell 1993, p. 233)
Michel Foucault carries the discourse as social practice even further, seeing 
history, or social knowledge, as a fragmented narrative that he prefers to call 
archaeology (Foucault 1973). This narrative constructed by the writer, reflects his or 
her own institutionalized perspective. He sees discourse as social practice and 
situated statements, rather than as texts subject to “interpretation,” and as such can 
only be understood within the context of its institutionally situated paradigm. He 
emphasizes the constitutive nature of discourse and contends that every society is the 
production o f discourse and controlled by discourse. To Foucault, the study of social 
practice and social will is the study o f discourse.
In considering discourse as a social practice, it is important to include 
Aristotle’s emthymeme, the syllogism whose major premise is a popular belief, and 
the intermingling o f instrumental and constitutive rhetoric. Edwin Black has 
suggested that enthymematic discourse “ .. .trades upon a body o f settled convictions
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attitudes and beliefs,” (Black 1965, p. 29) and establishes a frame o f reference—a 
reality or a paradigm— shared by a body o f readers or audience. It “ .. .does not 
proceed argumentatively. Rather its traffic is realities. It does not argue, it 
describes. Such discourse invokes myths and ideologies by using metaphors and 
topos (commonplaces) that constitute discursive “idiomatic tokens o f ideology.” 
(Black 1970) From a critical examination o f such discourse and its style, it is 
possible to discern a real or implied auditor. That “ .. .auditor implied by the 
discourse what the rhetor would have his real auditor become.” (Black 1970, p. 113) 
Thus, it is possible to reveal the moral character o f the discourse, i.e., the moral 
beliefs o f its authors. Such a perspective is essential to fully making sense of much of 
the discourse around standardization. Unstated conceptions of reality and moral 
beliefs about openness, balanced participation, the role of government, and about the 
role of the market play a major role in the standards discourse.
4.3.2.1 Theories of Rhetoric
It is useful to briefly consider traditional instrumental views of rhetoric 
because they provide a contrast to the view emphasized in this study, and because 
they contribute an insight into how instrumental discourse can become constitutive as 
is encountered in standards practice. The ancient Greeks considered rhetoric as 
instrumental. To the Sophists, rhetoric was a method of persuasion and content was 
unimportant. They considered the use of language in heuristic terms and took a 
playful or experimental attitude toward its use.
Plato objected to such abuse, seeing rhetoric in dialectic terms, as a method of 
searching for truth. This conflicting view is effectively portrayed in Plato’s dialog,
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Gorgias. Although, to Plato, rhetoric was about persuasion, his theory of rhetoric 
draws a distinction between knowledge and belief, and holds the highest purpose to 
be the pursuit o f truth (good). The persuasive power of rhetoric brings the persuader 
and the persuaded together, either by persuasion-to-belief (bad rhetoric) or by 
persuasion-to-knowledge (good rhetoric). If  focused on knowledge, rhetoric combats 
convention/conformance rather than exploiting it; educates rather than satisfies base 
desires; raises the student/reader to the level of the teacher/writer rather than lowering 
the teacher to the level of the student; and seeks truth rather than simply conformity 
or influence.
More specifically, the method of Plato’s dialog employs dialectic, the pursuit 
o f truth not simply articulating a truth position but by approximating or approaching a 
truth position (concept) by responsive and iterative interlocution or conversation 
(Farrell 1993, p. 248) between multiple speakers. They are engaged in a “rite of 
speech” which adheres to certain principles of sincerity of purpose in search of truth 
and not merely for the purpose of persuasion alone. In a sense, the discourse 
practiced in traditional standards committees, especially on the lowest (technical) 
level, could be seen as striving for this ideal. Farrell discusses “conversational 
coherence” and applies Habermas and Burke in bringing dialectic into the realm of 
communicative practice. (1993, p. 248)
Aristotle took a much different, although instrumental, view of rhetoric. To 
Aristotle, rhetoric is not the act or purpose o f persuading, but the process of “finding 
the means of persuasion” in a specific situation. To Aristotle, the discourse is always 
situated in some specific context. Aristotle sought, through analytical empirical
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method, to learn the science, or techne, o f such persuasion and to establish general 
principles by which the process could be understood. Aristotle relied on invention, 
dialectic, and knowledge (sensing). His dialectic was different than Plato’s, being 
more focused on process than on truth which is a form of critical thinking. As part of 
his pragmatic toolkit, Aristotle identified a set of 26 topoi, or stock arguments, 
employing rhetorical syllogisms or enthymemes. (Kennedy 1991)
The enthymeme, or truncated syllogism, is a central device in Aristotle’s 
techne o f rhetoric. This syllogism is truncated or incomplete because rather than 
explicitly stating its premises, it deliberately omits an important premise, thus 
allowing or inviting the audience to provide it. In the process of providing the 
missing premise, the audience participates in the speaker’s project and is induced to 
“buy in” to the rest of the speaker’s assumptions or purposes, thus forming a certain 
communication link between the speaker and audience. Such engagement of the 
audience’s pre-existing belief structure (perhaps part of its identity) begins to build a 
common consciousness with the speaker. This method, begins to resemble Burke’s 
constitutive consubstantiality and Althusser’s interpellation. Analysis of such 
enthymemes and identifying their unstated assumptions provide an important and 
useful method o f analysis in approaching the discourse on standardization. Farrell 
develops Aristotle’s enthymeme, maintaining th a t, “[with]...the moderating 
reflective tendencies within rhetoric... it is the enthymeme, as a middle-range7 
inferential prototype o f rhetorical practice, that allows conduct to become obligatory 
through an intertwinement o f situated interests and perspectives.” (p. 232)
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4.3.2.2 Constitutive Rhetoric
Theories of rhetoric provide a rich method of analysis for understanding the 
discourse on standardization. Some of these have already been mentioned above. 
Rhetoric has a long tradition, beginning from an “instrumental” view of persuasion to 
a later “constitutive view” o f identification. Very often these views are intertwined 
and both can be applied at the same time. O f some interest here is the concept of 
constitutive rhetoric, variously known as interpellation or consubstantiality.
Traditional instrumental rhetoric sees discourse largely as a listener or 
audience being persuaded by a speaker, and it the assumption is that such listeners or 
audiences are extra-rhetorical or passive and outside the rhetorical process. (Burke 
1950) The constitutive view, in contrast, regards the audience as an active participant 
embedded spontaneously, intuitively and unconsciously in the rhetorical process.
This is a process of bringing the audience into an ideological framework through the 
process o f interpellation, a term developed by the French political philosopher Louis 
Althusser. (1971, p. 170) Interpellation is a process of bringing something (e.g., an 
audience, or a cultural or social entity) into being by simply “calling” or “hailing.”
This interpellation is accomplished in the case of the standards discourse by 
projecting a message at the audience that identifies some common history and 
purpose with an additional narrative containing other assumptions about their history, 
identity and destiny. Those hearing the message find their own identity embedded in 
part of the message, but cannot clearly separate out the additional assumptions, and
thus tend to adopt the entire identity package. Thus they are “ interpellated” as 
political subjects through a process of identification in rhetorical narratives that 
“always already” presume the constitution of subjects. They are not persuaded in the 
usual sense, because belief is inherent in the subject position of the rhetoric. In 
Althusser’s terms, the process is an ontological one. The subject is not persuaded to 
be a subject, he or she is always already a subject, by simply hearing the message.
This process is very similar to that described by the Burke. (1950, p. 50) It works by 
offering a “consubstantiality” or identity between the would-be subjects. Such 
subjects may include the participants in the standards process, a public constituency, 
or those seeking to merge it with a specific political or economic agenda. Charland 
(1987) has applied Burke’s move to identification in an ideological context. He 
comments that “A consequence of this theoretical move is that it permits an 
understanding within rhetorical theory of ideological discourse, of the discourse as 
always only pointing to the given, to the natural, the already agreed upon.” (p. 133) 
Examples of such ideological discourse that are a focus of interest in this study will 
be about the free market, the sectoral approach, and compatibility.
Simply put, rhetoric can be seen as constitutive and incorporated into social 
practice, rather than as a method o f argumentation that addresses an objective and 
external audience in the traditional or classical sense. It can also be argued that 
constitutive rhetoric is also instrumental because it is so effective.
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4.3.2.3 Theory of Signification and Semiotics
An important and basic method of analysis employed in this study is broadly 
called semiotics or theory o f signification. Beginning with Saussure (1974) and 
Barthes (1973) and then extended by Fiske and Hartley (1978), a useful hierarchy has 
been established consisting o f three orders of signification that may be applied to the 
standards discourse: 1) sign, 2) myth, and 3) ideology.
The first order o f signification establishes a “sign” that is constructed by 
associating a symbol or “signifier” with some meaning or “signified.” Sometimes 
called denotation, it establishes the most basic symbols and signs that constitute the 
terms o f discourse, words or basic procedures through which meaning is conveyed. 
This order of signification includes the least value-laden terms, including, committee, 
working group, study group, secretariat, convener, and a vast array of acronyms and 
other standards jargon.8
The second order o f signification is constructed by combining first order 
signs, (which then become signifiers) with additional meaning or other signs to 
establish a new higher level o f connotative meaning. This new sign is known as a 
myth9 in which cultural images or meanings are packaged and conveyed. Myths 
encapsulate a set of meanings that reflect the value system of the culture of the person 
employing them. In the case o f standardization, this second order sign can include 
not only words but also the basic discursive practices of the standards process (e.g., 
how committees are constituted, organized and convened). Examples of second order 
signification found in standardization discourse may include terms such as free, open, 
balanced, public, private, and SDO.10 Standards groups and practices are
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mythologized in a variety of ways that include or employ rules, procedures, 
organizational structures, administrative or leadership hierarchies, expectations, and 
limitations.
The third order of signification, ideology, combines myths as signiflers to 
form yet another level of coherent pattern of meaning or belief that constitutes 
underlying, invisible organizing principles. This order of signification can also 
include the institutional frameworks within which standardization proceeds, including 
their economic, social and political contexts. Examples of such ideological signifiers 
in the present context of standardization might include such strongly value-laden 
terms as openness, free market, democratic, sectoral, privatization, and 
globalization.11
4.3.3 Political Economy and Related Theory
A number of scholars have applied methods of discourse analysis to 
communication policy, often with a theoretical focus on a political economic analysis 
of the outcomes. Calabrese (1991) has pointed out the problematic nature of terms 
such as community and analyzed the way certain communities o f  interest are 
discursively constructed.12 Wagner (1999, 1999a) has investigated the discourse 
around ICT policy in developing Asian economies from a political economic 
perspective. Rowland (1986) has examined the role of discourse, myth and 
ideological perspectives in communication policy research. Streeter has studied 
communication policy (1990) and, earlier, the history and discursive construction of 
the early cable television industry (1986) and the role of technocracy. This term may
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be applied critically to some standards bodies or consortia, or those who would apply 
and/or justify the results of their work:
.. .they tend to involve a continual striving, on the part o f a limited and 
relatively privileged group of people, for a Solution, a Truth, a bedrock of 
certainty that can then be used to justify making decisions that affect a much 
larger group o f people without embarking on the uncertain and troublesome 
process of involving the larger group in making those decisions. (Streeter 
1986, p. 207)
Theories and discourse of political economy are relevant to this study because 
the discourse on standardization is embedded in a material context. This context is 
that o f policy actions that lock it into economic and political institutions that are 
constituted by the discourse.
Historical institutionalization, although not the central methodology employed 
in the present study, does provide valuable insight, especially where it overlaps 
discourse. Wagner (1999) has studied the role o f discursive practice in policy 
formation from the perspectives of institutionalization established by Veblen 
(1919/1990) and by Innis (1972). He draws a distinction between the “old” 
institutionalist school which emphasized the social entities that provided legal and 
practical bases for economic activity, and the “new” institutionalist, school that 
concentrates on firms, markets, communication and transportation systems, and 
government, (p. 95) He points out that the former emphasizes the contingent and 
culturally constructed nature o f information, while the latter emphasizes individual 
optimization. The former concept is more useful to this study because it is the 
institutionalized codes o f conduct, norms o f behavior and conventions that constitute 
discursive practice and reveal meaning in standardization. This stands in contrast to 
the utilitarian or “rational choice” economic models applied by the latter. Wagner
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notes that this *wold” institutionalist method and its inherent anti-teleological ontology 
(or lack o f a predetermined end point or telos) renders precise predictions 
problematic, it does allow a level o f objectivity and forecasting however because of 
the tendency for discursive practices or habits to “lock-in” and to become institutions, 
(p. 98) He concludes, with particular relevance to the present study, that the “.. .kinds 
o f confusion about public and private networks, individual and corporate users of 
technology, and individual versus collective rights and interests, are not accidental 
constructions but the consequence o f historical predominance o f powerful classes 
within the institutional and discursive realms.”(p. 103-4)
Other closely related institutional perspectives that have influenced this study 
include Mansell (Mansell 1993; Mansell & Silverstone 1993; Hawkins, Mansell and 
Skea 1995), Hawkins (Hawkins, Mansell and Skea 1995) and Feenberg (1991) on the 
political economy of policy and standards; Bijker (1993, 1999) and Williams (1975) 
on the social construction o f technology; and, o f course, Carey (1989) and Schiller 
(1996, 2000) in communication studies.
4.4 Research Questions
The enclosure discourse and its authors (Lessig, Boyle, Litman, Benkler, et. al.) have 
been concerned about the openness o f outcomes, but the processes o f standardization 
by which many such outcom es are determined have not been examined closely in the 
context o f  their arguments. That is the question being explored by means of looking 
specifically at the policy discourses in which the technical standards for ICT are 
decided, including discourses on the institutional structures and their legitimation.
The research questions are: How public has standardization been in the past and how
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does that compare with the standardization process o f today. What is meant by terms 
such as public, private, ” and “open, ” and how are their meaninsg constructed 
and applied? I f  the process is now undergoing increasing enclosure, what are the 
roots o f  such enclosure? What are the responses to arguments that enclosure is 
occurring? What are the institutional responses to the perception o f  enclosure?
This study seeks to explain the concept o f  standards in the context of 
American and global industrial policy (e.g., what are “standards”? What is “open”?).
It then center the study around an examination o f the discourse on standards and 
consider what enclosure might imply for the future of open standards. Next, it 
consider specific case studies for their relevance to the enclosure hypothesis. Finally, 
it examine some of the institutional responses and proposed remedies to perceptions 
o f enclosure.
4.5 Conclusion
These theoretical perspectives of Habermas and of his concepts of discourse, 
communicative action, and the public sphere, o f standardization as a social practice, 
and o f political economy combine to provide the framework o f analysis in the 
standards discourse, the object o f analysis for this study. These theoretical 
perspectives will be applied together, each providing complementary elements of a 
framework for interpretation o f  the discourse on standards and standardization—the 
research “data.” For instance, in looking at a specific discourse or practice, the public 
sphere theory provides a grounding or reference model, the social practice perspective 
provides an understanding o f  the linguistic and rhetorical elements o f the discourse 
and how they constitute a reality, and the perspective of political economy provides a
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way o f finding the underlying motivations. The enclosure discourse and the research 
questions identify the specific problematic discursive constructions to look for. This 
analysis applies the method o f discourse analysis and historiography to find the 
various constructions and meanings embedded in the discourse. The overall purpose 
here is to provide a way of thinking about standards and standardization.
Research and analysis of standards and standardization discourse is important. 
As the metaphor of discourse becomes reality, perceptions influence policy decisions. 
Such decisions have material consequences for what is or is not developed (e.g., 
technologies, standards, intellectual property, innovation, etc.) and for who gets 
access to or control o f what (e.g., networks, information, resources). In summary, the 
standards discourse contains definitions or meanings. These meanings drive and 
justify policy decisions with material consequences. By examining the discourse, the 
meanings and their origins can be established. The final result is greater clarity o f  
the issues and o f the interests being served or not served. Better policy choices may 
then be possible.
The standards discourse is conducted within specific cultural, disciplinary, 
and institutional paradigms (e.g., science, engineering, business, economics, etc.) 
within which their various signs, myths and ideologies shape discourse, thought and 
action. The power of culture in technical organizations has been recognized and 
described by Thomas Kuhn (1962) as the “scientific paradigm,” concept that is 
particularly relevant. Standardization bodies and the industrial and governmental 
groups that constitute and convene them form an institutional context or culture 
within which certain mythological and ideological constructions are constituted,
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maintained, and embed them in a policy decisions. Wagner has found a very similar 
situation in other areas of technical and industrial policymaking.
.. .it has been widely recognized since Kuhn’s seminal work that 
adherents to particular disciplinary paradigms maintain orthodoxy within their 
ranks by means of consensus that are as much sociological as scientific. 
Disciplinary and ideological boundaries are hence [constituted and] 
maintained by virtue of discursive practices; tacit and unexamined agreement 
among members o f “epistemic communities,” concerning what is properly to 
be considered valid argument and conclusion. Paradigmatic divisions are 
further constructed and exacerbated by the selection and promotion of 
research and ideas by powerful institutions that have a high degree of interest 
in particular policy outcomes, and in promoting the paradigms of knowledge 
and discourse that tend to support those outcomes. (Wagner 1999a, p. 2)
The discourse o f standards and standardization can only be understood in the 
context of the institutions wherein it is practiced. The discourse is entwined with the 
social, cultural, economic, and political institutions and practices where real people 
and real structures are involved.
From the preceding general historical background, and with the aid of the 
literature and discourse on enclosure and on standardization that has been presented, 
this study proceeds to apply the foregoing theoretical perspectives and 
methodological approaches to the specific standards institutions, discourses, and the 
issues with which they deal. The next chapter will examine how the discourse was 
situated and observed (i.e., the field research method) and will establish the essential 
terms o f the discourse and their meanings. The ensuing chapter will then apply such 
meanings in examining the traditional institutions and practices that form the 
foundation of the present global standardization system.
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Discourse analysis is operationally defined here as including observing, transcribing, 
listening for particulars, selecting excerpts, documenting inferences, linking to scholarly controversies, 
and identifying or building insightful central claims.
2 Standardization practice could also be seen as being nested within another practice, that of 
international agreement, policymaking, negotiation, trade, diplomatic protocol, and rhetoric.
J MacIntyre defines practice as any coherent, complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve standards of excellence appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form 
of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (1981, pp. 169-209)
4 The standards themselves and their creation comprises yet another discourse worthy of 
study, but beyond the scope of the present study. The focus here is on the meta-discourse—i.e., the 
discourse about the discourse of standards.
5 Other such problematic terms to be considered include “sector,” private sector/public sector, 
sectoral approach, free market, capitalism, democracy, standard, legitimate, accredited, strategic, 
compatibility, and platform.
6 Farrell cites from the chapter, “What is Universal Pragmatics?” (Habermas 1988, p. 41)
7 By “middle-range,” Farrell means between extremes of logical argumentation (i.e., 
Habermas) and strategic action using belief or ideology.
8 Additional examples of first order signs include, rapporteur, convene, chairman, draft, 
contribution, recommendation, and ballot.
9 It is important to note that the term myth is not used here in the layman’s sense of “false 
belief,” but as a construct of meaning without regard to assessment of validity or merit.
10 Additional examples of second order signs include, consensus, voluntary, market, trade, de 
facto, expert, standard, SRO, MDC, etc.
11 Additional examples of third order signs include development, capitalism, regulation, 
deregulation, open processes, voluntary consensus, consortium, and relevance.
12 The term community has been appropriated by Sun Microsystems in constituting the Java 
Community Process, a form of standardization consortium. Kuhn (1962) emphasizes the notion of 
community in the establishment of a paradigm: “A paradigm governs...not a subject matter, but a 
group [community] of practitioners.” (Kuhn 1962)
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...communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is 
produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed.
—James Carey, 1989
CHAPTER 5 
Situated Discourse and Essential Terms
The research for this work is based on the thesis that standardization is 
moving from public formal bodies to more private consortia. A relevant question is 
why? Another basic question is what do these key words mean? In any case, the 
approach taken in this study is analysis o f historical and current discourses about 
standardization from the perspective of a separate discourse about privatization, or 
the enclosure discourse. The latter discourse was examined in the previous chapters 
to establish a perspective o f analysis. This chapter seeks to identify the essential 
terms o f the discourse of standards and standardization and to establish meanings. 
First, however, it is useful to briefly note the process by which much of the current 
standards discourse is situated and how it has been researched.
5.1 Field Research Method
Although this is not an ethnographic study, the research method used was 
inspired, by Geertz’ classic account of the Balinese cockfight.1 There may be some 
similarity between standards committee meetings and cockfights, and the cultural 
dimensions are no less complex and determinative. As an anthropologist, Geertz 
sought to gain an understanding of cultural meaning by participating in specific social 
practices, and by doing so becoming somewhat o f an "insider.” By taking the same
risks as local villagers, rather than remaining detached, he was able to gain 
acceptance by and access to the participants and their practices. In this Geertz was 
able to discern the cultural meaning involved in various rituals and activities. The 
Balinese cockfight is a highly ritualized competition that gives insights into the 
Balinese culture. My approach here is somewhat similar, having been already 
accepted as a standards “warrior,” an insider who works on standards, administers 
committee activities, and struggles in the same highly ritualized battles as those that I 
study.
Much of the discourse discussed in this work was acquired by attending 
academic and industry conferences and actual standards meetings in which many of 
the principal actors in the discourse participated. This includes seventeen separate 
gatherings taking place over a three-year period. A list of these gatherings is 
provided in the Appendix. Since the author is personally known to many of the 
participants, it proved to be more fruitful to rely on informal unstructured interviews 
and discussions in hallways over coffee, around dinner or luncheon tables, and other 
similar situations. Using this method, the artificiality of structured questionnaires or 
interviews was absent did not tilt the answers or inhibit voluntary comments.
Although it became common knowledge among the participants at these gatherings 
that the author was engaged in academic research on standardization, it was also 
known that the author was attending not solely for research purposes. The author 
often spoke on or was a member on panels dealing with the topic of standards 
research, or actually was engaged in setting standards. This posture created a fruitful 
and candid atmosphere that minimized the distortion or biasing of the research data
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because the researcher was also an insider, a bona fide participant. What such an 
insider perspective provided was access to key elements of the discourse, both verbal 
and written, and the ability to contextually assess their relative importance in ways 
that an outside observer might find difficult. The author was able to make effective 
use o f his own knowledge, familiarity and contacts to get past many of the barriers 
that exist for outsiders attempting such a study. An example might be candid 
discussions between the author and participant(s) that would not have been 
undertaken with an outsider.
5.2 Essential Terms o f the Discourse
Many terms o f the discourse on standards and their usage will emerge in the 
research below, but several deserve special focus and some initial explanation. O f 
particular importance are: public and private, public sector and private sector, 
sectoral, and, most important of all, open?
5.2.1 Public and Private
The problematic nature of the terms public and private has been discussed in 
earlier chapters. The word public is usually defined as pertaining to the people as a 
whole on some unspecified scale, (i.e., community, city, state, nation, etc.). (Random 
House 1967, p. 1162) However, in its successive definitions, public comes to refer to 
open to the people, acting for  the people, representative of the people, the affairs o f 
the people and then finally government. This gradation or spectrum of meaning is 
depicted in figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1—Spectrum of Meaning for Public
Private begins from the opposite end: the individual person, then progressing 
to a small group of persons, to limited groups or access, to not representative or not 
public, and ultimately to not government. A similar spectrum of meaning is depicted 
in Figure 5.2.
not
government
Not
Public
limited
Not access limited
representative group small
of the public group indivdiualperson
Figure 5.2—Spectrum of Meaning for Private
Thus, the meaning o f these terms becomes highly contextual and also depends 
on the direction from which one approaches the terms. In standards discourse, it is 
not uncommon to find these words, public and/or private, used in different senses 
within the same document or even within the same paragraph. For instance, when 
public is directly juxtaposed with private, or when the word sector is used, it signifies 
government and non-government, as in the usage public sector3 versus private sector. 
This usage is contrasted with terminology such as public access, public availability, 
public forum, public opinion, or public exposure, which does not signify government,
but rather multiple private parties considered together as a public. This latter case is 
more the sense of Habermas’s public sphere.
Habermas traces the evolution of the bourgeois public sphere from the 
Enlightenment period of the 17th and 18th centuries. He sees it as a space that was 
related to the notion o f civil society, as distinct from government, “ .. .within which 
private people assembled to constitute a public and to regulate those aspects of their 
commerce with each other that were of general concern.” (Habermas 1962, p. 142). 
Such assembly often took place in London coffee houses and Parisian salons of that 
period. Habermas’s primary concern is the changing rationale for politics. That also 
was a structural transformation of this public sphere in modern society brought about 
by a mutual infiltration of public and private spheres, a transfer of public function to 
private corporate bodies (i.e., privatization) and the extension of public authority over 
sectors of private realm (refeudalization and/or neomercantilism). He sees this 
transformation as having lead to a decline of public life and a replacement of the 
discursive and interactive politics of the earlier public sphere by technical, 
administrative and commercial discourse and politics that were devoid of genuine 
public judgement.
This study suggests that the political life of the public sphere may be in the 
process of being restored to some extent in this highly specialized arena by a 
necessity of dealing with public policy issues in the private-yet-public realm of 
standardization. Such policy discourse has found its way into standards discourse by 
the interwoven nature of technical and policy issues, as claimed by Lessig. This 
public/private ambiguity is relevant because its various perceptions are reflected in
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the access to participation and in the interests being served. When Habermas in 1962 
recognized the decline o f his generalized concept of “the public,” he also reflected on 
the possibility to realize some of the benefits of the principle of publicness within 
more specialized forms of discourse that take place within complex modem intra- and 
inter-organizational spheres (1962, p. 248). Hence, it can be suggested that the 
process of standardization approximates this sort of discourse.
The consequence for standards discourse—struggling to deal with notions of 
what is or ought to be public or private, and to what degree—is that the situation is 
ripe for confusion and strategic manipulation. Standardization practice, it is 
suggested, dwells somewhere between the poles of public and private as in 
Habermas’ public sphere or Lessig’s commons. Since there is no accepted term in the 
general discourse for such a place— only an unspecified, but nevertheless sharp, 
public sector/private sector dichotomy—the public sphere or commons is thus de­
legitimized4 and rendered invisible and, therefore, cannot be considered. This is a 
case o f rhetorical reverse appellation, to use Althusser’s term. The end result is an 
inability to stabilize the concept of whether standardization is a public or private 
function, or what the role o f government, industry, or the public ought to be. Much of 
the discourse struggles with that question, particularly the tension between the U.S. 
and European concepts of standardization.
5.2.2 Sectoral
The term sector is likewise afflicted with multiple meanings and also with 
limiting connotations. This term occupies a prominent place in standards discourse in 
the United States, particularly in ANSI discourse, and when distinguishing between
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U.S. and European practices. The initial words in the National Standards Strategy 
(ANSI 2000, p. 2) set the general tone and acknowledge the dual meaning of sector:
Voluntary consensus standards for products, processes and services are at 
the foundation of the U.S. economy and society. The United States has a 
proud tradition of developing and using voluntary standards to support the 
needs of our citizens and the competitiveness of U.S. industry. The American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the coordinator of the U.S. standards 
system, has brought together public and private sector interests to make this 
happen, [emphasis added]
The above passage contains a prominent footnote on the word sector that reads,
The word “sector” is used in two different meanings in this document. 
The first use divides the world into the “public sector” and the “private 
sector,” distinguishing between the roles of government and non-government. 
The second use refers to a technology area where customer needs dictate a 
coherent and consistent approach to standardization. This use is sometimes 
called “industry sector” or “market sector” but we have chosen to use the 
simpler term “sector” to include all interested parties and not just commercial 
interests. Most standards are related to specific sectors (e.g., information 
technology, automotive) and are not applicable to the needs of other sectors.
The basic meaning o f sector is a piece of pie, sliced radially. Its use in geometry, 
military service, and astronomy imply a rather precise spatial demarcation. In both 
meanings cited above, no such precision is possible, yet it is still implied. Its use fails 
to acknowledge the ambiguity or overlap between “sectors.” The problem with the 
first usage in this respect has already been discussed in this chapter. In regard to the 
second usage, one problem is that industry or market sectors are not only unclearly 
defined and overlapping, but often mobile, particularly in high technology areas. For 
instance, with the convergence of technologies, markets and business organizations in 
the ICT field, many older sectoral divisions of telecommunication (i.e., telephony), IT 
(i.e., computers), software, cable, broadcasting, Internet, etc., have become limiting 
and conflicting in respect to standardization and to regulation, as noted in Chapter 2.5
One o f the greatest points of conflict between European and U.S. standards 
discourses has been this sectoral approach issue. The ANSI claim that “most 
standards are related to specific sectors and are not applicable to the needs of other 
sectors” is problematic and directly in conflict with the European tradition of 
standardizing and regulating on the basis of overriding principles, wherever possible. 
This tradition seeks to base policies and standards on general cases or unifying 
principles rather than on narrow sets of rules. The European, or more broadly the 
non-U.S., view is that the sectoral discourse is about the avoidance of establishing 
broad principles that might later somehow limit the options of players in the market.6 
Such a sectoral approach does not provide for “coherence” or allow the possible 
restructuring of industries. (Vardakis 2002) In the footnote cited above, the ANSI 
claim is that it is necessary to narrow the scope of a standard in order to provide “a 
coherence and consistent approach” to meeting “customer needs.” The implication is 
that non-sectoral approaches may be of value where “customer needs” are not in 
question. It is not clear when such a situation would occurr. The opposite of ANSI’s 
claim is that the sectoral approach may result in conflicting, overlapping and 
competing standards, and that “coherence and consistency” can only be fully 
achieved by a broader, more comprehensive, approach (Vardakis 2002, 1998). Thus, 
both sides claim their path to coherence and consistency is the correct one.
ANSI’s commitment to the sectoral approach may be seen as accommodating 
the traditional “tu rf’ divisions of its diverse constituents and the necessities of 
holding such a voluntary private federation together, absent of any overriding 
mandate (i.e., government regulatory authority).7 It has been suggested that this
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structure may also be related to a need of preserving revenues from the sales of 
standards documents. (Cargill 1997, p. 245) In any case, it may be that the sectoral 
approach is an inevitable consequence of a standardization regime based on private 
associations rather than one with a greater public mandate. The sectoral vs. non- 
sectoral approach has been characterized as a vertical vs. horizontal structure. This 
topic along with the issue o f narrow rules vs. broad principles will be considered in 
greater detail in Chapter 7.
5.2.3 Open
The term open is perhaps one of the most important and yet also most 
imprecise concepts.8 In the earlier discussion regarding Free and Open, it was noted 
that Lessig interpreted open as in open society. A good place to start refining the 
definition is with philosopher Karl Popper’s notion of open society in his seminal 
work, The Open Society and Its Enemies. (Popper 1945) In Popper’s sense, an open 
society is one where
...no ideology or religion is given a monopoly, where there is critical 
interest in new ideas wherever their source, where political processes are open 
to public examination and criticism, where there is freedom to travel and 
where restrictions on trade with other countries are minimal, and where the 
aim of education is to impart knowledge rather than to indoctrinate.
(Outhwaite and Bottomore 1993, p. 430).
Much of the above description seems directly relevant and applicable to 
standardization as a social practice. Popper contrasts open society and its reliance on 
critical thinking with closed groupings where there is a reliance on pre-existing moral 
authority, tribal loyalty or corporate unity. He notes that life in an open society can 
be quite arduous and not necessarily happier than in a closed society because of the
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burden on individual responsibility and critical thought. Popper’s open society has no 
historical determination or destiny. It is only the sum of its members, and their 
actions serve to fashion and shape it, not the converse. The social consequences of 
intentional actions are often, and largely, unintentional.
As in the case of other key terms in the lexicon of standardization, the 
distinction between open and closed is not a sharp dichotomy, but a gradation of 
multiple dimensions. Each of the attributes noted by Popper could be applied to 
standards activities as found in their various institutional or organizational practices 
from the very open to the not-so-open? The concept of Popper’s open applied to 
standards practice is consistent with both the social constructionist (i.e., Social 
Construction of Technology) perspective and with Habermasian notions of discursive 
practice and democratic deliberation (i.e., communicative action) mentioned earlier. 
With this theoretical perspective, it is possible to more directly define open 
standardization practice.
As discussed in an earlier chapter, a recent ANSI annual report (ANSI 2001, 
p. 4) defines open as a condition where “any materially affected and interested party 
has the ability to participate.” This wording is an abbreviated version of the phrase 
used in the ANSI Procedures (ANSI 2002a) under the category of “due process,” a 
phrase that derives from the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The full text 
of the subsection “openness” 10 reads:
Participation shall be open to all persons who are directly and materially 
affected by the activity in question. There shall be no undue financial barriers 
to participation. Voting membership on the consensus body shall not be 
conditional upon membership in any organization, nor unreasonably restricted 
on the basis o f technical qualifications or other such requirements.
I l l
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Timely and adequate notice of any action to create, revise, reaffirm, or 
withdraw a standard, and the establishment of a new consensus body shall be 
provided to all known directly and materially affected interests. Notice should 
include a clear and meaningful description of the purpose of the proposed 
activity and shall identify a readily available source for further information. In 
addition, the affiliation and interest category of each member of the consensus 
body shall be made available to interested parties upon request. (ANSI 2002a, 
p. 1)
In ascertaining the full meaning of this definition and its historical evolution, it is 
useful to go back to an earlier discourse, the National Policy on Standards for the 
United States. This document was a precursor to the present ANSI Procedures, 
released by the National Standards Policy Advisory Committee in 1979. (NSPAC 
1979). Much of the wording is identical, but with an interesting difference. The 
earlier document reads:
.. .shall be open to all persons who might reasonably be expected to be, or 
who indicate that they are, directly and materially affected by the activity in 
question. ...Organizations shall give reasonable notice of standards 
development activities and actions, (p. 1). [emphasis added]
The current language seems to have migrated somewhat over the issue as to who has 
a legitimate interest on the basis of being “materially affected.”11 The above citation 
also has a footnote that reads:
One member, (George Papritz) expressed the view that the first and last 
sentences should read as follows: “Participation in national standards 
activities should be open to all interested persons and groups.”
“Organizations shall give interested persons and groups reasonable notice of 
standards development activities and actions.”), [emphasis added]
George Papritz at that time was the chief o f standards for Consumers Union. It 
appears that there was at that time a controversy over who should or should not be 
included in open standardization. Since that time the language has migrated in the 
direction of privatization. It is also interesting to note that the 1979 National
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Standards Policy Advisory Committee document used the phrase government sector, 
rather than public sector. There are a number of other interesting differences in the 
two documents.12
A useful, i f  not rigorous, taxonomy o f open standards has been proposed by 
Krechmer (1998) in The Principles o f  Open Standards, a paper13 that expands on the 
ANSI principles. K rechm er proposes ten  criteria:
Open Standards is a changing concept, molding itself to the evolving 
needs of an open, consensus based society. Currently ten concepts are 
considered, at least by some, to constitute part of the principles of Open 
Standards:
• Openness - all stakeholders may participate in the standards development 
process.
• Consensus - all interests are discussed and agreement found, no 
domination.
• Due Process - balloting and an appeals process may be used to find 
resolution.
• Open IPR - holders of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) must identify 
themselves during the standards development process.
• Open World - same standard for the same function, world-wide.
• Open Access - all may access committee documents, drafts and 
completed standards.
• Open Meeting - all may participate in standards development meetings
• On-going Support - standards are supported until user interest ceases 
rather than when provider interest declines.
• Open Interfaces - interfaces allow additional functions, public or 
proprietary.
• Open Use - low or no charge for IPR necessary to implement an 
accredited standard.
The first three principles are at the heart of the existing ANSI Open Standards 
concept. These are required procedures of the American National Standards 
Institute for all accredited standards organizations. The fourth principle (Open 
IPR) has been formally added to the standards development process by ANSI, 
its SDOs and many international standard development organizations. The 
fifth principle (Open World) is supported by ANSI but not required. The 
additional five procedures represent Open Standards concepts which are 
emerging but which are not yet supported by most accredited SDOs. To what 
extent should Open World and the additional five procedures be considered 
principles of Open Standards? (p. 1)
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Krechmer then proceeds to attempt to map various activities and organizations 
according to his proposed criteria listed. Although he encounters some difficulty, due 
to the limitations o f  the public/private, sector and openness terminology, he shows 
how various organizations meet or apply the multidimensional term open differently. 
This line o f analysis will be pursued further in respect to certain specific discourses 
making claims o f openness.
5.3 Conclusion
This chapter has examined how standardization practice and discourse is 
situated and how it was observed. It also has sought to identify the essential terms o f 
the discourse and establish their meanings. These terms included public, private, 
sector, sectoral, and, m ost importantly, open. The next chapter examines some o f  the 
most traditional standardization institutions and practices, with particular attention 
given to the application o f  the above terms and their meanings applied by those 
institutions.
1 Chapter 15: “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” p. 412-453, in Geertz (1973).
2 Other terms include balanced, free market, capitalism, democracy, standard, legitimate, 
regulation, co-regulation, harmonize, specification, essential requirements, coherent, accredited, 
strategic, compatibility, and platform.
3 The use of sector implies a sharp distinction that is left undefined—a slice of the pie, but of 
unknown dimension—and fails to recognize or acknowledge the ambiguity or overlap between sectors.
4 This term was suggested by van Wegberg (2002a).
5 Examples of conflicting regulatory and standardization paradigms might include telephony 
and VoIP, cable and DSL regulation, broadcasting and Internet radio. The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 is very conflicted in this respect and the structural organization of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) is under re-consideration.
6 The issue of data privacy is a good example. The EC adopted broad privacy directives and 
an effort was made to bring these into the ISO standardization arena—an effort that was successfully 
fended off by ANSI. A detailed account of this discourse on privacy standards has been provided by 
Schoechle (1998, 1995).
This is the author’s interpretation as suggested by the introductory remarks of Oliver Smoot 
(ANSI Board Chairman) and of Mark Hurwitz (ANSI President and CEO), other participants and 
audience comments at the Breaking Down Borders: business, standards and trade: ANSI Annual 
Conference, Washington, DC, October 15-16, 2002. Smoot’s remarks emphasized the “sectoral view.” 
Hurwitz remarks emphasized the “diverse nature of U.S. delegations to ISO meetings” that were 
representative of the unique character of the ANSI Federation,” the need to “get high level corporate 
executives to support standardization,” and the important “issue of membership” and funding.
It is interesting to note that in one particular dictionary, the definition of open is one of its 
longest, offering 82 separate meanings. (Random House 1967, p. 1008)
Virtually all standards bodies claim some measure of openness and virtually none admits to 
being closed.
Section 1 (Due process and criteria for approval and withdrawal of American National 
Standards), subsection 1.2 (Due process requirements), paragraph 1.2.1 (Openness).
11 The use of the phrase, “any materially affected and interested party,” is interesting. What 
does materially mean—holding a financial stake? Does and mean that the party must be both 
materially affected and materially interested^ . What does interested mean? The passage following 
indicates that some proposed to simplify this wording to only interested, but were unsuccessful in 
doing so. What was the purpose in a restricted definition? The term stakeholder is also often used in 
the standards discourse with similar ambiguity.
12 For instance, the paragraph V. (General Principles), 2. (National Standards Writing 
Activities), e. (Consumer/User Views) in the older document mandating pro-active soliciting of 
consumer participation was dropped, as well as V. 6 (Consumer/Small Business Funding) urging 
financial support of smaller participants.
13 This paper was awarded 2nd place in the annual World Standards Day paper competition for 
1998, sponsored by ANSI and NIST.
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The noisiest of those competitive battles [between suppliers] will 
be about standards. The eyes of most sane people tend to glaze 
over at the very mention of technical standards. But in the 
computer industry, new standards can be the source of 
enormous wealth, or the death of corporate empires. With so 
much at stake, standards can arouse violent passion.
—The Economist, 23 February 1993
CHAPTER 6 
Traditional Institutional Structures and Practices
In order to understand how traditional processes and discursive spaces may be 
undergoing enclosure, it is useful to examine the baseline from which recent changes 
have taken place. In other words, it is important to ask, How open were these 
standards-setting institutions and their practices in the past? This is not an easy 
question to answer. The diversity among various institutions is considerable. Even 
the question, What institutions should we be talking about? is not easy to answer. A 
detailed historical account, analysis, and comparison of standardization bodies is 
beyond the scope o f this study, but the three oldest and most established international 
institutions, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), have been selected here because they are stable, they are 
respected, and their authority and legitimacy are well established. They were 
mentioned briefly in an earlier chapter, as part of an historical overview of the global 
standardization system. They will now be examined in more detail.
In the previous chapter, certain key terms of discourse were identified and 
considered. These terms included public, private, and open. The present chapter will 
examine the history, structure, and practices o f these institutions in an attempt to form 
a profile for each. It will then draw comparisons between them on the basis of these 
terms. The assumption here is that history can help reveal the meaning embedded in 
this social practice. Only enough history will be visited here to find the contextual 
meaning of the terms. This examination will proceed chronologically, beginning with 
the oldest—the ITU, then the IEC, the ISO, and finally JTC1, a collaboration between 
IEC and ISO. The ITU differs significantly from the others because it is a 
governmental treaty organization, now part of the United Nations, while the others 
are voluntary non-treaty and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nevertheless, 
the standards1 that come out of these three organizations are all voluntary in their 
application. They may later become “national” standards if adopted by an 
appropriate national body and may subsequently acquire force of law or regulation on 
a national or regional basis.
6.1. ITU— International Telecommunciation Union
6.1.1 ITU History
The ITU dates from the formation of the International Telegraph Union at a 
conference called by Napoleon III and held in Paris in 1865. The Paris conference 
produced a treaty known as the International Telegraph Convention that established 
an organization and a set o f regulations. The “electric telegraph”2 had previously 
been introduced in a number of nations and immediately employed to improve the 
operation of their railway systems, but international operations were encumbered by a
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lack of uniformity and interoperability. One of the earliest tasks of the ITU was the 
establishment of technical standards, in particular for deciding on a code to be 
used—the international Morse code, The ITU also addressed matters such as the 
interconnection of important cities, hours of reception for telegrams, the obligation 
for foreign message delivery, and the commitment of transmission capacity. (Codding
1982, p. 4) Another outcome of the 1865 Paris conference was the concept of 
periodic meetings, known as conferences, of delegates from national telegraph 
administrations to keep the standards, rules, and regulations up to date. This 
hierarchical conference-based structure became the basic organizational model of the 
ITU.
The early application of the telegraph was seen not simply as a means of 
operating railroads, but more generally, according to the ITU, as “ ...an efficient 
means of establishing central control and government” (p. 4). Except in the United 
States, telegraph systems were generally institutionalized as monopolies, owned and 
operated by national governments. In the U.S., the telegraph was dominated by 
Western Union, a private corporation that established an early monopoly (DuBoff
1983, Horwitz 1989). News services and other early commercial users were 
welcomed because their revenues were used to cross subsidize government and 
railway users, who often enjoyed the use of the telegraph without charge. In many 
countries, the telegraph system was combined with the postal system and 
administered by organizations that later became known as PTTs (offices of Post, 
Telephone, and Telegraph). With such a system of combined post and telegraph 
operation and cross-subsidization, it became virtually impossible to identify the true
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cost of telegraphy. Ordinary citizens had little access to the telegraph due to high 
charges and low priority. Thus the basic practices of the ITU and its close 
relationship with member nations and with commercial entities became 
institutionalized at an early stage. Inherent limitations on openness and public 
interest representation were cast in institutional structures and practices from the 
outset, while ordinary citizens or their direct interests were not really involved.
The ITU grew rapidly, from its initial twenty members to twenty-four by its 
London Conference in 1879 and to forty-eight by 1914. The United States refused to 
join the ITU because it had never nationalized its telegraph and telephone networks 
and it could not participate in an organization that regulated their use. (p. 11) 
Nevertheless, the U.S. did send observers to ITU meetings and participated 
informally in the developing global network, and their role should not be 
underestimated for lack o f formality. U.S. industrial policy in telecommunications 
and its role in shaping the international system were reflected in many ways including 
the Communication Act o f 1934, in ownership policies, and in the way that notions of 
“public” interest and service militated against the public agency approach of PTT 
nations.
As the ITU grew, bringing in many developing countries and the interests of 
their national PTTs (a growing source o f revenue for national governments), another 
basic organizing principle o f the ITU took form—the importance of 
telecommunications in national development and the influence of developing 
countries as a political force within the ITU.
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Except for the development of the telephone, very few technical innovations 
took place in the telegraph world for nearly four decades. The telephone escaped 
much of the telegraph's regulatory regime because of its expense and unreliability, of 
the predominance o f the telegraph for formal communication (having a written 
record), and of a lack of interest by telegraph monopolies preoccupied with protecting 
their investment in telegraph systems. It was not until the 1925 Paris Telegraph 
Conference that, with the perfection of the telephone and of radiotelegraphy, the need 
was recognized for a separate telephone consultative committee to deal with technical 
standards for telephony.
Radio also developed along a much different pattern than telegraphy. It found 
its early application in communications between ships at sea and land and played an 
important role in the world’s merchant fleet for both safety and commercial purposes. 
The Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company gained an early dominance due to its 
technological and commercial adeptness. (p. 12) When the company, challenged by 
U.S. and German firms, overplayed its hand by refusing interoperation with other 
equipment, it evoked pressure for international agreement that eventually resulted in 
the 1906 International Radiotelegraph Convention. The 1906 agreement was 
ultimately incorporated into the ITU structure, although not fully until 1938. The 
underlying struggle was basically between corporations (i.e., RCA, Siemens, and 
Marconi), but regardless o f the winner, the principle of the primacy of private 
interests was firmly established.
With the gradual development of telephony and radio, additional technical 
standardization bodies were established in various forms and eventually incorporated
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into the ITU structure. The CCITT (Comite Consultatif International Telegraphique 
et Telephonique) became a formal permanent study committee of the ITU in 1956.
Its mission was to ensure interoperability of national networks.3 The CCITT became 
the principal standardization arm of the ITU for telecommunications. The CCIR 
(Comite Consultatif International de Radiocommunication) was formed as a 
comparable technical standards body for radio.
An important characteristic that evolved in the ITU was that of the 
relationship between private interests, public interests, and government interests. The 
early domination by governments of telegraphy, and later of telephony and to a 
certain extent of radio, was justified by the importance of these technologies and 
technical systems to their respective national public interests. Soon, however, as 
described above, the interests of government diverged from those of the public. 
Monopolistic rate structures, impairment of innovation, and lack of competition 
served governmental institutional interests but worked against much of the general 
public. Private, largely corporate interests were often served by the development of 
symbiotic alliances with government institutions. In the United States, arguments 
were typically advanced against government regulation and ownership, even as 
monopoly corporate interests were justified by government regulation in the “public 
interest.”4 In such cases, a general pattern of the “capture” o f regulators by those 
corporate interests they regulated, often produced essentially the same result as the 
national PTT monopolies (e.g., AT&T). (Horwitz 1989)
Here, as seen earlier in this study, the limited terminology of the 
public/private dichotomy proves inadequate in describing the reality of the
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situation masking the important distinction between the public and the government. 
This concern was reflected in a report o f the American observer to the St. Petersburg 
Telegraph Conference in 1875:
The interests of the public who use the telegraph seemed to be entirely 
subordinated to the interests of the state and to the administrations: that is, to a 
fear lest any improvement (in the rate structure) might produce less revenue 
than is got at present, and lest it might throw more work on the telegraph 
bureau. (Codding 1982, p. 8)
The history o f the ITU is one of an institution, initiated by governments, but 
proceeding by both a tension and an accommodation relative to private interests. 
Standardization in the ITU reflects a classic debate over the relationship between 
standardization and innovation.
Standards are, in the abstract, both a help and a hindrance to the 
development of telecommunications. By obtaining common agreement on a 
standard, business and governments can be induced to implement new 
facilities and systems. On the other hand, the adoption of such a standard is 
usually based on existing technological assumptions which may well 
change... In the real world of competition among providers of 
telecommunication equipment and services, the adoption of standards also 
represents a way o f creating market opportunities. (Codding 1982, p. 226)
How the market opportunities are reflected in standardization activity can play 
out in various ways. The standards wars over television standards represented an 
interplay between standards bodies and national commercial interests that resulted in 
competing regional standards, much like the history of railroad gauges or of electrical 
power plugs. For example, a controversy arose over the formation of the radio 
committee at the 1927 Washington Radiotelegraph Conference; “ ...the U.S. argued 
that such a body might hinder the evolution of radio by adopting premature standards. 
The French were afraid that [through such a committee] some private companies 
might obtain unfair advantage over others by gaining approval of their technology.”
(p. 17) Codding reflects that “The two surviving international consultative 
committees [i.e., CCITT and CCIR] are unique in the ITU experience, and in the 
experience o f most other international organizations, because of their participatory 
blend of government and private enterprise.” (p. 105) For instance, the 13th 
International Telegraph Conference and the 4th International Radiotelegraph 
Conference meetings in Madrid in 1932 included eighty countries and sixty-two 
private companies and organizations, (p. 18) In reality, government positions in the 
ITU are usually driven by private industry research and development priorities. The 
result is that industrial interests end up defining the “public interest,” despite 
complaints, particularly heard in the United States, about government bureaucratic 
interference and national industrial policy.
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6.1.2 ITU Structure
Figure 6.1— ITU and ITU-T Organizational Structure
The present structure of the ITU was solidified at Plenipotentiary Conferences 
held in Geneva in 1992 and in Kyoto in 1994 and is shown in figure 6.1. The 
governance o f the ITU is a top-down structure, with ultimate authority resting with its 
Plenipotentiary conferences. The CCITT and the CCIR were renamed the ITU-T and 
the ITU-R sectors respectively and are governed by the World Telecommunication 
Standardization Conference (WTSC)5 and the World Radio Conference (WRC) held 
on a four-year cycle. The ITU’s international development role was institutionalized
through the formation of the ITU-D sector as a basic part of the structure. All 
standards (known as Recommendations) developed by ITU-T committees (called 
Study Groups) must ultimately be approved by a WTSC Conference that meets every 
four years before they are considered final.. All new work items or projects (known 
as Questions) must also be so approved every four years.
The ITU-T organizational structure is also shown in figure 6.1 under the ITU- 
T block. Standardization activity takes place within the eighteen Study Groups (SGs) 
that have been established to date (see table 6.1). They are administered by the 
Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) acting as a central secretariat in 
Geneva. Each SG is divided into Working Parties (WPs) that are assigned general 
topics including groups of specific Questions. Each Question is then assigned to a 
Rapporteur Group, the lowest level, where, as in most standards bodies, the actual 
work is done. As in other standards bodies, the actual study work is carried on 
largely through contributions (i.e., documents) that are submitted by group 
participants, distributed by the TSB, and then discussed either by correspondence or 
at scheduled international meetings. This work is often the result of collaboration 
with other organizations. Such contributions often require substantial resources to 
produce, and represent an avenue by which private corporate interests are represented 
in ITU activities at the lowest working levels. In most cases, the WTSC approves the 
Recommendations as presented or makes only minor changes. (Cemi 1984, pp. 140- 
141) In practice, the work generally proceeds without waiting for formal approvals.
A useful summary of the working procedures and practices in ITU-T committees is 
provided in ITU-T/ISO/IEC (1996).
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SG Title
Definition and Operational Aspects of Telegraph and Telematic Services 
Telephone Operation and Quality of Service
III General Tariff Principles
IV Transmission Maintenance of International Lines, Circuits, and Chains of 
Circuits
V Protection Against Dangers and Disturbances of Electromagnetic Origin
VI Protection and Specification of Cable Sheaths and Poles
VII Data Communication Networks
VIII Terminal Equipment for Telematic Services (Fax, Telex, Videotex, etc.)
IX Telegraph Networks and Terminal Equipment
X (discontinued)
XI Telephone Switching and Signaling
XII Telephone Transmission Performance and Local Telephone Networks 
XII (discontinued)
XIV (discontinued)
XV Transmission Systems
XVI Telephone Circuits
XVII Data Communication over Telephone Network
XVIII Digital Networks
Table 6.1—ITU-T Study Groups
Participation in SGs is formally established by national bodies as members.
In the U.S., this role is under the Office o f International Communications of the 
Department of State and is administered through a U.S. National Committee structure 
that mirrors the ITU’s SG structure. U.S. National Committee SG meetings are “open 
to all interested persons.” (Cerni 1994, p. 142) Contributions (documents) are 
submitted on a national level and then advanced to the ITU in Geneva either as a U.S. 
contribution, representing a consensus o f one o f the U.S. mirror SGs, (i.e., a formal 
U.S. position) or as an individual member contribution, representing the position of a 
private U.S. organization or of individual experts.
Although voting membership in the ITU is formally organized on a national 
basis, in practice, participation in technical work has expanded over time to include a 
wide array of organizations and interests. These members are classified as
Recognized Operating Agencies (ROAs), Scientific and Industrial Organizations 
(SIOs), and others. ROAs are basically telecommunications operators or service 
providers, either nationally or privately held (e.g., Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, 
AT&T, Telenor, British Telecom, Deutsche Telecom, Telecom Italia, etc.). The SIO 
category includes m anufacturers and other corporations (e.g., Lucent, Ericsson, 
Siemens, Nortel, Nokia, Telcordia, etc.), and other standards bodies, including both 
formal Standards Developm ent Organizations (SDOs) and private consortia (e.g.,
E TSI, IETF, ECM A, IEC, ISO W3C, IEEE, etc.). Also included are many non­
governmental organizations (e.g., European Space Agency, International Committee 
o f the Red Cross, International Criminal Police Organization, Inter-American 
Association o f Broadcasters, Intelsat, the Internet Society, etc.). A recent dues- 
paying membership tally showed 189 m em ber states, 180 ROAs, 232 SIOs, 19 
Associates, and 42 others. (Zhao 2001, p. 18)
6.1.3 ITU Practice
In the past, ITU practices have reflected control by governments, participation 
by industry and coordination with a few formal SDOs. Today, this practice has 
evolved into a one that is basically driven by industry, is market oriented, and 
includes participation by governments, regulators and many SDOs and consortia.
(Zhao 2001) The evolving and growing influence o f non-governmental participants 
was noted by Codding (1982) over twenty years ago:
One o f the aspects o f the work o f the consultative committees that has 
intrigued its observers over the years is the participation o f individuals from 
private entities along with individuals from government agencies in important 
aspects o f decision-m aking. W hile the logic o f including manufacturers and 
private users o f  telecomm unications equipment in the search for acceptable
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standards is strong, government entities are rarely willing to share 
international decision-making responsibilities so openly, (p. 99-100)
It seems clear that the participation of private operating agencies and the 
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment in the establishment o f 
international standards is more than merely symbolic. While national 
administrations tend to keep a close rein on the non-governmental groups at 
the time of the final decision-making in plenary assemblies, these groups are 
given a wide opportunity to affect the work of the study groups where basic 
research takes place, (p. 102)
The paragraphs above illustrate a certain mutual tension-yet-reliance that exists 
between government and private participants. The inherent tensions that existed 
between these elements is further illustrated by the following passage:
Particularly controversial in this international dialogue is the matter of 
private leased circuits...A new Recommendation has recently been 
adopted... [regarding] the use of private international telecommunication 
networks by specialized organizations. This matter is controversial because if 
private businesses (i.e., “specialized organizations” in CCITT jargon) obtain 
their own circuits, they could potentially compete with the existing 
monopolies which own and operate the public networks, (p. 232)
Another aspect o f ITU practice that has evolved is the accessibility of 
documents. Traditionally, ITU working documents as well as standards were not 
accessible to the public. A bewildering mix o f incompatible, inconsistent, 
duplicative, and expensive CCITT “Yellow Books” and (even more obscure) CCIR 
“Green Books” published in arcane formats made ITU standards work available only 
to the most determined observer. This mix o f documents and formats reflected the 
historic evolution and jurisdictional struggles over various subjects within the 
institution. This situation is changing with the introduction of limited document 
access via websites and the inclusion of other standards bodies, students, and 
academic researchers in ITU activities. Such changes also include the introduction of 
alternative “fast track” standardization processes such as the “Industry Agreement,”
the "Alternative Approval Process (AAP), the MoU (Memorandum of 
Understanding), jo in t management team meetings, common texts, etc. The recent 
changes reflect a struggle for relevancy and adaptation by this oldest standardization 
institution to the rapid advance o f technology and markets and to the resulting 
competition from “private” forums and consortia.
6.1.4 ITU Summary
The ITU has faced a dramatic challenge to re-invent itself—as a large 
institution with its legacy as a clearinghouse for monopoly telecommunications 
carriers and with representation by national governments under treaty obligations. It 
has been characterized as a “public” organization by Codding (1982) and by Cemi 
(1984), in contrast to other standards organizations, which are seen as “private.”
It is interesting to note that a public international organization like the 
ITU isn’t really necessary for the adoption of international standards. Indeed, 
several important private international standards-making bodies have existed 
for many years. Some of the more prominent include the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IE C ).. .These organizations tend to serve the needs of 
manufacturers for rather detailed equipment standards, [emphasis added] 
(Codding 1982, p. 225)
In what sense is the ITU public, while the ISO and the IEC are private? Clearly, the 
underlying unstated assumption above appears to be that the terms public and 
government are synonymous. This study seeks to show the limitations of such a 
concept and the need for more dimensionality o f meaning for these terms. While 
parts o f  the ITU process are ostensibly open, the complexity and detail of the 
technical work tend to favor well-heeled interests and place nonprofit public, NGO- 
like entities at a substantial disadvantage. It is not clear that the new inclusiveness of
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the ITU will or can remedy this problem. In fact, it may exacerbate the problem by 
making the process more complex, enabling access for certain parties who have 
adequate financial resources, but perhaps not others. The Plenipotentiary-based top- 
down governance structure may not be consistent with a quest for openness either.
6.2 IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
6.2.1 IEC History
The IEC, like the ITU, originated from an international conference, but it took 
a much different path— one of voluntary, non-treaty and non-monopoly orientation. 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, several international congresses were held as a 
result o f growing interest in international cooperation in electrical standards. As early 
as 1881, meetings were held to agree upon basic units of measurement, establishing 
the Volt, the Ampere, and the Ohm. In 1904, the International Electrical Congress 
held in St. Louis resulted in a decision to establish a global body to “facilitate the 
coordination and unification of national electrotechnical standards.” (Cemi 1984, p.
21) The IEC was actually formed at a subsequent conference in London in 1906, and 
a central office was established there. The motivation was primarily to “prevent the 
kind o f divergence in national electrical standards that had already resulted in 
European nations operating electrical systems at 220 Volts while North American 
nations operated at 115 Volts.” (p. 130) Another important early motivation was 
electrical safety. In addition, gratuitous and unnecessary variation in national 
standards for electrical plugs, partly perhaps intended to favor and protect certain 
markets and suppliers, was threatening to impede trade and commerce. The IEC’s 
mission is now considered to be to “promote international co-operation on all
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questions o f standardization and related matters in the field of electrotechnology.” 
(IEC 2003) Its central office was moved from London to Geneva in 1948.
6.2.2 IEC Structure
The IEC, organized much like the ITU-T, is governed by national committees 
and employs a hierarchical structure o f committees to carry out its technical work. A 
major difference, however, is the strong governing role of a centralized IEC executive 
committee, rather than large plenary assemblies. The IEC organizational structure is 
shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2— IEC Organizational Structure
IEC membership is based on national committees. Each member country has 
a body responsible for representing relevant interests within the particular country 
such as industrial, commercial, government, trade association, professional society, 
test laboratory, research laboratory, academic, customer, etc. Government 
participates on a basis generally comparable with other interest groups within a 
member country. The U.S. National Committee for the IEC is administered as part of 
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and has no connection with the 
U.S. Department o f State. In other countries, that role is generally maintained by 
traditional national bodies that may or may not have a direct government involvement 
(e.g., Deutsche Institute fu r Normung (DIN) for Germany, British Standards 
Institution (BSI) for the United Kingdom, Association Franqaise de Normalisation 
(AFNOR) for France, etc.). The national committees coordinate each nation’s 
consensus position and reflect it in consensus standards development and in IEC 
governance.
A structural feature unique to the IEC is its four special Advisory Committees. 
These include the Advisory Committee on Safety (ACOS), the Advisory Committee 
on Electronics and Telecommunications (ACET), the Advisory Committee on 
Electromagnetic Compatibility (ACEC), and the Advisory Committee on 
Environmental Aspects (ACEA). These committees monitor and provide advice with 
regard to certain topics across all standardization activity in other IEC committees 
(including JTC1 committees). For instance, ACOS looks at the safety considerations 
of standardization work proceeding in all other IEC and JTC1 committees. A list of 
IEC TCs and SCs is provided in the Appendix.
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IPX membership presently includes fifty countries and eleven associate 
member countries, for a total membership o f sixty-one. (IEC 2003) The IEC is 
supported primarily by membership dues, but approximately one o f its revenue 
depends on royalties and sales o f publications (such as standards). Membership dues 
are based on a sliding scale according to each country’s economic strength, and 
associate member dues are greatly reduced in order to attract developing countries.
6.2.3 IEC Practice
Although national committees are formally responsible for appointment of 
national delegations to meetings, in practice, meetings are generally open to anyone 
who knows about them and has the time and resources to attend. This limitation is 
not a small matter because highly paid technical experts must travel internationally 
and working meetings can often occupy a week or more. Knowing which meetings to 
attend is also not trivial because it requires careful monitoring of the committee work 
over time and maintaining continuity. The IEC has implemented a number of 
mechanisms intended to increase direct industry involvement and influence. These 
include Industry Sector Boards for setting priorities for standardization and planning, 
direct industry liaisons for PAS (Publicly Available Specification) submissions, and a 
special President’s Advisory Committee on future Technologies (PACT) for top-level 
industry players.
Technical Committee administration is not carried out by a central body, as in 
the ITU-T, but by various national bodies or committees that undertake the 
responsibility and expense o f serv ing as “Secretariat." This role is often very 
influential and seldom relinquished, once established. The same is also true on the
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Subcommittee and Working Group levels. The national bodies often delegate the 
secretariat role to trade associations or other entities in the various countries.
In spite of the apparent openness of meetings, working documents and 
websites are required to be password protected and are not easily available to 
outsiders. This practice seems to be for two reasons: 1) to protect revenues from the 
sale o f final documents, and 2) to shield work-in-process and voting positions from 
outside scrutiny, perhaps for fear of embarrassment, misinterpretation, or premature 
adoption by the market. Often, the passwords can be obtained, but the net result is 
that the openness o f the process is questionable and citizens and individuals do not 
generally have access or influence.
The IEC has sought in recent times to streamline its organization and to 
introduce a hierarchy of fckproducts” in an effort to successfully compete vis a vis the 
many newer consortia. A recent list of such products includes:
International Consensus Products:
• International Standards (full consensus) (IS)
• Technical Specifications (full consensus not (yet) reached) (TS)
• Technical Reports (Information different from an IS or TS) (TR)
• Publicly Available Specification (IEC-PAS)
• Guides (non-normative publications)
Limited Consensus Products:
• Industry Technical Agreements (ITA)
• Technology Trend Assessment (TTA) (IEC 2003, p. 25)
The first three, IS, TS, and TR, are the traditional IEC products, developed 
under the full formal rules o f  procedure. TS and TR are often the result of a standards 
effort that is not yet ready for full standardization, but is under consideration or 
informative to an ongoing standardization project. The PAS. however, is a recent
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addition. It represents a mechanism for the adoption of a specification that may not 
have been created by an SDO, but is already in use in the marketplace. This case 
often represents an effort to '‘bring the work o f as consortia into the realm of the 
IEC. (p. 36) One possible interpretation is that by endorsing the PAS, the IEC seeks 
to reclaim its “market relevancy” by recognizing a market reality, even though the 
PAS subject matter was not developed under the formal procedures that traditionally 
bestow legitimacy on SDO-developed standards.6 Much the same can be said about 
the limited consensus” products on the list. Here, perhaps the IEC is trading some of 
its institutional legitimacy for some measure o f market relevance and the ability to 
publish and sell additional documents. The ITA process is similarly justified on the 
basis that it “offers a new and dynamic way of achieving market acceptance of a new 
technology with the IEC’s intrinsic seal of approval.” (p. 35)
6.2.4 IEC Summary
The IEC, like the ITU, is seeking to re-invent itself and to find its place in the 
present environment of fast moving technology and markets. In many ways, the IEC 
has an easier task because o f its smaller size and its relative freedom from 
government and politics. Its challenge will be to adapt to the challenges posed by the 
rise o f consortia and other trends without sacrificing its reputation and institutional 
integrity. A major problem that continues is its dependency on publishing 
revenues—a factor that works against its basic mission of disseminating its standards 
widely. Its recent thrust into the area o f conformity assessment, testing, and 
certification may offer alternative sources of revenue. It also faces some of the same 
criticism for slowness and lack of transparency that has afflicted the ITU. In
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particular, the lack of public access to working documents inhibits or precludes public 
participation, and has from the beginning.
6.j ISO International Organization for Standardization
6.3.1 ISO History
The ISO is, like its sister the IEC, a voluntary, non-treaty international 
organization headquartered in Geneva. They share a building across the street from 
the ITU. The ISO was founded in 1946, continuing the work started in 1926 by the 
International Federation o f National Standardization Associations (ISA). The ISA’s 
activities were interrupted in 1942 by the Second World War, then resumed at a 
conference in London in February 1946, where delegates from 25 nations created a 
new organization to “facilitate the international coordination and unification of 
industrial standards.” (ISO 1999) The first ISO standard was published in 1951 with 
the title, “Standard Reference Temperature for Industrial Length Measurement.”
The ISO develops, coordinates, and promulgates international standards that 
facilitate world trade, contribute to the safety and health of the public and help protect 
the environment. Its standards cover all fields except electrical and electronic 
engineering, the domain o f the IEC. (Cemi 1984, p. 121) The IEC and the ISO 
together, according to ISO/IEC Guide 2,
...form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National 
bodies that are members o f ISO or IEC participate in the development of 
International Standards through technical committees established by the 
respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO 
and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields o f mutual interest. Other 
international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison 
with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. (ISO/IEC 1996)
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Like the IEC, the ISO sees its mission primarily in terms of facilitating international 
trade and commerce. It has broadened its mission in recent years to support 
sustainable development, technology transfer,7 and social concerns such as consumer 
welfare and the “digital divide.” (Smoot 2003)
Over the last decade, the ISO introduced a new class of standards, known as 
technology management” standards. Rather than specifying products, systems, 
technologies, or compatibility, this new class defined procedures for the management 
of technical systems including procedures, documentation, training and record­
keeping requirements, etc.). The first o f this new family was the ISO 9000 series (for 
which the ISO name is probably best recognized by the public) for quality 
management standards, primarily applied in manufacturing processes. Another series 
is the ISO 14000 series for environmental management, also applied in manufacturing 
processes. A new family, now in its early stages, is the ISO 18000 series that deals 
with social responsibility (e.g., labor rules, personnel management procedures, etc.). 
These new management standards have been somewhat controversial, primarily due 
to cultural differences among ISO members.8
An example o f ISO’s social initiatives is the Consumer Policy Committee 
(COPOLCO), an Advisory Committee that considers issues such as consumer 
privacy, safety, and education, across all other ISO technical committees. The 
COPOLCO has been active in establishing guidelines for standards that affect the 
disabled and the elderly, and a current focus is e-commerce. According to the current 
ISO president, “COPOLCO caused the launch of the ISO Corporate Social 
Responsibility project. It was through the involvement of leading international
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consumer organizations that we learned that they think ISO excludes consumer 
input.” (Smoot 2003)
6.3.2 ISO Structure
The ISO s structure closely resembles that o f the IEC, employing a similar 
decentralized managem ent structure with a small central administration. Also, like 
the IEC, the ISO distributes the responsibility and expense o f managing technical 
committee work am ong secretariats in member countries. These secretariats are 
responsible for the appointment o f committee chairs and for providing administrative 
support and assuring procedural integrity in accordance with ISO rules. This 
decentralized (TC/SC/W G) structure in intended to assure “that decision making is 
carried out at the level o f  highest knowledge o f consequences, and that decisions are 
approved with a m inim um  o f bureaucracy and cost.” (ISO 1999)
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Figure 6.3— ISO Organizational Structure
The ISO organizational structure is shown in figure 6.3. As in the ITU and 
IEC, ultimate governing authority and establishment of basic policy rest with the 
members. However, as with the IEC, the actual administration of ISO is effectively 
delegated to an executive body and central secretariat with essentially all of the 
technical work distributed among member bodies acting in the role of secretariat. 
ISO Technical Committees, as in the IEC, are numbered chronologically, beginning 
from TCI, “Screw Threads” (established in 1947), to TC225, “Market, Opinion and 
Social Research.” Recently, there were 186 Technical Committees, 576
Subcommittees, and 2057 Working Groups in the ISO. (ISO 1999) A list of ISO TCs 
and SCs is provided in the Appendix.
The ISO sees itself as integral with the new global landscape in which the 
WTO (World Trade Organization) is a prominent feature. A major purpose o f 
international standards is the elimination of technical barriers to trade (TBT), a 
significant item on the WTO agenda. Many new WTO members, notably China, also 
seek to become active players in the standards arena. ISO membership, tracking 
WTO growth, presently totals 147: 97 full voting members, 35 corresponding 
members, and 15 subscriber members.
ISO has long played a major role in information and communication 
technologies (ICT)— particularly in the realm of software, computing, and 
communication protocols— while the IEC has played a complementary role on the 
hardware side of ICT, the realm of cables, connectors, signaling methods, etc. As 
ICT matured, these realms became interwoven, “open systems” (discussed here in an 
earlier chapter) became a vital focus o f interest in standardization, and the 
coordination, competition and overlap between ISO and IEC committees became a 
more significant problem. In 1986, ISO and IEC took the decision to form a new 
joint committee known as Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC1) for “Information 
Technology” and to fold all relevant ISO and IEC committees into it. Perhaps the 
largest change was moving ISO TC97, the committee for “Information Processing 
Systems,” and its many subcommittees, into JTC1. The United States, which had 
held the secretariat for TC97, became the secretariat for JTC1. The most significant 
effort produced by TC97 during the years prior to the formation of JTC1, had been
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the creation of what was known as the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) family of 
data communication network protocol standards and the closely related family of 
telephone system standards, developed in cooperation with CCITT, known as 
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN).9
6.3.3 ISO Practice
Within ISO committees, as in IEC committees, participation in meetings is 
open to any interested party, but voting, usually only done on a TC or SC level, is 
open only to “P” (Participating) members. Members having “0 ”(Observing) member 
status have no obligation to attend meetings and no right to vote. Voting procedures 
usually require a super-majority that varies, depending on the nature of the ballot. 
Procedures are defined in “directives.” The IEC, ISO and JTC1 each have their own 
sets of directives that are similar, yet different, reflecting slightly differing 
organizational cultures and terminology. In essence, the three organizations operate 
in the same or very similar manner, with JTC1 operating as a super-TC within both 
the ISO and the IEC. A list of active JTC1 subcommittees is provided in Table 6.3.
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SC Title
SC 02 Coded Character Sets
SC 06 Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems
SC 07 Software and System Engineering
SC 11 Flexible Magnetic Media for Digital Data Interchange
SC 17 Cards and Personal Identification
SC 22 Programming Languages, their Environments and Systems Software 
Interfaces
SC 23 Optical Disk Cartridges for Information Interchange
SC 24 Computer Graphics and Image Processing
SC 25 Interconnection of Information Technology Equipment
SC 27 IT Security Techniques
SC 28 Office Equipment
SC 29 Coding of Audio, Picture, and Multimedia and Hypermedia Information
SC 31 Automatic Identification and Data Capture Techniques
SC 32 Data Management and Interchange
SC 34 Document Description and Processing Languages
SC 35 User Interfaces
SC 36 Information Technology for Learning, Education, and Training
SC 37 Biometrics
Table 6.3— JTC1 Subcommittees
The traditional formal standard development cycle within ISO (and essentially 
the same within IEC) follows a basic seven-step consensus building process. (Cemi 
1984)
1. The new work item (NWI) is included in the program of work (POW) of a 
TC. The initial document, called a working draft (WD), must be circulated 
among appropriate members (TC, SC, or WG) with a view to the subsequent 
presentation of a draft proposal (DP), (sometimes called committee draft 
(CD)). The circulation time for the first DP or CD is three months. The DP 
or CD must have “substantial support” from the P-members of the TC. 
Members casting a negative vote must provide comments and the comments 
must be answered by the originating committee. A DP or CD may fail and go 
back around, after modification, for another ballot cycle, until sufficient 
consensus (substantial support) is achieved.
2. The DP or CD is registered at the central secretariat within 2 months of final 
approval by the TC.
3. The central secretariat registers the DP as a Draft International Standard (DIS) 
after checking and editing to ensure conformity with directives.
4. The DIS is approved by the member bodies within six months of distribution 
by the central secretariat. The DIS must receive a majority approval by the 
TC members and 75% of all voting members. Two or more negative votes 
prompt special consideration.
5. The approved DIS and revision are returned within three months to the central 
secretariat for submission to the Council.
6. The DIS is accepted by Council as an International Standard (IS).
7. The IS is published.
ISO committees have published 13,736 International Standards and other 
normative documents, (including those of JTC1), 4,437 work items are currently in 
progress. (Smoot 2003, p. 3) In 2002, 889 o f these documents were produced; 
approximately 40% of them were developed in 3 years or fewer, (p. 3)
6.3.4 ISO Summary
Consideration o f the speed at which documents were produced recently 
reveals a dilemma that faces the ISO, as it does the other institutions described: that 
of the competitive pressures posed by other standardization bodies and processes 
compel compromises between “market relevance” and legitimacy. The recent
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improvement in speed with which 40% of 2002’s documents were adopted reflects 
the fact that "an increasing number do not go through the traditional full ISO 
process, (p. 4) Increasingly, alternative “fast-track” or PAS processes are being 
employed to bring standards in from consortia and other sources in order for ISO to 
survive economically. “As many entering consortia work have found, it is not the 
administration or procedures, but the degree of consensus that chiefly determines 
speed, (p. 4) It will be argued here that despite rhetorical arguments from consortia 
advocates, it is not bureaucratic delays that take up time; consensus building and the 
open processes that enable it simply take time. What is the price of the speed for the 
sake of market relevance? This study seeks to examine how rhetoric about speed and 
market relevancy may work to renew old exclusionary tendencies and further enclose 
the standardization process in new ways.
In many respects, the ISO shares many of the same challenges as does the 
IEC, except perhaps more so because o f its larger size. Its continuing dependency on 
publishing revenues works against its basic purpose, the widest distribution and use 
of its standards, and these revenues are continually eroding due to the increasing 
electronic distribution o f documents.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the history, structure, and practices of the three 
oldest standards-making organizations, the ITU, IEC, and ISO. It began with the 
question, How open were these institutions and their practices in the past? As has 
been discussed in an earlier chapter, openness is a multi-dimensional quality. Most 
importantly, openness here is not openness in any absolute sense— as an objective
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measure but is about the perception of openness. The examination above has been 
informed by the ten criteria of openness proposed by Krechmer (1998). In particular, 
it has looked at such indicators as working document access, access to meetings, 
balance o f participation, voting, governance, and dependence on sale of standards 
(i.e., access to final standards, technical reports, and other normative documents). A 
question that emerges is how to operationalize this information in a useful and 
informative way. The following suggests a method that might provide a path for 
further research.
Using Krechmer s criteria as a starting point, it would be possible to construct 
an operational profile o f each organization by assigning some numerical index value 
to each of the ten criteria and plotting it graphically. A suggested format is shown in 
figure 6.4. The scoring shown is for illustrative purpose only and provides a model of 
how openness might be evaluated. The limitations in this approach are significant 
and need to be recognized. It would not be possible to construct a conclusive profile 
of an organization without further refining each criterion and developing a 
methodology for quantifying each one. This profile technique is suggested here only 
as a possible methodology— to show the utility of the criteria and how they might be 
applied or operationalized. Evaluation and quantification could possibly be based on 
surv eys of some set of observers. It would be important to consider how different 
evaluators (e.g., governments, regulators, manufacturers, consumers, etc.) might 
judge the criteria. In any case, such a survey would provide subjective measure and 
would need to be based on some group consensus.
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CRITERION 1 (low) 2 3 4 5 (high)
Openness Tbalancel
Consensus
Due Process
'Ooen IPR
Open World
Open Access cx— -
Open Meeting
On-going Support
Open Interfaces
Open Use o ---------- "
Figure 6.4— Suggested Openness Profile Format
What has been found in the preceding examination of three institutions is that 
none of these organizations are fully “open” in all respects. They have always had to 
navigate between the conflicting needs of their members—government, industry, 
users, and consumers— and their history reflects the compromises they struck. They 
differ from each other in various ways, and they do not always succeed in fulfilling 
their own principles. But, they do in many respects earnestly espouse and aspire to 
those principles and to an open process in general. At the same time they are still 
supporting themselves by selling documents and, more recently, their legitimacy.
The ITU differs most significantly from the other two, mainly because of its origins 
as a creature of government monopolies. All three face similar challenges to their 
openness and legitimacy presented by the necessities of maintaining or regaining 
market relevance while not losing their grip on their traditional principles. The ISO 
and the IEC suffer from their dependence on publishing revenues and from the 
limitations that such dependency places on the distribution of their work. These two
also aspire to be technical and apolitical, although inevitably they are tossed about by 
political forces, because their work has enormous political and economic 
consequences of their work. The standards-setting institutions face the same erosion 
of trust that afflicts the global economy, governments, and industry.. As the president 
of the ISO noted recently, “The trust crisis affects not only corporations; it affects 
organizations generally, including ISO. While ISO is a non-governmental scientific 
and technical organization, it cannot help but be affected by politics.” (Smoot 2003, 
p. 2) In response, the ITU, IEC, and ISO are searching for new ways to be inclusive, 
to address the needs of consumers and of developing countries, and to pay increased 
attention to the transparency of their own procedures, especially where public 
perception is involved. A remaining dilemma is how to be open and engage public 
participation, given the inherently arcane, technical nature of standardization work 
and the need for technical expertise backed by substantial resources not generally 
available to ordinary citizens or public advocacy groups.
Industry and trade have always played a central role in standards institutions 
and in driving their agendas. It is ironic that industry, which gains so much from their 
work, often neglects these same institutions, failing to support them adequately, either 
financially or through earnest, good-faith participation. New technologies depend 
particularly on standards, but often “... leaders in new technologies frequently are 
ignorant or disdainful o f the benefits o f standardization.” (p. 2) Thus industry leaves 
them to fend for resources as quasi-public institutions having to serve multiple 
masters. “Public goods” tend to be chronically under-funded. An alternative view is 
that it may actually be no irony at all that industry under-funds their standards
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committees. If they were better supported, they could be more open and democratic,
and could possibly even undertake technical research. Consortia are not under­
funded.
The next chapter will proceed with an analysis of the actual discourse about 
standardization. It will identify the principal arguments and other rhetorical elements 
from the viewpoint of the theoretical perspectives described earlier. It will seek to 
clarify the significant issues and describe how the process of standardization is being 
discursively re-constructed.
1 ITU standards are known as “Recommendations” while ISO and IEC call theirs “Standards.”
2 Earlier telegraphy systems were visual, based on networks of semaphores (e.g., Siemens).
The CCITT, like other ITU-related bodies and conferences, has a convoluted history. Some 
predecessors to the CCITT were the CCIF (Comite Consultatif International Telephonique), 1934- 
1956; the Comite Consultatif International des Communications Telephonique a Grande Distance, 
1924-1934; and the CCIT (Comite Consultatif International Telegraphique), 1925-1956. Codding 
(1982) provides a detailed historical account o f these various bodies.
4 The phrase “public interest, convenience and necessity” is firmly embedded in regulatory 
practice and administrative law in the United States as a justification for government intervention. 
Rowland (1997, 1997a) argues that such meaning clearly and paradoxically referred to regulatory 
actions that were primarily intended assure the health of industry and commerce. The rationale in the 
United States was that the interests of the public and consumers could best be served by protecting the 
economic well being o f private corporations that provided goods and services that benefited the public. 
(Rowland, 1997, p. 320) This approach stands in contrast to the more direct government “public 
interest” (i.e., public agency) rationale of most other nations and their PTTs.
5 Formerly called the Plenary Assembly of the World Administrative Conference for 
Telephone and Telegraph.
6 It should be noted that PAS processes and meaning differ between IEC, ISO, and JTC1. The 
ISO directives define PAS as “a document not fulfilling the requirements of a standard.” In contrast, 
the JTC1 directives define PAS as a path for origination or development of international standards 
outside of JTC l’s subcommittees, and the resulting document can become a international standard.
7 Standardization itself can be seen as a form of technology transfer. (ISO 1999)
8 For instance, in the U.S., industry often tends to see these new standards as bureaucratic and 
interfering with management prerogatives and market forces. ISO 9000 was also initially seen by 
some as an effort to fortify European industry against foreign competitors by creating a quality 
documentation hurdle. Subsequently many enterprising firms have turned it into a marketing asset.
The area of social responsibility is still particularly thorny.
9 A detailed history o f the OSI and ISDN standardization efforts is provided by Cemi (1984).
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When what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not 
culminate in success.
—Confucius, c. 479 BC
CHAPTER 7 
Discourse on Standardization: Public or Private?
The preceding chapter examined the history, structure, and practices o f the 
principal international institutions, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), with particular attention to their composition, 
the public/private nature o f their organizations, the interests they serve, and their 
processes. The present chapter will examine current discourse on standardization and 
the rise of the consortia movement. It will do so first by framing the debate within 
general structural and openness issues and then by looking at specific rhetorical 
examples of arguments, claims, and controversies. It will then establish a taxonomy 
of arguments and rhetorical discourses, focusing on the issue of legitimation o f 
consortia standardization. It will next analyze several important cases looking at 
public documents, testimony, and reports. In doing so, it will examine the specific 
claims to legitimacy made by both consortia and traditional bodies. It will seek to 
clarify how the practice o f standardization is being discursively re-constructed.
Finally it will consider international, institutional, and industrial responses to these 
claims of legitimacy and to the political/economic pressures they have brought.
7.1 Structure and Openness
This section will examine the discourse on standards and standardization in 
order to identify the broader issues and the terminology that set the stage for a 
detailed analysis o f the discourse. These issues include the structure of 
standardization, the openness of its practices and processes, institutional motivation, 
and other forms o f  enclosure that are interwoven in the standards environment. In 
particular, this section will focus on the key issue of claims to legitimacy that are 
made by the various actors in the debate. This focus will provide a framework for 
establishing a taxonomy of arguments in the following section.
7.1.1 Discourse on Structure of Standardization
The emergence o f standardization outside the traditional formal system raises 
issues about how to describe it or even refer to it. The terminology, Standards 
Development Orgainzation (SDO) vs. Standards Related Organization (SRO), as has 
been noted earlier, comes from the SDO world, whose members generally draw a 
sharp distinction between standards and specifications—standards being those 
documents that the SDOs create and that enjoy the legitimacy of creation by duly 
accredited bodies. Members o f SDOs regard specifications as normative documents 
that do not meet the rigorous requirements of formal standards. Many members of 
the non-SDO world also regard themselves as standards developers, but they and do 
not generally draw such a strict distinction.1 It is difficult to find terminology both 
worlds accept. One problem is the vagueness of the term specifications. It is too 
general to convey the normative purpose of a document. There is no consensus 
regarding the scope of the term standards either.
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Another way o f making this distinction, coming from economic discourse 
about standardization, is market-based v.v. negotiated selection (Vercoulen and van 
Wegberg 1998) o f standards, with consortia or SROs falling roughly into the market- 
based category. However, this distinction is not precisely the same as the SDO vs. 
SRO distinction. It juxtaposes market-based competition among standards bodies and 
their standards (much as is the practice in the United States) with the realm o f formal 
standardization where competing standards are avoided and a single standard must be 
chosen by whatever authority is able (much as is the practice in Europe). The 
competing-standards model practiced in the U.S. has also been characterized as a 
bottom-up approach. (Egyedi 1996, p. 13; Thomas 2002) The negotiated approach 
practiced in Europe has been characterized by critics as “ ...too academic, too lengthy, 
and unresponsive to market needs.” (p. 13)2 Although the market-based vs. 
negotiated dichotomy is perhaps useful, it runs a risk of overlooking commonalities 
and overlap. Those engaged in negotiating standards often argue that they are serving 
market needs, and it is likely that those in consortia frequently engage in negotiation. 
Another problem is that the market-based mode would also include de facto standards 
that may not involve any standardization process, but simply reflect the dominance of 
a particular successful technology or firm. In any case, the nature of the negotiation 
process itself has been highlighted and is receiving some needed attention (Lim and 
Smits 2002), and the new category of hybrid selection has been introduced.
(Vercoulen and van Wegberg 1998) This hybrid model involves active collaboration 
between negotiated and market-based selection processes and it has been further 
resolved into component elements:
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There are two kinds of hybrid standard selection modes. The former 
consists o f attempts to integrate elements of market selection in a negotiated 
or coordinated mode. The latter consists of including forms of coordination 
into the market selection mode (such as the development of a market leader). 
(P- 18)
This hybrid model has also been examined employing a three-way distinction, 
SDOs, MDCs (Market-Driven Consortia), and International Standardization.
(Shapiro, et. al. 2001) O f particular importance are the perceptions of the differences 
in the cultural values between the traditional SDOs and the newer MDCs that are 
evident in the discourse.
A hybrid standard setting solution offers a promising way to encompass 
the positive aspects of SDOs, MDCs, and international institutions, such as the 
ITU, in the development of technical standards. SDOs tend to most highly 
value openness, balance, fairness and due process. In contrast, MDCs tend to 
place more emphasis on speed, efficiency, branding and promotion, and they 
often have the resources to provide follow through with testing and marketing. 
A hybrid system may be better able to respond to market needs intrinsic in 
today’s convergent telecommunications market than each of these 
organizations might accomplish alone. Neither the SDO, the MDCs, nor the 
traditional international institutions are without significant drawbacks. Such 
include issues o f openness, timeliness and relevance to society and to the 
marketplace. (Schoechle, et. al. 2002, p. 10-11)
It might be observed that MDO values are far more diverse that those of 
SDOs, although there is a great variation in both. These values may be discerned 
from an analysis o f the structure and procedures of each organization based on each 
of the criteria provided by Krechmer (1998) discussed above. It is increasingly 
evident that no one can credibly claim a monopoly on openness, and that some 
consortia may be considered more open than some SDOs, an observation supported 
by Egyedi and by Krechmer.
.. .in certain respects consortia appear more open than the formal bodies. 
For example, while the latter usually keep access to committee drafts 
restricted to participants— and, thus, seek consensus within a limited group—
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consortia more often post their drafts on the web and actively seek comments 
from outside. (Egyedi 2001, p. 57)
Krechmer has observed that accredited organizations, by not always appearing open 
to new directions or new members, have provided an impetus to consortia.
Currently openness is deemed to be met if all stakeholders can participate 
in the standards development process. This may present the appearance of a 
closed committee to those who are not current stakeholders—a subtle but real 
way that incumbent stakeholders dissuade potential future stakeholders.
(1998, p. 3)
The term stakeholder is frequently used but never defined. Presumably it means what 
ANSI refers to as ‘"any materially affected and interested party.” Krechmer seems 
uncertain as he continues:
Possibly standards development meetings should be open to all (which 
the IETF [Internet Engineering Task Force] offers)3 as well as provide open 
access to committee documents. In this way, informed choices may be made 
about bringing new work to an accredited standards committee. Too often 
stakeholders in a new technology are reticent to bring their ideas to an 
accredited standards committee they have no experience with, or access to.
The Open Standards concept may not be well served by stakeholder-only 
committee meetings. Ultimately, as technology use expands, technical 
standards stakeholders are everyone. Using the Internet, access to committee 
discussion can be opened to almost all. This review appears to argue for open 
standards development meetings. However participation in standards 
meetings is a significant reason why some organizations join SDOs. So 
offering free meeting participation to all may well have negative economic 
consequence to some SDOs. (p. 4)
Lessig would probably argue that as standards come to define our modern world, it is 
increasingly true that there is no one who is not a stakeholder.
Another structural term is the distinction between de jure and de facto 
standards— de jure being those created by SDOs. While the term de facto standard is 
widely used, there is little agreement on its meaning, which is caught up in the 
rhetoric about openness and legitimacy.4 On one extreme is a strict constructionist
\ \c\ \ . Dc \  ries defines de facto standardization as "standardization earned out by 
non-governmental parties other than [SlX>s).~ (1999, p. xvii) 1 hat is, as earned out 
by ...companies, sectoral or specialized standardization organizations, and
consortia." (p. 175)
Another author concerned about the importance o f the distinction is GifTord, 
who defines de facto  standard as, "a design or protocol that dominates the market 
through the unorganized actions o! suppliers or consumers, without any formal* 
adoption or enforcement by non-market or regulator)' bodies...usually associated 
v\ith a single manufacturer...** (1997, p. 3) Gifford associates de facto standards with 
“market power" and is concerned about its dependence, -...on  factors other than 
technical performance.** Gifford places consortia in a separate category from de facto 
standards, SIX)s, and regulation. Even though all three of these meanings are 
different, they all relate to openness, participation, and legitimacy.
Looking to the future, Jakobs predicts the de facto de jure dichotomy will
loose importance:
This very popular classification should primarily refer to the different 
ways the respective standards emerge, this includes the characteristics of the 
respective originating organisations. ...the attribute "de jure" is associated 
with standards that emerge from an SIX) through a voluntan process, and 
which arc indeed only voluntary in nature. Standards that emerge purely 
through market forces (maybe through the dominant position of one or a 
group of players) arc referred to as being “dc facto." With the increasing 
complexity o f the world of standards, and the cross fertilisation between 
SDOs and consortia, this distinction will escntuall) become obsolete. (2000, 
p. 13-14)
One recurring theme in the I uropc vs. U.S standards discourse is a 
fundamental difference in the way the two societies approach standardization and
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regulation that is principles vs. rules. This distinction is essentially the same as the 
discourse about the sectoral approach, and the horizontal vs. vertical structure. This 
topic has been mentioned above with respect to privacy standards and to the U.S. 
pieference for sectorally targeted solutions rather than for broader solutions based on 
overriding or common principles. One other particular case may be informative— 
that of accounting standards.
Two different sets of accounting standards are used at present: 1) GAAP 
(Generally Accepted Accounting Practices) in the U.S. (set by the FASB—Financial 
Accounting Standards Board), and 2) the IAS (International Accounting Standards) in 
Europe and other countries (set by the IAS Committee).6 In commenting on the roots 
o f the recent accounting scandals in the U.S. and particularly the collapse of Enron, 
the seventh largest U.S. corporation, Goran Tidstrom of the European Federation of 
Accountants, explains,
...in the U.S., accounting standards are “rules-based,” while in Europe, 
standards are based on principles. In other words, in the U.S., what is not 
specifically forbidden is allowed. In Europe, an accounting decision must be 
justified on the basis of sound business principles... [In] the U.S. [one is] 
living under the impression that everything that is not regulated in detail is 
allowed. And as long as you are not breaking what is stated in a specific 
standard, it is [allowed]. That would definitely not be the case in Europe, if an 
accounting decision were at the same time against sound interpretations of the 
business deal. (Baker 2002)
Tidstrom continues, adding that the enormous debts hidden by Enron in off-the-books 
partnerships were fully legal under U.S. law and were apparently sanctioned by 
Enron’s auditor, the firm o f Arthur Andersen LLP.
This basic difference in approaches has its roots deep in American and 
European cultures and is reflected throughout the standardization system. It probably
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has to do with the primacy of commerce in American culture. (Schoechle 1998,
Lipset 1996) In any case, the differences will not be resolved easily and will continue 
to be reflected in standards discourse in such terms as sectoral approaches, 
government, regulation, bureaucracy, free markets, market-driven, relevancy, 
consumer interests, coherence, harmonization, etc.
7.1.2 Discourse on Openness: Framing the Debate
The structure and practices of the international standards system are often the 
subject of discourse about openness and participation, and here the collision between 
the U.S. system and the European and international systems becomes apparent. A 
U.S. perspective is provided by Warshaw and Saunders (1995).
In contrast to the U.S. system, standardization in the European 
Community (EC) has significant government influence. The EC system is 
much more integrated at both the national and regional levels. It is also 
generally a closed system. Participation in formal standards development 
activities at the regional level is limited to authorized representatives of 
European national bodies, thus excluding participation by non-European 
countries, even signatories to the GATT code. (p. 69)
Which system for international standards development can best meet the 
changing needs o f  global business? One which resembles the European 
regional system— monolithic, integrated, formalistic and policy-driven; or a 
system more like that which has evolved in the U.S.—pluralistic, sometimes 
fragmented, ad hoc and market-driven.
...superficially the international system looks like the European model. 
However, international standardization activities extend well beyond 
ISO/IEC, and there is real competition among international standards bodies 
in several areas. As in the U.S. system, competing organizations seek to 
respond to changing priorities and interests, (p. 70)
The U.S. model, which provides for broad participation of all interested 
parties and which allows competition among parties to determine the best 
technical approach may be the best one to enable international standards 
bodies to respond to the growing demands placed on them. (p. 71)
Although these words were written in 1995, they still very much reflect the 
discourse at the most recent American National Standards Institute (ANSI) annual 
conference. (ANSI 2002b) The following is an account o f a conference, taking the 
form of a debate, that shows how rational arguments are interwoven with 
fundamentally different underlying cultural identities and beliefs {i.e., clashing 
mythological and ideological frameworks). The opening keynote speaker, William 
Lash III, Assistant Secretary for Market Access and Compliance for the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (a Bush administration appointee), struck a confrontational 
posture, celebrating, “American principles o f openness, transparency due process and 
the [proper] role o f government,” and assailing the European “15 votes to [the United 
States’s] one,” “block voting,” and penchant for regulatory standards. (Lash 2002)
He called himself the “assistant secretary for hard messages [to Brussels],” insisting 
that “we don’t want a club,” “international standards do not mean European 
standards,” and that “ISO does not mean ISO-lation to European companies.” He 
then described Japanese standards and trade practices in even less salutatory terms.
The rhetorical content o f the remainder of the conference, though not as 
colorful, reflected a collision o f systems and cultures (i.e., United States vs. the 
world), reflected rapid change and adaptation on all sides. As the conference 
proceeded, it became clear that the organizers, deeply concerned about U.S. global 
competitiveness, were attempting to create a provocative multilateral discourse and 
had invited speakers from all over the world suited to that purpose. Following Lash, 
an international panel convened on the topic of “Competing in the Global Stage:
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Knowledge is Power,” that provided the general flavor of the international discourse 
that is relevant today.
Dr. Setsuo Harada , head of Sony’s trade relations office, denied the validity 
of certain comments by Lash characterizing standards as weapons. He portrayed the 
privatization of standardization as beneficial, detaching it from traditional 
government bureaucracy. Tony Flood of the Canadian National Committee of the 
IEC (and IEC presidential candidate) spoke about global relevance (i.e., reducing the 
domination of regional [i.e., CENELEC] standards)7, about harmonization (i.e., throw 
out your standard and accept ours), about the influence of the IEC over developing 
countries (that lack technical expertise of their own), and about essential 
requirements (i.e., European infrastructure-related standards mandated by the 
European Commission). Flood concluded by commenting that, “The reason we got 
into this situation was no participation [by North Americans]; we’ve got to get 
everyone involved— [especially] manufacturers.” He added later, “Going it alone as 
a country is not the best way to get things done today...conflicting [competing] 
standards confuse the market.” Veit Ghiladi of Daimler Chrysler (Germany) 
commented that his firm dedicates many senior level people and $20 million per year
O
to standards. In response to the complaints about ISO one-country-one-vote policies, 
Neil Reeve of Shell Global Solutions International (The Netherlands) commented 
that, “the vote is irrelevant, the words that end up in the document are what counts 
and they get put in by the working group— not by vote, but by consensus.”
The influence o f World Trade Organization (WTO) policies was evident in 
the conference discourse. Ghiladi commented about openness, stating that the
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European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) accepts corporate members 
as well as national members, and posts all its documents for free on the web. Flood 
lesponded that the WTO defines open standards in terms of “open to all stakeholders 
and consensus. He said, “WTO does not give preference to country and regional 
interests when other needs exist in other countries or regions.”
On the issue o f structural differences between the United States (based on 
business) and the European Union, (based on government), the question was asked, 
How can the United States even compete with these government-sponsored people? 
Flood responded that the problem did not exist at technical levels; the participants all 
come from companies, not government. Ghiladi added that “About 20,000 come 
from companies and others from universities—not from government, not experts 
anyway— some from unions and some from consumers.” “Companies,” Setsuo 
agreed. Reeve commented that, “Government participation is small, one of many— 
[it’s] mostly industrial people doing the actual work.”
A prominent speaker at the conference was Evangelos Vardakis, Director, 
Directorate General Enterprise, of the European Commission. He spoke of sweeping 
changes in the role of regulation and standardization beginning with the New 
Approach, a major initiative begun in 1985 to facilitate economic integration of the 
European Community. He remarked on European recognition of the WTO Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) principles and particularly on the importance of coherence 
for standards: “Competing standards are OK, but not conflicts—a difference with the 
American System.” Vardakis bemoaned the “egoistic” hunting of sales by standards 
bodies (based on copyrights). Looking into the future, he recommended, for the sake
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of global convergence, readying for change (not merely exporting a national system), 
lecognizing a single international body, agreeing on good regulatory practices, 
agreeing on levels of safety, interoperability, consumer information practices, and on 
cooperation not conflict. When questioned about the essential requirements, he 
commented on the problem of the vertical vs. horizontal structures of standards and 
regulation (a reference to the U.S. emphasis on the vertical, or sectoral, approach. 
Vardakis emphasized the importance of “allowing new organization of industries.”
One puzzle that remains at the end of the day is that—for all the U.S. rhetoric 
about broad participation, responsiveness to market needs, decentralization, limited 
government role, competition, and the merits of the sectoral approach, etc.—it seems 
difficult for U.S. industry to step up to fund and participate in its own system, or to go 
to the international meetings.
7.1.3 Rise of Consortia: Clash of Systems
The emergence o f consortia in standardization practice is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, probably beginning in the late 1980s in the IT industry.9 Carl Cargill, 
provides a brief history o f the consortia movement in a conference paper on the topic 
(1999) as well a more extensive history (1997), written from his perspective as an 
active participant and vocal advocate in the process.10 The primary driving forces are 
most often considered to be the need to “keep pace with rapid market change” and the 
“extra time needed to achieve consensus” in SDOs. (Krechmer 2000, p. 1) A fairly 
accepting yet circumspect account of consortia is provided by CEN11, in providing an 
extensive survey o f consortia that lists 225 organization in its seventh edition. (CEN 
2002)
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The role o f formal standards organizations (globally, ISO, IEC and ITU) 
has become somewhat muted in the world of [Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT)]. This is perhaps principally because the 
processes of the formal organizations have been deemed too slow to keep up 
with the furious pace of market change. Thus, for example, in the 1980s 
much effort was expended in the formal organizations on [Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI)] standardization, whilst the market was developing in a 
rather different direction.12
The relative decline in the role o f formal standardization has been 
matched by the development of “consortia standardization”, in which 
interested parties club together to produce “standards” without the so-called 
drawbacks of the formal standards process. These consortia have their own 
drawbacks, not least in terms o f ensuring broad consensus and subsequent 
visibility, but they are an established “feature of the landscape”.
Although the impetus for the ascendancy of consortia is complex, the primary 
perceived motive seems to be speed. This is followed closely by the ability to focus 
effort among like-minded participants on a relatively narrow task, to dispense with 
unnecessary procedures, and often to have the money to follow through with 
branding, marketing, testing, certification, and maintenance—functions that would 
not be within the charter of most SDOs.
In Cargill’s view, “The market no longer really cares where a standard comes 
from as long as there is a standard.” (1999, p. 1) Cargill argues that the formal bodies 
were incomplete— that the real task is to standardize, to test, to market, then to 
promote. He points out that the old SDO system was not set up to do that. He asserts 
that the consortia among IT firms “are not cabals,” that “companies have limited 
money to spend,” and that “standards are competing for bandwidth” and need a more 
complete process/lifecycle—a more efficient way in a market economy. He adds that 
the old system was based on monopoly, not on a market.13
Cargill traces the early roots of consortia to a crisis that arose in U.S. 
standardization practice in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During that time, 
increasing regulatory use of standards by the government and a 1997 antitrust suit 
alleging anti-competitive behavior in setting plywood standards called into question 
the general fairness o f standardization practice. Particular issues were the lack of due 
process and lack of consumer protection in existing voluntary standards organization 
procedures. (Cerni 1984, p. 53) Partly in response to the threat of government 
regulation and o f legislation establishing government management of 
standardization,14 ANSI stepped forward with a “private sector” solution, assumed 
accreditation responsibility and, in 1977, formed an independent 30-member body, 
the National Standards Policy Advisory Committee, that drafted the policy document, 
the National Policy on Standards for the United States. (NSPAC 1979) This 
document became the basis of the present system of due process that defines the 
voluntary consensus process. Essentially what was happening was a privatization of 
regulation—vesting in ANSI regulatory responsibility that might elsewhere have been 
a government, or public responsibility. In present day ANSI rhetoric, this is the 
“basic principle o f the U.S. standardization— that standards-setting is a partnership 
process between government and the private sector.” (Smoot 2001) But, as Cargill 
summarizes the end result, “Once the chronology is traced, it becomes apparent why 
the U.S. voluntary system is the way that it is, with all of the “due process” features 
that make it very cumbersome for the IT industry.” (1999, footnote xiv)
Another key formative document that came out of that early crisis period, 
described in Chapter 2, was OMB Circular A-119 (Office of Management and
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Budget), drafted over a 6-year period from 1976 to 1982 and last revised, February 
10, 1998. Like the NSPAC document, it helped solidify ANSI’s role as a quasi- 
legulatory authority in the accreditation of standards bodies. This document has now 
become a focal point for the discourse about consortia legitimation because it defines 
federal policy with respect to regulation and procurement. It directs agencies to use 
voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards “except where 
inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical.” But in doing so, its wording raises a 
question for consortia, described by Gerald Ritterbusch, Director of Standards for 
Caterpillar Inc., in his recent testimony before a Congressional committee:
Because the OMB Circular No. A-l 19 is silent on consortia standards, 
some have interpreted the meaning o f the circular to not allow consortia 
standards to be used by government. The emphasis for the circular was to 
make inroads in the usage of formal standards development process standards 
by government because the process already has performed the due diligence 
that would be required for government promulgation of a standard. 
(Ritterbusch 2001, p. 3)
Ritterbusch, an ANSI board member, wants to preserve ANSI’s accreditation role, but 
at the same time probably does not want to exclude consortia standards from 
procurement, thus possibly provoking increased pressure for Congressional 
legitimation of consortia in OMB Circular A-l 19. He continued with conciliatory 
words:15
The circular lumps all other standards as “other” and delineates the 
private sector standards as “non-consensus”, “industry”, “company”, or “de 
facto” standards. As consortia standards are “non-consensus”, they would 
clearly be in this group. .. .the purpose of the circular was to create greater 
interest with government agencies to look to the formal standards 
development process standards, but not limit them to the use of only these 
standards. Thus, the use of consortia standards by government is not 
prohibited in any way.
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Contrary to Cargill, Ritterbusch asserts that the process matters; that 
timeliness is important, but not at the sacrifice of openness, information availability, 
balance, consensus and due process. Rather than relying only on “like-minded 
interests, he prefers "multiple minds and hands.” He characterizes the debate in 
terms of risk. According to Ritterbusch, the formal voluntary consensus process 
provides a form o f due diligence evaluation that the user would otherwise need to 
perform, and that although consortia standards may be appropriate in some cases, the 
burden of risk is then on the user, and the preference in the long run should be toward 
the consensus standards.
7.1.3.1 Over-inclusiveness argument
An argument favoring consortia is made by Balto in describing what he calls 
over-inclusive standard -setting organizations and in defending the tendency by 
consortia to limit participation. He bases his argument on issues of competition, 
efficiency, consensus, and innovation:
Obviously denying access means that some firms will be excluded, and 
that raises questions whether those firms can use the antitrust laws to claim an 
illegal group boycott. Some might suggest that the “safe” course is to admit 
all to avoid antitrust disputes. Such an approach may be unnecessary and 
counterproductive. It is unnecessary because for the most part, the courts 
have accepted the argument that the ability to restrict membership to a 
standard setting body may be efficient and procompetitive.
It is counterproductive because a relatively small group may function 
more effectively than a more inclusive one and the resulting efficiency will 
increase incentives to establish standards, thus increasing 
output...Overinclusiveness may pose more significant problems than 
exclusion.... Standard setting bodies may end up in delay or stalemate. 
Adoption o f a new technology may be delayed as the body tries to achieve 
consensus.. .Overinclusive standard setting may actually result in less 
innovation [through] reduced differentiation, ...dampened incentives to 
innovate, [and]... entrenchment of an inferior standard. (Balto 2001, p. 6-7)
Balto s arguments are reminiscent of arguments that have long been advanced 
against democratic forms of governance; inefficiency, delay, gridlock, etc. Although 
Balto s arguments sound reasonable and plausible, they do not address the basic 
concerns o f the enclosure discourse: the downside sof exclusiveness are unchecked 
power, lack of accountability, and the depredation of the public commons. The 
recurring argument is that: because the resulting standard document is open (if not the 
process by which it was made), it is good enough to be called an open standard. This 
is an enthymematic argument relying on assumptions about what is open. Lessig 
would likely argue that who gets to define the code and the architecture is important, 
not simply who gets to use it, because the former inherently shapes the latter. Balto’s 
arguments are pragmatic and rhetorically persuasive, and what he describes may be 
reality in practice; but they do not address the fundamental issue of legitimacy.
7.1.3.2 Institutional Motivation
It is possible that one of the driving forces for consortia formation is simply 
money. ICT corporations have money to spend and problems to solve. Consortia do 
address real problems and do reflect industry needs. Each consortia is a corporate 
structure, even if  non-profit, and may take the form of a highly focused trade 
association16 whose activities may complement those of SDOs. Through such 
institutionalization, organizations often tend to acquire a life of their own, which may 
persist well after the original mission has been accomplished. Consortia membership 
fees are often huge, especially for large corporate members, with some paying over 
$50,000 each per year (compared to the rather meager budgets for SDOs). This 
funding enables consortia to hire a paid cadre of management, consultants, and staff,
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who may then establish a significant ongoing organizational economic and cultural 
structure.
7.1.3.3 Two Systems, Solutions, and Motives
The ascendancy of consortia as described above, has led to a global 
standardization system that has bifurcated into roughly two kinds of organizations— 
the traditional formalistic bodies and the newer, diverse consortia, or fora—and into 
two resulting solutions to the problem of standardization. These two systems and 
solutions are driven by two contrasting sets of characteristics. These are depicted in 
Table 7.1 below. It should be remembered that the consortia category is much more 
diverse than is the formal category, so the characteristics depicted in the table should 
be considered as general guidelines, with all of the caveats with which generalizations 
should be treated.
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Consortia _________ _________________ SDOs
Motivation
market-driven
speed
strategic focus
Participation and Activities
like minded participation 
pay-to-play
high membership dues
private club, responsible to members
defensive participation
full service (marketing, promotion,
branding, testing, certification, etc.)
Resources
membership dues, license fees 
significant budget and staff support 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
embrace IPR issues (e.g., licensing) 
specifications distributed free
process-driven 
consensus 
technical focus
balanced participation 
open access 
little or no fees
public responsibility/obligation 
participation only where relevant 
specialized (to standards-setting only)
document sales revenue, trade association 
sponsorship, some government funding 
all volunteer/little or no budget
avoid IPR issues (i.e., RAND statement: 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) 
standards documents for sale
Table 7.1— Principal Characteristics of Consortia vs. SDOs
The principal characteristics described in this table are classified according to 
organizational motivation; member participation and activities; resources and their 
sources; and approach to intellectual property. These contrasting characteristics are 
manifested in the arguments that are advanced by each side about their relative merits 
and the basis of their claims to legitimacy.
7.2 Taxonomy of Arguments and Discourses
The basic enclosure process that has been observed here is the shift of a 
significant amount of standardization activity and industry financial resources, at least
in the ICT industries, from the accredited voluntary consensus process to consortia of 
various types. The reasons are varied, but speed and control are clearly important 
factors. The more public process is often perceived to be slow, uncontrollable, and, 
to some, unnecessary. But for now the consortia process still lies outside the fold— 
lacking in the legitimacy that is conferred by the formal institutional process and by 
government procurement and trade policies. Some consortia have carved out their 
own niches and gained enough respect through technical and market performance to 
be satisfied with the situation. These consortia have hammered out satisfactory 
working relationships with the formal institutions (e.g., the IETF). Others are 
clamoring for legitimacy, for example, in federal procurement processes, in the 
United States, the European Union, and in the WTO policy arena, where legitimacy 
boils down to money.
7.2.1 Arguments
The basic arguments regarding standardization are analyzed here for topoi17, 
or lines of reasoning, and classified into a taxonomy; then the arguments are 
summarized; and finally, specific cases and texts of characteristic discourses are 
analyzed in detail for their use of these arguments. The first level of classification 
found here is between 1) arguments for and against consortia legitimation and 
practice, and 2) standardization system structural18 arguments. All of these 
arguments are also classified according to the principal issues that they address.
Many arguments address multiple issues and there is considerable overlap among 
them. These issues are described in terms of the essential questions that they propose 
to answer. The basic issues identified here are:
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• Openness— How open should the process be?
• Expediency— How should the process be done?
• Administration— Who should do it?
• Purpose— Why should it be done?
• Legitimacy— How legitimate is the process or the outcome?
The consortia and formalist legitimation arguments constitute one distinct set
of arguments. The system structural arguments constitute a second distinct and more 
general set of arguments. In the debate over consortia, the two sets often become 
interwoven. This is in part because the consortia phenomenon was largely initiated in 
the U.S. and carries with it significant cultural aspects which carry over between the 
two sets of arguments.
7.2.1.1 Consortia Legitimation Arguments
The consortia legitimation stock arguments, or topoi, are given a short 
mnemonic tag and briefly paraphrased in its preferred reading, followed by its 
oppositional reading. The preferred reading is the meaning intended by the presenter 
of the argument. The oppositional reading is the meaning attributed by an adversarial 
reader, and it is not the same as a rebuttal or counter-argument, although it may be 
similar. Each argument is also summarized in the first half of Table 7.2.
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The open standard argument: Because the outcome is open, the process is 
irrelevant. Oppositional reading: This is simply trying to justify an exclusionary 
process.
The compatibility aim argument: Because compatibility is the real aim of 
standardization, the process to achieve it is unimportant except where there is a 
regulatory justification. Oppositional reading: This is simply trying to justify an 
exclusionary process.
The over-inclusiveness argument: Too many “cooks in the kitchen,” slow 
down the process and hurt competition, efficiency, consensus, and innovation. 
Oppositional reading: This is simply trying to justify an exclusionary process.
The market-driven standards argument: The market knows its needs better 
than government or self-appointed technocrats. Oppositional reading: This is simply 
trying to justify an exclusionary process serving limited interests and to avoid 
common infrastructure needs which are not adequately served.
The relevance argument: The market knows what needs are relevant better 
than government or self-appointed technocrats. Oppositional reading:Tthis is simply 
trying to justify an exclusionary process serving relevant (favored) interests.
The speed argument: SDOs, being removed from the market, are slow and 
unresponsive to the real needs of the market. Oppositional reading: Slowness is a 
myth that is not justified and is used as an excuse to justify an exclusionary process 
and hide other agendas.
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The lesser evil argument: Consortia may not be perfect, but they are better 
than living with proprietary standards that are not open at all. Oppositional reading: 
This is simply trying to justify an exclusionary process.
The multi-party argument: Consortia are better than having standards set by a 
single party monopolist that is not open at all. Oppositional reading: This is simply a 
variation on the lesser evil argument above, trying to justify an exclusionary process.
The common good argument: Consortia standardization is a reality, so we 
should accept and live with it while we work together for a common good, the 
avoidance of proprietary or monopoly-owned (single-party) standards. Oppositional 
reading: This is simply trying to justify an exclusionary process and is perhaps a 
licensing cartel or cabal.
The managed innovation argument: SDOs are not equipped or suited to deal 
with the difficulties o f managing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), while consortia 
can aggregate, license, enforce, and limit IPR royalties. Oppositional reading: This is 
simply trying to justify a licensing cartel.
The monopoly’s child argument: SDOs have inherited the culture of the old 
telecom monopoly world and many o f its bad habits, such as slowness, insulation 
from market forces, procedural excess, etc., and they have no special claim to 
legitimacy. Oppositional reading: This is simply trying to justify an exclusionary 
process.
The regulatory relevance argument: the public’s range of legitimate interest in 
standardization is limited to areas with regulatory relevance (e.g., health, safety, etc.);
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outside of that, let the market work on its own. Oppositional reading: This is simply 
trying to justify an exclusionary process.
The democratic failure argument: SDOs are not really more democratic in 
actual practice, having many failures and shortcomings in meeting their ideals; often 
consortia actually are better in this regard. Oppositional reading: That principles of 
process may not always be met is no reason to throw them out; this is simply trying to 
justify an exclusionary process.
7.2.1.2 Formalist/Traditionalist Legitimation Arguments
The formalist/traditionalist arguments, many of which respond to the consortia 
arguments above, are briefly paraphrased below and are also summarized in the 
second half of Table 7.2, along with their oppositional readings.
The accreditation argument: Accreditation establishes the openness and 
legitimacy of the standardization process as well as the standards that are produced, 
assuring that principles of due process, consensus, and balance were followed in 
recognition of a public purpose. Oppositional reading: Accreditation, as structured, is 
unnecessary and is a means of protecting territory from other bodies; it preserves 
unnecessary bureaucracy and protects traditional revenue streams.
The standard vs. specification argument: Only standards established through 
an accredited process should enjoy the title of standard, a term that conveys an 
assurance of openness and quality; other normative documents should be called 
specifications. Oppositional reading: We all can make standards, and SDOs have no 
special claim to the term, not even to the term SDO—we also are SDOs.
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The stakeholder argument: An open and fair process must include all 
stakeholders to be considered balanced and legitimate. Oppositional reading: 
Stakeholders are those with a direct financial interest. Those not willing to pay-to- 
play, are not sufficiently interested to contribute. This argument is just a way of 
protecting territory.
The consensus argument: Only through an open and balanced consensus 
process can all interests be properly represented; superior technical quality comes 
from striving for broad agreement with many interests represented. Oppositional 
reading: Excessive consensus takes too much time and hurts innovation; consensus 
can be reached more quickly with fewer people around the table. This argument is 
just a way of protecting territory and bureaucracy.
The infrastructure argument: Market-driven consortia may be good at 
applications but they are not good at building basic common infrastructure—public 
goods are chronically under-produced. Oppositional reading: Moving away from the 
market is an excuse for bureaucracy and for technocrats who think they can pick 
winners and losers.
The resource sink argument: Consortia are extremely expensive and 
proliferating, using up all the financial resources and leaving none to support the 
standards system. Oppositional reading: The SDOs are envious; their business 
models don’t work and they are trying to excuse their poverty, inefficiency, and 
unresponsiveness.
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The poker game argument: Consortia participation is often driven by 
defensive motives and distrust and does not reflect genuine interest in standardization. 
Oppositional reading: SDOs are envious and trying to protect their territory.
The accommodation argument: SDOs are adapting and accommodating the 
consortia by working together in hybrid arrangements, Publicly Available 
Specifications (PAS), workshops, and other means. Oppositional reading: The SDOs 
owe an obligation to consortia which are really doing the work. SDOs are simply 
protecting their territory.
The open process argument: Standardization should be about building 
common interests, so process is as important as outcome. Oppositional reading: The 
SDO interpretation o f an open process is cumbersome and unnecessary.
7.2.1.3 European System Structural Arguments
The European System Structural arguments are briefly paraphrased below and 
are summarized in the first half of Table 7.3, along with their oppositional readings:
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The negotiated vs. market-driven argument: Standards should be negotiated 
among many stakeholders, not simply those with market-oriented or financial 
concerns, such as government agencies, regulators, consumers, users, etc. Broader 
public needs should be addressed, not simply those of manufacturers. Oppositional 
reading. A focus on negotiation ignores vital economic interests and becomes an 
excuse for bureaucracy and technocracy.
The principles vs. rules argument: Standardization should be guided where 
possible by general overriding principles that can be applied consistently across 
industry sectors. Oppositional reading: Principles are subject to interpretation that 
invites uncertainty, and they may needlessly constrain sectors where they are not 
needed.
The horizontal vs. vertical argument: Applying the same principles 
horizontally across sectors makes the system of standards coherent. Oppositional 
reading: This is trying to force solutions from one sector onto another where they may 
not appropriate and may needlessly constrain sectors where they are not be needed 
(similar to principles vs. rules argument).
The top-down vs. bottom-up argument: Top-down management and 
coordination of standardization provide guidance and assure coherence, avoiding 
conflicting standards. This very similar to horizontal vs. vertical argument.
Oppositional reading: This imposes bureaucracy and technocratic judgments, 
removing it from the market.
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The harmonization argument: It is important to provide coordination to 
reconcile potentially conflicting or competing regional standards in order to establish 
a coherent and consistent system that is the same worldwide. Oppositional reading: 
Harmonization in practice means “throw out yours and use ours,” due to imbalances 
in voting rights.
The coherence argument: It is important to provide enough centralized 
leadership to assure a coherent system of standards. Coherence means possibly 
competing, but not conflicting. Oppositional reading: This is an excuse for imposing 
bureaucracy and technocratic judgments, removing standardization from the market.
The essential requirements argument: Rather than setting regulatory 
standards, government should establish essential requirements to guide standards 
bodies and thus hand off much of the role of regulation. Oppositional reading: This 
masks resistance to deregulation.
7.2.1.4 U.S. System Structural Arguments
The U.S. System Structural arguments are briefly paraphrased below and are 
summarized in the second half of Table 7.3, along with their oppositional reading.
The rules vs. principles argument: Standards need to meet real needs in a 
particular market, and they should establish specific rules that provide certainty to 
producers and users in the marketplace. Oppositional reading: Narrow rules are 
simply a way o f complying with a requirement while limiting constraints and keeping 
open the maximum number of options for manufacturers or providers.
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The sectoral approach argument: Each market sector has different needs, and 
participants in that sector best know what their needs are and should set their 
standards accordingly. Oppositional reading: This is a way for specialized trade 
associations to maintain their territory and keep their constituents happy, limiting 
constraints, and keeping open the maximum number of options.
The bottom-up vs. top-down argument: Standards should be responsive to 
needs that are identified by those engaged in the market, not by bureaucrats, 
technocrats, or planners. Oppositional reading: This is just about diverse trade groups 
maintaining control, while often allowing incoherent or conflicting standards.
The global relevance argument: Standards must be relevant to global markets 
and not allow regional domination. Oppositional reading: Complaints of regional 
(i.e., European) domination often are an excuse for a lack of participation in the 
international system.
The voluntary argument: Through the voluntary consensus system the market 
sets standards with government acting only as an ordinary participant. Compliance is 
voluntary, not mandated and does not take on the force of law or regulatory policy. 
Oppositional reading: This allows the public interest to be under-represented; 
standards very often must also serve a public or common purpose, beyond simply a 
regulatory function.
The block-voting argument: The international system is unfair, with each 
European country having a vote, and the United States having only one vote. The 
Europeans often vote as a block. Oppositional reading: This is really fear about any
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voting against the U.S. position. The actual work is done by consensus at the 
working group level, not by voting.
The competition argument: Standards should be able to compete, leaving it to 
the market and to consumer choice to determine which one is best. Oppositional 
leading. This is insincere and is really about each trade association or standards body 
trying to claim territory; it leads to consumer confusion, inefficiency, and lost 
opportunity.
7.2.2 Summary o f Principal Arguments
The foregoing taxonomy o f arguments provides a set of specific elements, or 
topoi lines of reasoning out of which the principal arguments are constructed.
These elements may then be combined with more general arguments, or elements, to 
form the principal arguments. Such general arguments might include efficiency 
(expediency vs. delay), consensus (fairness vs. gridlock), standardization (innovation 
vs. stalemate), IPR (innovation vs. monopoly/cartel), sector (private vs. government 
roles), sectoral standardization (market/industry vs. coherence), and openness. Some 
more general arguments are mythological or ideological (or moral) in nature, relying 
on sets of cultural beliefs or conceptions o f reality that are unstated and may be 
interpreted differently, depending on the audience. Typical mythological arguments 
might include slowness, openness, publicness, and compatibility as the aim of 
standardization. Typical ideological arguments might include democracy, the free 
market, the role o f government, the role of the market, and the role of law 
(regulation/law vs. volunteerism), wealth creation (commons vs. private), innovation 
(freedom of ideas vs. ownership of ideas), the relationship between IPR and
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innovation, rules vs. principles, the sectoral approach, and elitist vs. egalitarian 
conceptions of governance. Some o f the topoi listed in the taxonomy above articulate 
portions of these mythological and ideological arguments.
Two strawman arguments will be constructed and presented below in the 
following two sections. They will draw on the elements described above. The first 
strawman argument will be a principal argument for consortia standardization as a 
challenger to the traditional formal system. The second strrawman argument will be a 
response of the traditional formal system. These examples can be considered only as 
sample or typical arguments, because an almost infinite number of variations could 
conceivably be constructed.
7.2.2.1 Consortia Principal Strawman Argument
The rise of consortia serves an unmet need in the standardization system. It 
provides an alternative process that is needed for a number of reasons. Consortia are 
more focused on specific market needs and thus faster at addressing them than the 
general-purpose formalist traditional system of standing bodies. Consortia are full- 
service organizations that not only establish a technical standard, but then go on to 
provide conformity testing, certification, branding, and promotion—all necessary 
elements to bringing a new technology into the marketplace, and not provided by the 
traditional bodies. Consortia can meet these needs because they are structured to 
raise the needed financial resources and, at the same time, to focus the group around 
those with a true financial and market stake.
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The aim of standardization is to achieve technical compatibility and market 
coordination. In cases where standards touch on with public policy issues (e.g., 
health, safety, etc.), the inclusiveness and procedural formalities provided by the 
traditional system may be appropriate, but generally such a focus results in an over­
inclusiveness that actually works against efficiency, and that can impair development 
of competition, make consensus more difficult to achieve, and hamper technical 
innovation.
Consortia are fully capable of expeditiously delivering open standards. Open 
standards define open systems and foster a competitive and open markets. With 
SDOs, the market may get stuck with proprietary or monopoly standards. Consortia 
create standards through a multi-party process that, while not being overly inclusive, 
may actually be more open than many o f the SDOs. SDOs are frequently not good at 
fulfilling their democratic ideals, are subject to political pressures, and are often more 
restrictive than consortia (e.g., working document access, distribution of standards, 
etc.). Consortia, being adequately supported by membership fees, are not motivated 
to restrict access to working documents, and are able to more freely distribute their 
standards. SDOs are chronically under-funded and presently have no generally viable 
business model. They still are often dependent on traditional publishing revenues, a 
factor that works against their basic mission, the broadest possible distribution and 
use of standards.
Another problem that afflicts the formalist traditional system is the difficulty 
it has in dealing with IPR issues. With the unfortunate trend of participants claiming 
IPR on standards, SDOs are adverse and ill-equipped to enforce their own RAND
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(Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory licensing) policies. Courts are also finding 
such policies inadequate. In contrast, consortia are in a good position to deal with 
and manage this increasing problem by forming patent pools and/or licensing 
authorities, capping royalty obligations on standards, negotiating with IPR holders 
from a position of strength, and enforcing IPR disclosure policies among their 
members.
Consortia standardization is a reality and needs to be recognized. Its 
standards are already and increasingly in the marketplace, and formal purchasing, 
procurement, and trade systems must and do utilize them, albeit informally at present. 
Some criteria must be found to recognize and incorporate consortia standardization 
into the global system, perhaps through some form of “differentiated” standards 
policy that recognizes the difference between regulatory governance and market 
coordination in meeting the separate legitimate interests of both the public and private 
markets.
12.2.2 Formalist/Traditional Principal Strawman Argument
The formal standardization system is being challenged by the rise o f consortia, 
but it is adapting and improving itself accordingly. Consortia have often represented 
themselves as a panacea and have cloaked themselves in mythology. They claim to 
be faster and more focused on their goals than SDOs. An examination of the record 
shows examples that contradict this myth and demonstrate that consensus-building 
takes time, whether it be in a consortium or an SDO. Certainly, time can be saved by 
limiting the consensus to a small number like-minded people, but what is the cost in
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terms of the consequences for the market and society? Such focus could also be 
characterized as “group-think” or “tunnel vision.”
Openness and balanced representation o f interests are critical elements of 
standardization, and the process by which standards are made can be as important as 
the standards themselves. It is a fallacy to claim that the legitimate stakeholders are 
only those with a direct commercial interest. Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) penetrates every aspect o f today’s information society, and 
everyone is a stakeholder. Public interest can no longer be limited to public policy 
issues. It is impossible to foresee all the implications of the new technologies that are 
defined by standards and that shape our world. Such matters cannot be left to the sole 
domain o f self-selected closed industrial groups that would prefer to manage 
innovation according to their own strategic business interests. A good example is 
IPR.
Abuses of IPR laws and practices today are harming the global 
standardization system, with a rush to attach IPR claims to otherwise open standards. 
Consortia have responded to this problem by forming patent pools and licensing 
authorities to control IPR claims and to cap royalty burdens on standards. But the 
cure may be worse that the affliction, since these consortia may then become 
essentially industrial cartels, harming competition and innovation even further. What 
is needed is not the simple legitimation of consortia practices, but the reform of IPR 
laws and the enforcement o f anti-trust laws to create consistency with an open 
standardization system.
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In any case, consortia and the needs that they claim to meet are being 
addressed by the formal SDO system through adaptation and accommodation. These 
include, hybrid standardization practices whereby SDOs and consortia are 
collaborating, and the introduction of new alternative processes such as PAS, fast- 
track, and workshop procedures. The formal process is being redefined, meeting the 
needs of industry through a graduated system of standardization methods, and these 
new methods obviate much o f the need for consortia.
The cost to industry and to the world economy of the proliferation of consortia 
is becoming unmanageable. It is soaking up available resources and tilting the system 
unfairly toward the largest players—hardly the way to encourage competition and 
innovation. Consortia are becoming self-serving business ventures in themselves. 
Often they resemble a poker game dominated by the strongest players, who keep 
raising the stakes, while the other players are afraid not to stay in the game. Such 
participation is not motivated by trust or by a common goal of standardization, but is 
simply defensive.
It is necessary to see consortia standardization in the proper perspective. 
Consortia do meet a need, particularly in the role o f commercialization and diffusion 
of new technologies into the market, but they should be limited and should not be 
legitimated by further recognition. On the contrary, they should be subject to anti­
trust enforcement, while the IPR system is reformed to alleviate some of the pressure 
that drives them. The formal system and consortia are learning to live and work 
together.
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7.2.2.3 Purpose of Principal Strawman Arguments
The two sections above presented the principal strawman arguments for two 
conflicting sides of the consortia legitimation issue. This presentation attempted to 
make strong cases for each position that brought out the possible arguments in a 
single coherent text. These arguments can be made in many differing ways, and this 
text is only a guide. The next step will be to examine actual texts of cases where 
these arguments are made and to study how the arguments are constructed and 
applied.
7.3 Analysis of Cases
The discourse considered in this study ultimately centers on the issue of 
legitimacy. Specifically, the quest for legitimacy by consortia is driven by the desire 
for access to systems o f government procurement and international trade. Two 
specific cases have been chosen for close examination because of the representative 
rhetorical arguments they advance. These cases are not isolated or anecdotal 
narratives. They have been selected because they are being advanced by influential 
individuals or bodies whose opinions were solicited by significant policy-making 
forums considering the issue of consortia legitimation for the specific purpose of 
legislation or administrative policy. This analysis does not claim to be a 
representative polling o f opinion; it is an analysis o f terms, arguments, discourse, and 
the discursive formation of meaning.
The first case is an industry position paper supporting testimony before a U.S. 
Congressional committee recommending changes to federal procurement policies
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(i.e., to OMB Circular A-l 19) regarding the inclusion of consortia standards. The 
second case is a report on an academic study o f consortia to the European 
Commission (E.C.) recommending similar consortia-including changes to European 
Union (E.U.) procurement policies. These two discourses are analyzed and compared 
with specific opposing discourses from academic, industrial, and governmental 
sources. What is found is the way in which all sides couch their arguments in various 
ideological conceptions o f what is open, what is a consortium, and what is in the 
public interest and ought to be legitimated.
7.3.1 U.S. Congressional Testimony Case
In support of his testimony before a Congressional committee,19 Cargill,20 
provided a thirty-page position paper (2001a) [hereafter called the Paper and 
available in the Appendix of this work] that he summarized as follows:
Standardization is essential to the growth of the IT industry. Within the IT 
industry, well-developed consensus consortia standards should be placed on 
an equal footing with standards developed by ANSI accredited organizations. 
The current Federal procurement practices— as mandated by OMB A-l 19—  
discourage the use of consortia specifications. The paper concludes with a 
proposal for a legislative change to permit and encourage Federal use of 
consortia-created standards in procurement, (p. 2)
The Paper describes the importance of standards to the IT industry and to the 
broader environment o f business, society and culture. It then offers a three page 
evolutionary history of IT standardization including consortia; it attempts to define 
consortia and their strategic nature; and it offers criteria for a “good consortium.”
The Paper then discusses the role of national policy on standardization and its 
"significant consequences,” and offers strictures about the language in OMB Circular 
A-l 19. The Paper calls for an expanded definition of voluntary consensus standards
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body that includes good consortia, making them legitimate. Finally, the Paper 
provides an expanded history that places consortia at the end of the evolutionary 
chain o f standards-setting organizations.
The Paper begins its first rhetorical arguments by tracing the historical role of 
IT standardization up to the formation of consortia, then offering the IETF as the role 
model:
...in the later 1980s, a different form of standardization activity 
appeared... Providers began to move technology standardization away from 
the formal ANSI and ISO recognized SDOs to those o f consortia, which did 
not have the intricate processes of the SDOs. ... [processes] which were both 
time consuming and often Byzantine, were necessary because “[m]ost 
delegates represented] personal, professional, national, disciplinary, and 
industry goals. . and managing this vast and sometimes contradictory set of 
expectations forced these groups to create intricate rules to make sure that all 
voices were heard. Consortia, on the other hand, because they usually 
consisted of groups of like minded participants (either for technical or market 
reasons), did not need to have the lengthy discussions over the mission and 
intent of the proposed standardization activity—an organization’s presence 
was, in many cases, proof of a general agreement. The archetypal consortium 
was the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the group that manages the 
Internet. The success of this group in both keeping the Internet a leading-edge 
technical architecture leader as well as clear of greed, parochialism, and 
lethargy is a significant accomplishment, (p. 4)
Here in this text the Paper builds a logical argument similar to Balto’s overinclusive 
argument. But, then it makes an interesting rhetorical leap. It presents the IETF as 
the archetypal model o f a consortium, and then devotes most o f the remainder of this 
text to extolling the success o f the IETF and of the Internet (and the Web) as an open 
medium for “ ...making decision-making more transparent” and for the creation of 
"highly open, highly visible specifications.” It praises the IETF’s practices of open 
and free membership, document access, meeting participation, consensus building, 
and public comment. Although few would disagree that the IETF has been a highly
successful and highly regarded consortium (certain arguments about its openness 
notwithstanding), the problem here is that the IETF is unique and bears almost no 
resemblance to the other membership-based consortia that the Paper really 
represents. This argument rhetorically shifts from consortia in general to the IETF as 
a specific example, but the IETF is completely unique and atypical of the sort of 
consortia (e.g., paid membership, industry driven, etc.) that the writer advocates in the 
Paper and elsewhere. IETF participation is completely free and open, and it is 
based on individuals, not organizations. The result is a diverse group of participants, 
hardly a like-minded group in the sense used by the writer in the excerpt above.
This part of the Paper’s discourse seeks to create an identity between 
consortia as a class and the IETF (and the Internet itself). It presents an 
enthymematic argument, generalizing from a specific case to consortia as a class.
Good things about x are extended to y  as a member of the arbitrary class, without 
justification: i.e., the Internet and the IETF that created and maintains it are open and 
effective, and the IETF is a consortium, therefore other consortia may be attributed 
these merits. It is important to remember that the class, consortia, is a catch-all term 
for virtually all standards bodies that are not formal SDOs.
There is a certain irony in the Paper’s valorization of the IETF. It is not 
structured at all like the other consortia for which the Paper advocates. Although the 
IETF has performed well as a standards body, there are certain things about it that 
make it not a generalizable model for other consortia. For one, it lets the little guy 
participate who could not pay-to-play in other consortia that motivate the Paper. 
Additionally, it has a unique governance structure that depends on the good will of its
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traditional leadership as individuals. It completed a major part of its standardization 
work long before the Internet became economically important. At that time, no one 
cared what the academics were doing in their labs. The IETF established its own set 
of cultural practices which became institutionalized. It may have resisted corruption 
by the wealth it has created— so far— largely because of the personalities of its 
leadership and its culture. It would likely be difficult or impossible to form such a 
body and collegial governance structure in the highly competitive and strategic 
atmosphere of the ICT industry today.
In its attempt to define consortia, the Paper emphasizes the term strategic, 
referring to the important “ ...system architectures or new emerging markets where 
there is a need for a large number of interrelated and/or continuous specifications” 
that such consortia are standardizing, (p. 7) The implication here seems to be that 
because they are strategic, they are important and should be accommodated (or 
legitimated). But strategic also means something more than important. Strategic 
often refers to actions taken in response to, or in anticipation of, the actions of others, 
taken in pursuit o f some advantage and focused entirely on that end. Applying this 
meaning to consortia as strategic would seem to argue for even more public access 
and/or oversight, not less. Lessig (and the enclosure discourse) argues that the 
system architectures especially are not the place for exclusiveness. This line of 
reasoning leads to the issue of balance.
Perhaps the primary argument in the Paper is over the ANSI/SDO principle of 
balance. The Paper acknowledges that consortia can often meet essentially all other
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criteria in the voluntary consensus system except that of balance. Lack of balance 
seems to be an essential quality of consortia. The Paper argues:
With respect to participation, ANSI-accredited SDOs cite “balance of 
participation” (parity between the various affected parties, usually providers, 
users, and others) as one of the criteria forjudging whether an organization is 
legitimate. By definition, a consortium tends to be biased towards those who 
are interested enough to “pay to play”, which may be enough to violate the 
ANSI rule of balance. What must be assured is that no party is denied the right 
to participate based upon the nature of the would-be participant, unless the 
participant is unwilling or unable to meet the common entrance requirements 
of the consortium.
The key to judging the “openness of the consortia” is one of the major 
differentiators between the consortia and the SDO forms of standardization. 
Openness has traditionally been viewed as the willingness to admit all 
concerned parties to the table. Consortia typically do not do this. Only 
consortium members may be allowed at the table to discuss specifications.
This is why the members are willing to pay—they are trading money or other 
resources for the ability to determine the specification. This is not 
substantially different than the SDOs, where participants trade resources (time 
and travel budget) for the right to participate. Both groups traditionally charge 
fees—the difference is the amount o f the fee charged. Therefore, it is 
necessary to create new criteria for “openness” among consortia, (p. 8)
The Paper’s argument for legitimacy is nowhere more clearly laid out. In the 
phrase, “interested enough to ‘pay to play’,” it equates interest directly with the 
willingness or ability to pay money, and, conversely, the lack of willingness or ability 
to pay money with lack of interest. This rationale could hardly be further from IETF 
standardization practice, which engages large numbers of small participants, has 
nothing to do with money, and serves to institutionalize principles o f inclusiveness. 
The passage ends with an unconvincing attempt to draw a parallel between consortia 
and SDOs in respect to payment of fees, asserting that the “difference is the amount 
of the fee charged.” In practice, that difference is measured in orders of magnitude.
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The Paper contends specifically that OMB Circular A-l 19 is overly restrictive 
about what it considers open and thus what is included in procurement policy. It 
maintains that the Circular,
.. .seems to state.. .that the use o f consortia based standards, which are 
open, consensus driven, and lack only the “balance” described in 4.a.(l)(ii) 
are the equivalent o f proprietary or de facto standards, which they are not. 
Consortia standards represent standards that have been developed in an 
atmosphere that is as rigorous—if not more so—than most SDO standards, yet 
it is deprecated because it does not meet the five voluntary criteria, (p. 11)
So, if not balance, then what should be the criteria for openness? The Paper 
continues:
The primary test for openness should be the outcome of the consortia— 
(1) the specification should provide an open (RAND minimum) reference 
implementation, (2) two or more competing implementations should exist, and 
(3) there should be, if  appropriate, a testing regime to ensure interoperability 
among the various implementations. This approach focuses on the rationale 
for standardization—that is, there should be a mechanism by which the users 
have a choice of implementations from which to choose, providing guaranteed 
alternative sources for critical products, (p. 8)
The argument here is that open refers not to the process, but to the outcome—
i.e., that the outcome (the standard) is open and free. But the reference to RAND 
(Reasonable and Non Discriminatory license terms) means that open outcome does 
not mean non-proprietary or free, merely available on a non-discriminatory basis.
Thus, in the case that the consortia may enjoy an intellectual property right to the 
standard, it agrees to license the standard openly. Such would imply that the 
consortium is a licensing pool or cartel—a far different meaning o f open than that 
intended in ANSI, OMB, ISO or other SDO practice.
The Paper acknowledges that all consortia may not deserve legitimation and it 
proposes a six-point criteria (p. 9) for legitimate consortia, or good consortia, (p. 13)
A good consortium must:
1. Produce “usable” technical specifications.
2. Have a legal basis— some form of legal entity (and some form of government 
oversight).
3. Have well-defined rules and processes (i.e., charter, by-laws, etc.), assuring 
fair representation o f members and anti-trust protection for members.
4. Have clear and legitimate IPR policy that requires, at a minimum, RAND 
licensing of all IPR included in its specifications.
5. Have membership not arbitrarily restricted (restricted only on economic 
basis).
6. Should create reference implementations, competing implementations, testing, 
and conformance
A review of these criteria raises the question of how would it be known that a 
particular organization properly met them. Such is precisely the function of 
accreditation—the primary purpose for ANSI. The Paper alludes to acknowledging 
the appropriateness for “some form of governmental oversight” (p. 7) and specifically 
suggests that, “It may be appropriate to include a directive to NIST [National Institute 
of Standards and Technology]... if the private sector demands consortia 
accreditation.” (p. 13) It appears obvious that some accreditation process would be 
necessary, with the wide range of organizational structures and practices involved 
among hundreds of consortia. Here, ironically, appears to be an invitation for more
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government regulation o f exactly the form that was threatened by proposed 
legislation in the 1970s, as discussed earlier, and that became the prime impetus at 
that time for establishing ANSI’s non-governmental accreditation role and for 
defining the voluntary consensus system in the Circular and in the National Policy on 
Standards for the United States. One conclusion that might be drawn is that the 
Paper’s real complaint, at least in part, is with ANSI as an accreditor rather than with 
accreditation in principle. Such might be implied by the phrase, “ .. .ANSI is focused 
on maintaining its hegemony. . (p. 13), a thread that seems to run through the 
Paper.
The Paper's concluding paragraph (p. 22) is interesting in its rhetorical 
arguments:
All of the various forms of standardization can and do serve a purpose in 
the IT sector. There is the need for stability (provided by the formal arena), a 
need for defined and structured faster change (provided by consortia and 
alliances) and the need for complete community involvement (provided by 
open source.)
This presents a plea for a place among equals. It would then follow that if SDOs and 
(some) consortia are equals, they ought to enjoy equal recognition and legitimacy. 
Speed is again emphasized as a primary value worthy of recognition. The need for 
community involvement and open source is also emphasized.22 The Paper continues:
The groups within each arena have not learned to work together for the 
good of “open systems”. Rather than considering proprietary and closed 
systems to be the force to be changed, they have dissipated their energies 
arguing about which form of standardization is best, forgetting that the answer 
is that “Standardization is best, and non-standardization is less than optimal.”
This brings in the common good argument, which might be paraphrased as,
“Consortia may not be as open as SDOs, but they are better than Microsoft, etc. If we 
fail, look what you will have to live with.”
ANSI is a necessary, but not sufficient, standardization component for the 
needs of the IT sector. Consortia are central to IT standardization success—but 
need the stability that the formal process can offer.
Here is a vague complaint about ANSI followed by an appeal for stability and some 
accommodation with the formal process. It is not clear here what problem the Paper 
has with ANSI, but ANSI appears to have recognized a need for some 
accommodation. In the latest National Standards Strategy for the United States, 
policy 4 is to “Broaden the U.S. standards ‘umbrella’ to include all those 
organizations that are contributing to the standards system.” (ANSI 2000, p. 8) This 
policy includes the exhortation, “Non-traditional standards organizations should 
review their objectives to determine where closer interaction with the formal system 
will help add value to their efforts.”
The foregoing critique of the Paper attempts to follow its logical, 
enthymematic, and ideological arguments. It has pointed out inconsistencies and 
identified the central argument and purpose. It has shown how the arguments 
identified earlier in the taxonomy are applied in practice.
A recurring and central argument for consortia standardization is the issue of 
speed—or the slowness and unresponsiveness of the traditional formal 
standardization process to market needs. This argument has been challenged by 
Sherif in several respects. He argues first that the preoccupation with speed is 
dangerous:
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If standardization is about new concepts, urgency can distract from 
aspects that may or may not be apparent at the onset. In addition, the self- 
selecting nature o f [consortium] membership, lack of critical distance, and 
pressure to produce quick results could lead to “group think” or “tunnel 
vision.” The adopted solution, while satisfactory on a small scale, may not be 
suitable for wider deployment. (2001, p. 94)
He further argues that the notion that the formal standards process is 
inherently slow is a myth that is unsupported by objective evidence and masks other 
agendas, primarily of manufacturers.
It is widely believed that formal standard bodies are less responsive to 
market needs than industrial associations and consortia. ...[Agreements on 
shaky technical foundations for the sake o f producing documents may not be 
very helpful in the long run. ...[T]he time horizon of manufacturers... is much 
shorter than of [users]. .. .we propose.. .separating the technical issues from 
the immediate business needs and/or ideological persuasion. ...One cannot 
escape the conclusion that statements like “formal standardization is too 
slow,” which are contradicted by objective facts, have political and 
ideological motivations. (Sherif 2002)
Sherif cites cases where formal standardization was fast and responsive, and 
cases where consortia became backlogged, delayed, and missteped. He attributes 
“political and ideological motivations” to such issues as intellectual property rights 
and business strategies among closed industrial groups (e.g., manufacturers) for the 
control o f certain technologies or innovations.
A careful reading of the Paper does not dispel Sherif s concerns, and certain 
passages suggest that consortia are really about much more than speed.
The consortia, responding to the pressure of “time is money, especially 
when the product life cycle was shrinking”, wanted a faster system. The 
proponents and opponents of consortia have focused on this “speed issue”, not 
realizing that increased speed was achieved in a consortium by changing the 
process. The argument has never been about speed; it has been about the 
process needed to achieve the speed necessary to satisfy the market needs of 
the members of the organization, (p. 19)
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Here, the Paper acknowledges that the argument has never been about speed, but 
about the market needs of the members—about changing the process. Here, the 
Paper implies that the project is not about technical issues but about market issues 
and business strategy for a self selected group— or, in terms of the enclosure 
discourse, about the enclosure and control of technical innovation.
Many of the same questions and rhetorical arguments presented in the Paper, 
and some additional ones, can be found in standards discourse on the European side 
of the Atlantic, also focused on the issue of government procurement.
7.3.2 European Commission Report Case
In a report to the European Commission24 (E.C.), a European university25 
provided a sixty-nine page study (Egyedi 2001) [hereafter called the Report] that is 
summarized as follows:
Current standards policy appears to be caught up in a polarised discussion 
about what type of organisation best serves the market for democratic and 
timely standards: standards consortia or the traditional formal standards 
bodies. The general feeling is that standards consortia work more effectively, 
but that they have restrictive membership rules and are undemocratic. The 
latter is a cause of concern for the European Commission, which requires 
democratic accountability in the standards process if it is to refer to such 
standards in a regulatory context. The Commission's request for new input on 
how to deal with consortium standards is set against this background, (p. 3)
The Report is organized in three parts. It proceeds by first presenting two 
case studies of specific consortia standardization efforts, Java™ standardization in 
ECMA (European Computer Manufacturers Association), and XML (Extended 
Markup Language) standardization in the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium). It 
then confronts dominant assumptions on consortia standardization (i.e., that they lack
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openness and are undemocratic) with the case findings and critically examines the 
current basis for standards policy. Finally, the Report draws conclusions and 
recommends a differentiated European standards policy recognizing consortia 
standards, and a focus on compatibility as a goal rather than on standardization as a 
process.
The Report recognizes the European Commission’s commitment to formal 
European and international standardization and the voluntary consensus process, 
based on essentially the same principles as ANSI. It elaborates on this commitment 
in what it terms a democratic ideology characterized by,
decision making by consensus; voluntary application of standards; broad 
constituency of (national) delegations; well-balanced influence of national 
members in the management of international standards bodies; and impartial, 
politically and financially independent procedures, (p. 11)
It is important to remember that the European system differs from that in the 
United States in that formal standardization is typically carried out by national bodies 
rather than by trade associations, and that representation in regional and international 
committees is still determined largely on the basis of national bodies.
The Report then frames the debate, and seeks to challenge this commitment,
asking,
...why sometimes consortium standardisation is preferred to formal 
standardisation, and whether consortia work in ways that will deliver open 
standards... Does the way the problem of standards consortia is defined— i.e. 
that their procedures are restrictive and undemocratic, and that their standards 
are therefore unfit as an instrument o f regulatory governance— accurately 
describe what is at stake? (p. 3)
This way of asking the questions rhetorically constructs two arguments. The first is 
that the goal to “deliver open standards” is about the outcome, (i.e., use of the term
delivered ) rather than the process. This is a thread that runs through the Report and 
is consistent with the its later focus on compatibility (outcome) rather than 
standardization (process). Here, as in the Paper, open is left undefined but assumed 
in terms of outcome, and the process is thus made unimportant. The Report, in asking 
its central question— whether consortia can deliver open standards— it fails to define 
what is meant by open, or even to recognize the problematic nature of the term.
The second argument is that the only proper realm of democratic interest is in 
standards that are to have regulatory governance application. Such applications might 
include standards related to health, safety, or other consumer issues. It would follow 
then that if there is no regulatory or public interest standard (a term used later on in 
the Report, p. 45) application involved, then exclusive, restrictive or undemocratic 
processes would be much less of a problem, especially if the outcome (i.e., the final 
standard) were open. Here, as in the Paper, and as in the overinclusiveness argument 
described earlier, the enclosure discourse would argue that, who gets to define the 
code and the architecture is important, not simply who gets to use it— i.e., that the 
issue is less about regulation or democracy, but rather more about access and 
innovation.
The Report sets about its study by focusing on two specific consortia 
standardization projects: ECMA standardizing the Java computer language, and W3C 
standardizing the XML language. It finds that, not surprisingly, these two bodies are 
fairly open (inclusive and consensus based) on the lower working group level, 
whether or not they are democratic on higher oversight governance levels, (p. 40)
The Report observes that in even formal democratically constituted bodies, “ ...formal
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procedures are often exploited in ‘undemocratic’ ways,” (i.e., manipulation of voting, 
tilting the program of work, stuffing delegations, etc.) and that, “Regional 
governments and formal standards bodies are well aware that in formal 
standardisation the objectives o f democracy, diversity and openness often are not 
met. (p. 43) This observation may be correct, but here the Report’s rhetoric argues 
further that because the formal process suffers deficiencies in democratic 
application, it should not have preference in principle.
The Report’s Conclusion and Recommendations section, proffers an answer to 
its central question, Do consortia deliver open standards?
The two cases do not simply confirm the widely shared assumption that 
consortia are undemocratic. To the contrary, although there may be some 
practical exclusion mechanisms, in principle consortium membership is open. 
Indeed, in certain respects consortia appear more open than the formal bodies. 
For example, while the latter usually keep access to committee drafts 
restricted to participants— and, thus, seek consensus within a limited group— 
consortia more often post their drafts on the web and actively seek comments 
from outside, (p. 57)
It is difficult to disagree with the point above about access to committee drafts 
(and the like), and the shortcomings of many formal bodies, but the general assertion, 
“in principle, consortium membership is open,” is deeply problematic. Also, there 
remains a fundamental difficulty with the Report's generalizations about consortia as 
a class, from only two cases, ECMA and W3C. ECMA is a broad trade association, 
not unlike many of the ANSI accredited SDOs in the United States, and it would 
likely be so accredited if  it were in the United States. W3C is operated by the 
Massachusetts Institute o f Technology (MIT) and is structured more like a private 
club—perhaps more typical o f consortia—yet it employs the “philosopher king” 
model of high level governance (under the leadership of Tim Bemers-Lee, a
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distinguished inventor), much like the IETF. Here, the Report makes the same 
enthymematic argument as the Paper, generalizing from the specific. With over 255 
consortia to look at, encompassing a wide diversity of structures, memberships, and 
governance arrangements, it is difficult to draw categorical conclusions about the 
general merits of consortia openness or their ability to deliver open standards, and 
make policy recommendations from these two case studies, especially when they are 
either atypical and/or do not support the argument?
Another central and problematic conclusion in the Report is that the primary 
aim of standardization is compatibility. This is asserted in the beginning of the 
Report, not concluded from the case studies, and is not supported by theory, citations, 
or arguments in the study. The term compatibility is left undefined, but carried 
forward as a mythological construction through the entire discourse.
The cases further highlight that company and government policies overly 
emphasise the means of standardisation while largely bypassing its aim, 
namely technical compatibility. The latter can also be achieved by other 
means than standardisation. Among these are the proprietary and open source 
strategies to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) development. 
In certain circumstances, the latter strategies are more effective in achieving 
compatibility than standardisation, (p. 4)
Here is an enthymematic argument that depends on the assumption that compatibility 
is the aim of standardization. It concludes that other more restrictive means could 
adequately achieve the aim.
However, others would argue that compatibility is only one of a number of 
aims of standardization. Other aims, particularly in the ICT arena include defining 
unit and reference standards (including registries and character sets), similarity 
standards, and adaptability standards (also called flexibility (Sherif 2001), or etiquette
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standards). (Krechmer 2000a; 2000b) Another aim of standardization is
interoperability, which is not the same as compatibility.26 In addition, a recent aim of
standardization involves technology management systems (e.g., ISO 9000 or ISO
14000) and most recently, accountability standards, (i.e., ISO 18000) Yet another
aim of standardization, and possibly most important o f all from the discourse
perspective is setting infrastructure standards which define basic system architectures
(including gateway standards defining interoperability between systems). This last
category is where the concerns of the enclosure discourse are primarily focused__on
the infrastructure or platform technologies that constitute the commons for innovation
(e.g., the Internet), and which, it is contended, could be diminished by enclosure or 
privatization.
It is possible that the Report confuses the meaning of the term compatibility
with interoperability or conflates the two. Such might be inferred from the pervasive
use of the term technical compatibility and its manner of usage throughout the Report.
Nevertheless, even if one takes “compatibility” in the Report to mean “compatibility
and interoperability,” the claim that such is the aim of standardization is still 
problematic.
To claim that the essential aim of standardization is compatibility, and that 
compatibility can as well be achieved in other more enclosed ways, appears to 
overlook or to dismiss, any public character or interest that may exist beyond 
regulatory concerns in standards. In many cases, the enclosure discourse would argue 
that the process does matter. In framing the issue in terms of democracy or 
democratic ideology, the Report reveals another ideological perspective, that of the
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market.. As mentioned earlier, the enclosure discourse would argue that certain 
technical realms ought to be kept open, and that the process is as important as the 
outcome— that in such cases, the determining principles should be access and 
accountability, in process and in outcome, because one constitutes the other.
In its conclusions and recommendations, the Report aspires to go “beyond 
standardization, hence its title, to what it regards as the real issue—a means to 
achieve technical compatibility—thus dispensing with the baggage of democratic 
ideology and the rivalry between consortia and the formal system. The Report’s 
emphasis on compatibility as the aim of standardization is a reflection of its own 
ideological perspective the ideology of the market. That perspective is evident as 
the Report argues that the European Commission should decide “what type of 
democracy is needed for what purpose”—that more democracy may be appropriate 
for standards of regulatory application, “ ...where democratic accountability is still 
important,” [emphasis added] (p. 61), but not for market coordination:
For market coordination, on the other hand, the democratic requirement 
of “balanced representation o f interest groups” could be simplified to “multi­
party participation”.
A differentiated standards policy is recommended to better cater to the 
significance of standardisation as a means to coordinate the market and as an 
instrument of regulatory governance. Differentiation prevents a situation 
where democratic (or other political) ideals are diluted in order to be able to
apply a market-oriented standards policy to de jure [regulatory] situations__
or, as presently happens, vice versa.
Multi-party participation appears to suggest that the process ought not be 
dominated by a single monopoly firm, but leaves the possibility that a cartel or other 
form of market power might be acceptable as long as it provides market coordination. 
The second paragraph attempts to separate standardization into realms of regulatory
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governance and market coordination—and to represent the market as depoliticized. 
Such ideological depoliticization has been addressed by Sherif:
...criticism of established standards association, particularly those with 
government involvement parallel sustained attempts to replace political and 
democratic control of institutions with technocratic and financial procedures 
and to privatize the public space. The confluence of all these phenomena can 
be interpreted through the observation that unfettered markets must be 
engineered by weakening or dissolving all intermediary social institutions 
between individuals and economic entities that may challenge market-driven 
mechanisms [Sherif cites Gray 1998]. (Sherif 2002, p. 3)
The enclosure discourse would likely concur here with Sherif. Its response to 
the Report would likely be that standardization is mostly not about regulation vs. 
market coordination, but should be more concerned with access and innovation; and 
that market coordination is inevitably and inherently strategic and political. This 
view is also supported by Mansell in regard to reliance on the forces of the market to 
produce appropriate and timely standards:
.. .choices as to when to standardize a technical design or to encourage 
diversity do not necessarily reflect the relative superiority of alternative design 
innovations. They are often the result of oligopolistic competition, political 
bargaining processes and conflict resolution not just within, but among, a 
large number of institutions and actors with an interest in the outcomes (1995 
p. 224)
The cases analyzed above are parts o f a discourse that focuses on bringing 
about institutional and policy changes— a discursive re-construction of the 
standardization system specifically the legitimation of consortia for purposes of 
government procurement and trade. These cases above are only two examples, but 
they have been chosen because they are influential and illustrative of the principal 
rhetorical arguments, being made. Both the traditional standards institutions and 
industry have responded to such discourse, and to the changing political, economic,
and technological landscape, in a variety of ways. Some of these responses will be 
considered.
7.4 Responses
In view of the analysis above , it is interesting to examine briefly some of the 
institutional and societal responses to the discourse about standardization and to look 
at their adaptations to the changing environment for standardization. National 
standards bodies and international SDOs have been undergoing dramatic changes 
brought about by the challenge presented by the ascendancy of consortia; the 
dislocations resulting from privatization of the telecommunications industry; the 
general reduction of government support; and the loss of publishing revenue due to 
electronic distribution of documents. They have been forced to change their business 
models and to expand the scope of their membership. They have had to adopt hybrid 
forms of standardization that include collaboration with each other and with consortia 
and that introduce new practices such as the workshop agreement. The European 
Commission has launched major initiatives such as the New Approach21 (EC 2000a) 
to reconcile the European standardization system with European integration and the 
global environment. The WTO has become an important factor in the equation of 
standardization, especially in emerging markets and economies.
Other forms of standardization have emerged, including, most significantly, 
the open source movement. The scramble over intellectual property rights has 
become a major issue in standardization, posing legal and political dilemmas for both 
formal standards bodies and consortia. This trend toward the enclosure o f ideas has
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also inspired both open source as well as other even less conventional responses such 
as the Creative Commons.
7.4.1 European Institutional Responses
Generally speaking, the traditional national bodies, the British Standards 
Institution (BSI) and, to a lesser extent, the Deutsche Institute fur Normung (DIN), 
have responded by privatizing and internationalizing themselves. They are 
transforming from arms of their national governments to essentially quasi-private 
industry associations, expanding their clientele beyond their national borders and 
deriving revenues from an array of activities including publishing, training, 
consulting, testing, and certification. The European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI), a quasi-consortium,28 has endeavored to do the same; it is active 
globally with members in 54 countries. DIN is a central contributor to European 
standardization and has taken a lead in establishing standardization policy for the E.C.
A recent policy paper has been prepared by DIN setting forth the German 
position on current issues in standardization, including consortia, titled, Strategy for 
Standardizing Information and Communications Technology. (DIN 2002) This paper 
[hereafter called the DIN paper] provides an interesting response to the consortia 
discourse, including a number of the positions voiced in the Report, discussed earlier. 
On the issue of compatibility/interoperability, The DIN paper remarks:
...interoperability is the main standardisation objective for ICT.
...However, the standardisation objective of ICT is not limited to 
interoperability. Much rather, the penetration of ICT into all areas of society, 
especially the consumer area, means that issues of relevance to society are 
also gaining in importance. Security including biometry and data protection 
are in great need of standardisation, as are ergonomic aspects, especially with
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regard to allowing the disabled barrier-free access to new technology 
( disability access , ‘design for all’). These issues require the participation of 
the general public and are consequently predestined for treatment in 
standardisation organisations instead of other bodies. (DIN 2002, p. 4-1)
Then the DIN paper comments on the relationship between consortia 
specifications and SDO standardization:
The development of specifications and standardisation are methods for 
technical harmonisation called into being and supported by industry -  they all 
have their own justification. This leads to industry’s interest in combining 
these various methods and their products in accordance with their specific 
strengths and making the competent organisations and bodies cooperate 
purposefully, where this is necessary.
This is a call for hybrid models of standardization and collaboration between 
consortia and SDOs. Then the DIN paper begins to take a harder line toward 
consortia activity:
The proliferation of consortia in the ICT field that can be seen has 
considerable cost consequences for the companies affected: participation in 
many of these organisations requires high expenditure of personnel and 
financial resources, irrespective of the duplication of effort resulting from the 
lack of coordination between the consortia. It is therefore in the interests of 
the industry concerned to limit the number of consortia.
[this paper] therefore expressly welcomes the fact that the international 
(ISO, IEC) and European (CEN, ETSI; CENELEC under consideration) 
standardisation organisations, as well as DIN, make the establishment of fora 
and consortia superfluous to a certain extent by meeting the needs of industry 
by introducing alternative standardisation processes (workshops, etc.) and 
products (Workshop Agreements, etc.) and by a graduated system of 
standardisation products, (p. 4-2)
The DIN paper proposes to pre-empt consortia activity by further developing 
alternative standardization processes” such as the workshop process that operates 
under a much less formal set of procedures and consensus requirements, yet still 
remains under the SDOs “tent.” The enclosure discourse might suggest the argument 
that these bodies are trading some of their legitimacy for “market relevance” by
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compromising their processes. The DIN paper goes on to give its perspective on 
market needs, or what the Paper and the Report called market relevance-.
Standards that do not comply with market needs do not develop an effect; 
developing them is a waste of resources. The difficulty is recognising market 
needs when initiating a project with a certain degree of reliability or 
recognising declining market interest on time. If the players in a 
standardisation project are only economically interested parties, it can be 
assumed that a project meets the market needs. However, the situation is 
different in standardisation with a potentially broad spectrum of players, (p. 4-
4)
Here, both sides of the debate seem to agree that market needs, or market 
relevance, is important. The problem is how market needs are determined and how 
interpreted. It could be suggested that the market is not always good at knowing its 
own needs, much less the needs of society. The last sentence in the above quote 
seems to admit that there are broader needs to be considered than simply market 
needs. For instance, as noted earlier in this study, the market has not usually been a 
good indicator of infrastructure needs or the needs for public goods.
7.4.2 European Union Responses
With the objective of creating a single European market begun in 1985, the 
challenge has been to move from a system of mandatory or quasi-legislative-based 
disparate national technical standards (some intended to impede trade) to a unified 
and integrated voluntary consensus-based system. The New Approach is a set of 
policies to facilitate this transition through directives setting essential requirements 
that then are incorporated into voluntary harmonized standards.
A fundamental principle of the New Approach is that the legislator limits 
harmonisation to the essential requirements that are of public interest. These 
requirements deal in particular with the protection of health and safety of
users (e.g., consumers and workers) and sometimes cover other fundamental 
requirements (e.g., protection of the environment). By setting the technical 
specifications for the products to meet those essential requirements, European 
standardisation completes the picture: this makes the New Approach a good 
example of co-regulation. (Bilalis and Herbert 2002, p. 47-48)
The New Approach emphasizes the need for collaboration between SDOs and 
consortia, calling for consortia to input specifications into the formal process; and 
states that “a ‘good’ standardization system must satisfy market needs, has to be used 
in practice and be compatible with public interests.” (p. 49)
7.4.3 International Institutional Responses
The international SDOs have also adapted to the changing environment, with 
varying success. One response by ISO has been introduction of the PAS (Publicly 
Available Specification) and the fast-track processes. PAS is a shortcut endorsement 
process for conferring “international standard” status on selected consortia-developed 
specifications. It essentially allows the ISO to trade some measure of its legitimacy 
for a consortium’s market relevance.
The ITU has had a different and more difficult problem with its legacy as a 
clearinghouse for monopoly telecommunications carriers and with representation only 
by national governments under treaty obligations.29 Its processes were convoluted, 
bureaucratic, and not at all public or open by most measures. In recent years, the 
ITU-T (ITU Telecommunication Sector) has been striving under new leadership30 to 
partially re-invent itself and has been initiating processes for collaboration with SDOs 
and various other standards organizations and private entities that it did not work with 
in the past. These reforms have included granting membership status to groups such
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as the IETF, IEEE, ETSI, ISO, IEC and even some corporations (known as SIOs__
Scientific and Industrial Organizations).
7.4.4 Other Responses
From the U.S. perspective, another interesting response to consortia has 
emerged. Krechmer considers consortia partly a response to what had become a 
“lengthy and expensive two-stage process,” whereby regional SDOs would develop 
standards and then bring them to the international SDOs. He sees this process 
evolving, presumably under pressure of consortia competition, “...as the regional 
SDOs become caucuses for the international SDOs. As example, the rapid 
completion of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) standards in ITU Study Group 15 was in 
large part due to the extensive standardization work that had already taken place in 
ATIS Committee T1E1.4.” (Krechmer 2000, p. 4) Another closely related response is 
that in recent times, ANSI has been encouraging the initiation of work directly in 
international committees (e.g., ISO, IEC and JTC1), aided by its system of TAGs 
(Technical Advisory Groups) for each international committee.
Another extremely important response to the perception of enclosure of 
standards and to the ideology of intellectual property has been the rise of the open 
source movement an outgrowth of the free software movement that began in the 
early days of personal computers. A seminal paper on the topic is The Cathedral and 
the Bazaar (Raymond 1998), and the phenomenon of open source has been examined 
in some detail in the enclosure discourse by Benkler (2001). Basically, open source 
can be seen as a form of standardization entirely outside the traditional institutions, 
either SDO or consortia—in fact, outside the market paradigm altogether—and more
2 1 0
akin to the commons of the enclosure discourse. Yet it can create platforms upon 
which new markets can be built. It has learned to protect itself from enclosure or 
appropriation using a novel mechanism of licensing that perpetuates itself known as 
GPL (General Public License).
Another response to enclosure and the ideology of intellectual property is the 
Creative Commons, a recent initiative based at the Stanford University Law School 
and inspired by some of the contributors to the enclosure discourse, including Boyle, 
Lessig, and van Houweiling. This approach seeks to apply the land trust conservancy 
model of preservation from enclosure and GPL concepts to the realm of ideas and 
creative works—presumably including standards.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to explore the issue of the privatization or enclosure of 
standardization by proposing the hypothesis that the process is being enclosed, then 
asking why and how? Informed by a conception of enclosure from another discourse 
on ideas and intellectual property, this inquiry proceeded by examining the general 
discourse from the standardization field around this proposition, and then it focused 
on the specific discourse about the legitimation of consortia standardization. The 
inquiry converged on two specific documents, which were examined in detail to find 
the meanings of the terms in the discourse, the rhetorical devices used, and the way in 
which the practice of standardization was being discursively re-constructed. An array 
of societal and institutional responses to the challenges of enclosure were also 
examined.
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This study found that the principle issues addressed revolved around the use 
of such terms as open and balanced, and around the ideological and mythological 
constructions the words convey. It is hoped that this analysis will contribute to a 
better understanding of these terms and the ideas they represent. It is also hoped that 
this analysis can provide a framework which can inform policy discourse dealing with 
important issues that relate to technological innovation, global commerce, economic 
growth, and the stability of social institutions. The next and final chapter will 
attempt to draw conclusions from this analysis, make observations, provide 
recommendations, and suggest areas for further research.
1 It is interesting to note that, in some cases (e.g., IEEE, ASTM), ANSI accredited bodies may 
be reluctant to emphasize this SDO/SRO distinction because they are endeavoring to extend their role 
into the international arena. They are, in a sense, competing with their accrediting body for authority 
and recognition.
2 This criticism might seem somewhat ironic, at least in the case described earlier of Global 
System Mobile (GSM) (clearly in the negotiated category) and its unquestionable global market 
success vis a vis the fragmentation of the U.S. mobile telephony market, which pursed the market- 
based bottom-up approach.
J IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), not a formal SDO, is considered a consortium in 
this context, albeit highly atypical of other consortia.
4 From legal usage, the difference between de facto and de jure can be inferred to hinge on the 
presence of some formal process or methodology.
5 In this context, formal merely means procedural, not institutional.
6 IAS has been endorsed by The World Bank, United Nations and the European Commission. 
(EC, 2000)
7 Flood further commented that, “The CENELEC mantra overpowers everything else...has a 
program to sell CENELEC standards throughout the world...a goal stated in the Portugal [plenary] 
meeting...to expand its influence worldwide.”
8 For comparison, ANSI’s entire current annual budget is only about $16 million.
9 The IT industry grew up largely under the leadership of U.S. firms. IT standardization was 
thus largely a U.S. centric entrepreneurial culture.
10 Carl Cargill is presently the Director of Standards for Sun Microsystems and the author of 
numerous books, journal articles, and conference papers on the topic of Standards and Standardization.
11 Comite Europeen de Normalisation, a formal European regional standards body
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12 Open Systems Interconnection (O SI) was a large, formal standardization undertaking that 
was later largely pre-empted by the Internet, a system of standards that did not come out of the formal 
process.
13 Apparently this is a reference to telecom standardization in the ITU.
14 Such as the proposed Voluntary Standards and Certification Act o f1976 (S.3555)’ and the 
Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act o f 1977 (S.825). A detailed account of this crisis period is 
provided by Cemi (1984, pp. 49-61).
15 It is interesting to note that Carl Cargill, a vocal proponent of revising OMB Circular A-l 19 
to recognize consortia standards, presented testimony at the same hearing.
For example, the 1394 TA—The 1394 High Performance Serial Bus Association (TA means 
Trade Association) formed to commercialize support for the IEEE 1394 standard. The Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) is an ANSI accredited SDO but the 1394 TA is not.
17 Topoi is a term borrowed from Aristotle. It is his theory and method of identifying the lines 
of reasoning used to develop an argument. Here, it refers to a set of stock arguments and issues that 
can be found in the standards discourse.
18 Structural here means about the relative relationship between component parts.
19 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Sub-Committee on Technology, 
Environment, and Standards, June 28, 2001.
20 Director, Corporate Standards, Sun Microsystems Inc., Palo Alto, CA.
21 The IETF could not qualify as an SDO for another reason. Although regarded as extremely 
inclusive and consensus-based on its lowest working level, the IETF is governed at the highest 
technical levels by a “philosopher king” model of governance, with ultimate authority resting entirely 
with its Area Directors.
22 The reference to community involvement and to open source is ironic. Elsewhere, the 
Paper’s author has characterized open source as viral, because of the self-propagating nature of its 
General Public License (GPL) tradition and its resistance to control or enclosure.
Consortia may be seen as business ventures unto themselves. A case in point might be the 
Bluetooth Consortium. Substantial financial resources and an impressive list of corporate members 
were committed to what turned out to be a technically weak network protocol and a premature 
marketing, licensing and promotional strategy. Technical incompatibility problems with other 
standards and products emerged.
24 To the Standardisation Unit of Directorate General Enterprise.
Department of ICT, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of 
Technology, Delft, The Netherlands.
"6 Compatibility refers to co-existence or non-interference of elements in a system, whether or 
not they are interoperable (e.g., electromagnetic compatibility, such as concerns IEC Technical 
Committee 84).
27 New Approach to technical harmonization and standardization (OJ85/C136/01) and the
Global Approach
ETSI, is a hybrid standards body, created by the E.C., but organized like a consortium or 
trade association, it enjoys a exceptional, but not uncontested status or legitimacy, more like an SDO.
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29 The ITU is an international treaty organization and has traditionally been organized on a 
national body basis. Submissions come through national committees. In the case of the United States, 
the State Department officially coordinates and represents the U.S. position. The part of the ITU 
concerned with telecommunications standardization is called the ITU-T (formerly called the CCITT). 
The various ITU-T committees are called Study Groups and attendance is authorized through the 
national bodies. Working documents, contributions, etc., including meeting minutes, are not generally 
publicly available (they are on the website but are password protected).
,0 Houlin Zhao, Director, Telecommunication Standardization Bureau. (Zhao, 2001)
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[in regard to the caucus process] ...rhetoric o/inclusiveness is 
actually exclusive; who has the time to kill—all the action is 
after midnight
—John Durham Peters, 2002
CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion
This chapter offers the conclusions of the study, then briefly summarizes the 
entire study and then presents the results and their relevance to the study’s theoretical 
perspectives. Recommendations are also provided about how the discourse on 
standardization might be clarified and employed more fruitfully by those exploring 
policy alternatives, including academia, government and industry. The limitations of 
the study are assessed and some suggestions are made about possible areas for further 
research, both theoretical and practical. Finally, observations are included that relate 
this work to the larger context of global economic, political and social change.
8.1 Research Questions and Conclusions
8.1.1 Research Questions Revisited
This study began by establishing the following research questions: How public 
has standardization been in the past and how does that compare with the 
standardization process o f today. What is meant by terms such as “public, ” 
private, ” and “open, ” and how are their meanings constructed and applied? I f  the 
process is now undergoing increasing enclosure, what are the roots o f such
enclosure? What are the responses to arguments that enclosure is occurring? What 
are the institutional responses to the perception o f enclosure?
The study has sought to explain the concept of standards in the context of 
American, European, and global industrial policy (e.g., what are “standards”? What is 
“open”?). It initially, the study examined a discourse about the enclosure of ideas to 
establish a vocabulary and basic framework for its hypothesis of enclosure. Also 
included was an analysis of the discourse on standards and standardization. An 
historical review of several of the most established standardization institutions 
followed with attention to how terms and concepts of openness, and the public were 
applied, and what were their structural basis (i.e., what interests were they structured 
to serve). The study then an examined the discourse on standards and standardization 
and considered what enclosure might imply for the future of open standards. A 
taxonomy of arguments was established to aid in the analysis. Next, it considered 
specific case studies to find the application of the arguments and their relevance to the 
enclosure hypothesis. Finally, it examined institutional responses, and proposed 
policies and remedies to enclosure.
As the study proceeded, the basic research questions, revisited above, 
suggested the following operational questions: What is the meaning of “open” and 
how is its meaning constructed and applied? Can a standard developed in a closed 
committee be an open standard? What are the views on the effects of open/closed 
processes of standards-making?
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8.1.2 Conclusions
The conclusion reached is that open is a multidimensional term universally 
embraced, but never adequately defined. This ambiguity is used to rhetorically 
construct and legitimate a wide variety of activities. The most common problem in 
its use is confusion between open process and open result. Claims for legitimacy of 
consortia involved in standards-setting are frequently based on defining an open 
standard as a completed standard that is then openly available, whether or not it was 
developed in an open process. The claim is made on behalf of consortia that process 
is irrelevant and the defining criterion is market relevance. Traditional SDOs claim 
superior legitimacy because of open processes, even though they often fail to meet 
many of their own criteria of openness. This question of open is entwined with 
similar confusion over the meaning of public and private. As a result, 
standardization, as a quasi-public function, lacks recognition and support from both 
government and industry, in spite of its economic importance. This is particularly the 
case in the United States. Another problematic element is the use of the term sector 
and sectoral because it reveals deep structural conflicts and contradictions within the 
traditional standards system that leaves it vulnerable to enclosure by private interests.
The views on the effects of such open or closed (or rather open and not-so- 
open) processes have been presented. These views relate mainly to the issue of 
legitimacy, particularly in regard to government procurement regulations and trade 
policies. The study concludes that enclosure of standardization is driven by market- 
based political and economic trends that do not adequately consider issues of public
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good. Furthermore, governments and institutions face significant questions about 
how to structure and support the standardization process in the future.
The presented research and analysis offer the following summary of 
conclusions:
1. Conflicting systems: A conflict exists between the U.S. and European views 
pertaining to the structure of the global standardization system, based on 
differences in cultural meaning and institutional practices. Globalization 
exacerbates this problem.
2. Unclear terms and assumptions: Standards discourse is based on problematic 
and ill-defined terms and unclear assumptions on which conflicting policy 
decisions are being advocated.
3. Legitimacy: The central issue in the conflicting discourse, raised by the 
perception of enclosure, is the legitimacy of emerging consortia, and of older 
institutions.
4. Vocabulary: A mutually acceptable vocabulary can be established for defining 
the problem of enclosure and what a reasonable solution might look like.
5. Hybrid Standardization: Hybrid standardization is a pragmatic solution that 
offers a mutually acceptable mode of cooperative action in spite of ideological 
differences.
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8.2 Elaboration of Conclusions
8.2.1 Conflicting systems: United States, and Europe
The discourse about the U.S. sectoral approach to its system of 
standardization is colliding head-on with the European centralized system based on a 
more generalized approach. The U.S. system reflects a unique political and economic 
culture. The rest of the participants, meanwhile, either follow the European system or 
find themselves in a formative stage. This gulf was less a problem before the 
demands of economic and market globalization began to bring pressure for 
harmonizing national standards and internationalizing standardization. The United 
States is disadvantaged because it relies heavily on other nations for manufacturing, 
yet largely abjures the international standardization process. It even fails to 
adequately support its own national process. Present U.S. policy, as reflected in the 
standards discourse, appears to largely focus on advocating its privatized and sectoral 
system rather than reaching an accommodation with Europe and the international 
system. Europe, meanwhile, is moving proactively to fully adapt its system and to 
harmonize it inside the European Union, to expand the European Union itself, and to 
internationalize its system. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
functions as a privatized regulatory body and represents a model uniquely adapted to 
U.S. industrial culture. However the model is not one that is likely to be adopted by 
the rest of the world.
The question remains: Why won’t U.S. industry better support its 
standardization system? The entire ANSI annual budget is only about $16 million—a 
fraction of what major corporations spend on their own standardization activities__
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and miniscule compared to what is spent on other government priorities such as 
research and development. Part of the answer is suggested by ANSI Board Member 
and ISO President, Oliver Smoot:
A significant national need with regard to standards-setting and U.S. 
competitiveness is a much higher level o f executive awareness and 
understanding both within industry and within government of the strategic 
significance of standardization. (2001, p. 5). [emphasis added]
One conclusion is there is a lack of awareness and understanding—at least there is 
not enough to overcome the inherent difficulty in supporting a privatized, voluntary 
system devoted to a common good.
8.2.2 Unclear Terms and Assumptions
The research in this study has shown that the discourse around standards and 
standardization is to a large extent based on problematic or undefined terms, thus 
creating a discursive space that is fluid or mobile and unclear. In particular, the term 
open, while universally used, is virtually never defined, except contextually.
Virtually all claims are based on openness. Everyone claims to be open and no one 
will admit to being closed. The more that standards policy discourse is based on such 
fluid and unclear terminology, the more it is subject to manipulation and rhetorical 
constructions to achieve policy goals. In particular, the terms open, public, sectoral 
and compatibility lend themselves to contextual and enthemymatic application and to 
the construction of mythological and ideological frames of reference.
The discourse on standardization, as with all political discourses, is inherently 
rhetorical. It is also founded, however, on a long-standing commitment to reasonable 
deliberation and argumentation. Clarification of the terms of discourse and their
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related concepts offers to provide a firmer grounding for policy decisions. This is 
important because such decisions have significant material consequences in many 
vital national areas including commerce, government procurement, access to 
resources, economic and social equity, and technical innovation.
The term public is vague and used in a fluid and contradictory manner. The 
dichotomy between public sector and private sector is particularly confusing. It 
effectively excludes the most important discursive space, the public sphere or 
commons, from the discourse about standardization, rendering it invisible or 
illegitimate. The term compatibility, meanwhile, is used in certain discourse to bring 
standardization practice into a discursively depoliticized, technocratic, and 
ideological framework that justifies the legitimation of enclosed practices.
In the past, standardization has been an arcane world. Essentially, it was the 
realm of technical experts—an epistemic elite—who know the practices and the 
vocabulary of the standardization process as well as the highly technical subject 
matter of the standards themselves. These elites have been characterized by Streeter 
(1986) as technocrats. In terms of rhetorical theory, Farrell (1976, p. 4) has termed 
this sort of discourse as “technical knowledge,” in contrast to “social knowledge” that 
is accessible to the public. Cadres of experts are extremely expensive to maintain. 
Thus, it is no surprise that this discourse has been largely the exclusive domain of 
corporations and, to some extent, governments. This is the case, even though, as this 
study has shown, the discourse has, in theory, been largely open to public 
participation. Now, enclosure threatens to remove even the possibility of public
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access. This study proposes that the examination and clarification of the vocabulary 
will help bringing standards discourse into the public domain.
This study has attempted to gain an understanding of the enclosure of 
standards and standardization by examining its discourse and practices. In particular, 
it has focused on the issue of consortia standardization and its relationship with 
notions of private and public. What has been found is that there is no clear-cut 
delineation between these concepts, but a spectrum of relations and institutional 
structures. This spectrum is shaped by the language and the discursive practices used 
to talk about it. The significance of these practices is reflected in the discourse itself:
Pure public goods will not be produced privately. There are only a few 
pure public goods, one example being national defense. Other goods, like 
education and standards, are impure public goods. These combine aspects of 
both public and private goods. Although they serve a private function, there 
are also public benefits associated with them. Impure public goods may be 
produced and distributed privately in the market or collectively through 
government How they are produced is a societal choice o f significant 
consequence. If decisions about impure public goods are made in the market, 
on the basis of personal preferences alone, then the public benefits associated 
with them may not be efficiently produced or equitably distributed. (Congress 
1992, p. 9, footnote 23)*. [emphasis added]
This study has found that there is a significant divergence between the approach taken 
towerd standardization in the United States and that taken in Europe and in the rest of 
the world. This divergence is a reflection of the much different way in which the 
public interest is defined and served. It is expressed in basic attitudes and 
assumptions about the proper role of government and of private initiative and 
commerce in society. This study has attempted to explore this divergence through the 
discourse around standardization and its terminology, and through the way the social 
practice of standardization is institutionalized and supported. It is hoped that this
research has shed some light on how these societal choices are made. It is also hoped 
that this research has helped to clarify the issues and terms for those concerned with 
policy-making in the standards arena.
8.2.3 Legitimacy
The research has shown that the central issue in the standards discourse 
related to enclosure is legitimation. This issue raises questions of what constitutes 
legitimacy, who confers it, and who shall enjoy it. For instance, the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) are generally regarded as legitimate international standards bodies because of 
their historical role, general recognition by other national and international bodies, 
and their institutional commitment to practices of openness, due process and balanced 
participation. However, in another case, the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) is also regarded as a legitimate international standards institution, even though 
its practices would not meet the same test because of a conferral of legitimacy by 
national governments via an international treaty, and now by the United Nations.
ANSI is regarded as legitimate, even though it is a private membership organization, 
by its history of industrial practice and public service, by government endorsed 
privatized regulatory function and by its adherence to and enforcement of practices of 
openness, due process and balanced participation. Standards discourse currently 
reflects a debate over an appeal for consortia legitimation by government on the basis 
of a redefinition of openness and balance. Conflicts between U.S. and European 
practices also reflect discourse over issues of legitimacy.
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8.2.4 Vocabulary
This study concludes that a mutually acceptable vocabulary can be established 
for defining the problem of how the standardization system should be structured and 
what a reasonable solution might look like. The relationship between rational and 
rhetorical elements of standardization discourse and practice were examined in this 
study. It was found that any particular situation, any word, argument, or utterance 
might function simultaneously in each of three separate categories: locutionary 
(communicative action), illocutionary (symbolic action), and perlocutionary (strategic 
action). In the particular situation, the dominant meaning or mode of action is highly 
contextual and depends on the circumstances and the audience or participants in the 
discourse. In this manner, different speakers and different audiences might interpret 
the same words in different ways. In this process, a certain level of ambiguity allows 
adversaries to believe that their claims have been accepted without accepting their 
opponents’ assumptions or beliefs. In other words, it opens the door to a covert 
ideological rationale contained in the vocabulary shared by the contesting parties.
The clarification of some of the most basic terms proposed in this study will allow the 
establishment of a mutually acceptable vocabulary upon which further agreement and 
an acceptable mode of cooperative action can be built. One manifestation of such a 
mode of cooperative action that has been identified is hybrid standardization.
8.2.5 Hybrid Standardization
An additional conclusion of this study is that a great potential may rest in the 
hybrid process that is evolving today out of necessity and expediency. For instance, it 
has been noted earlier that the European workshop process is a hybrid response to
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consortia. If this trend progresses, it may alleviate the need to legitimize consortia. 
The open argument can not be easily resolved, but may be avoided by 
accommodation and collaboration between consortia and SDOs within a framework 
of anti-trust law application. From a public policy standpoint, there is no advantage 
in conferring legitimacy on consortia because one consequence a further 
disadvantaging or even destruction of the formal system. There exists at present a 
sort of balance of power and a creative tension. Persuasive arguments have been 
made on both sides. Consortia are a response to real needs, but may not be viewed 
favorably. Market-driven standards have limits; markets are not typically good at 
picking long-term needs or building basic infrastructure. For instance, the Internet 
was built by a government initiative. It is difficult to imagine it being constructed by 
market forces. Standardization arenas are needed that can focus on longer-term tasks, 
rather than those to which consortia are best suited. Consortia are diverse and are not 
easily assessed and classified as to openness and other characteristics. Also, some 
consortia are ephemeral in nature.
In any case, before any policies can be established through legislation or in 
governmental administrative procurement or regulatory rules, some criteria and 
accreditation scheme would need to be developed. The criteria proposed in the Paper 
is only conceptual and incomplete, and lacking on major points (e.g., balance). To 
embark on such a project without taking into account the existing criteria and 
accreditation system could be a big mistake. The inevitable question that arises then 
is: Can the need for some level of consortia legitimation or inclusion be 
accommodated within the existing structure, i.e., ANSI in the United States? Many
consortia are really marketing associations and the possibilities of collaboration with 
SDOs seem to have obvious potential.
8.3 Recommendations
The single most important recommendation this research can make is the 
elimination of the term public sector from standards discourse—and from policy 
discourse in general. A new space between private and government should be carved 
out for the public. For example, ANSI committees hold public meetings, but are not 
part o f government. They need a discursive space in which to live. At a minimum, 
the term government sector should be revived from older documents. Ideally, the 
term sector should be replaced because it perpetuates the misleading illusion of a 
precise division between private, public, and government. Sector also is confusingly 
used in an alternative meaning with industrial sector, as in sectoral approach. The 
sectoral approach has enough confusion associated with it already. These problems 
only get worse when they are introduced into the international discourse and are 
translated into other languages.
Another recommendation is to advance the emerging field of standards 
research. This may be achieved by engaging academic institutions, government and 
industry in collaborative forums to clarify and solidify the research agenda. 
Specifically, the goals should be to clarify the terms and identify the issues pertaining 
to the discourse on standards policy. Such initiatives have been started, both in 
Europe and in the United States2, but they need support, reinforcement and 
participation.
8.4 Summary of the Study
This study was initiated with the purpose of exploring and gaining greater 
understanding of an important and contentious issue in the increasingly essential 
global system of technical standardization—the rise of the consortia movement. It 
sought to do so by analyzing the discourse around this issue to ascertain the cultural 
meanings that drive related policy decisions by corporations, governments and 
institutions. It proceeded by establishing a perspective of analysis and an 
hypothetical problem statement based on discourse about the enclosure o f ideas and 
intellectual property, and approached the enterprise of standardization as form of idea 
generation in an intellectual commons.
This study then reviewed the historical roots of the present global 
standardization system and its institutions, with specific attention to the national, 
institutional, political, economic and cultural factors that led to the present structure.
It also examined this historical perspective with regard to the discursive construction 
of standards practice and the terms and assumptions of policy discourse around these 
practices and institutions. Of particular significance was the divergence between U.S. 
and European practices and institutions. Also of consequence was the emergence of 
the IT industry, the deregulation and privatization of the telecommunications 
industry, and the ongoing convergence of these two industries.
This study then reviewed the relevant literature and research and attempted to 
situate the study in a broader intellectual and historical context. First, the discourse 
about enclosure was reviewed in detail, including concepts and terms of discourse 
relating to the nature of technical innovation and markets. This review also included
the relationship between intellectual property rights and the intellectual commons, the 
derivative nature of intellectual creation and authorship (i.e., of ideas), the notion of 
the 2nd enclosure movement, alternative modes of production (i.e., of peer 
production), and specific terms such as public, private, free, open. Then literature 
and research on the discourse on standardization was reviewed with particular 
attention to conceptions of private and public, sectoral, and the rise of consortia and 
their claims to legitimacy.
The study then considered and defined relevant theoretical perspectives and its 
methodological approach—that of Habermas’ public sphere theory, political economy 
and discourse as a social practice. Discourse analysis was established as the primary 
methodology. The study then presented research and analysis by focusing first on 
some basic terms of the discourse, namely public, private, sectoral, and open. Then 
it focused on the discourse on negotiated vs. market driven standardization, hybrid 
approaches, international institutions, sectoral discourse, and on the motivation for 
consortia standardization practices. The study deconstructed two specific policy 
position documents, in both U.S. and E.U. discourses, and the claims they make for 
the legitimacy of consortia. It examined counter arguments from other related policy 
position documents and discourses. Finally, the research and analysis considered 
societal and institutional responses including related discourses and practices.
8.5 Results of the Research and Analysis
In order to show the relevance to standards practice of the theoretical 
perspectives that have been employed in this study, the research results will be 
reviewed. Early in this study, in the review of the literature, basic concepts of public
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and private, and those presented by Habermas were introduced. Introduction of the 
enclosure discourse then followed. The terms public and private, and others such as 
the commons, open, free and of property talk were also explored in relation to their 
mythological and ideological implications. This preview was provided to show the 
significance of the terms of discourse. Later, the full theoretical framework for the 
study was developed and, in that context, the research and analysis of the standards 
discourse were presented.
8.5.1 Basic Terms of the Discourse
Some of the most basic terms of the standards discourse, including the 
problematic nature of the public sector vs. private sector dichotomy was explored by 
seimotically mapping the signifiers to what was being signified, and attempting to 
establish the range of meanings being used in the discourse. This was done by 
applying Habermas s theoretical perspectives of public sphere, communicative action 
and practical discourse to their usage in standards practice. Missing meanings that 
were being excluded by such usage, were revealed and mapped back to meanings to 
the enclosure discourse. The problematic use of the term sectoral was similarly 
explored. This exploration showed the resultant conflicting meanings and showing 
semiotic (i.e., mythological) and enthymematic usage that rely on reader/listener/user 
assumptions about the proper role of standardization in a market economy. This role 
includes the proper political economic distributions of power among industries and 
public/private sector roles. Finally, the important and problematic term open was 
similarly explored. A connection was drawn with the enclosure discourse and with 
Habermasian discursive deliberation and public sphere theory and with Althusserian
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“interpellation” as a constitutive discourse. An attempt was made to narrow the 
definition by tying these and other theoretical constructs with the actual use of the 
term open in standards discourse and practice. An effort was made to trace the 
historical migration of the meaning of open for political economic reasons having to 
do with dominant interests and institutional priorities.
8.5.2 Discourse on Standards
The standards discourse was explored, using relevant documents and 
conference presentations and discussions. Additional terms of discourse were 
identified and explored. The discourse about negotiated vs. market-based 
standardization was studied. Its use was defined in terms of political economic power 
relations between industries and different forms of standardization institutions, {i.e., 
SDOs, consortia and hybrid forms of standardization). These terms were defined 
according to institutional cultural values and of negotiated authority among 
institutions. Possible implications were observed for these values in the context of 
both the enclosure discourse the public sphere. The problem of democratic 
legitimacy was introduced and explored in terms of openness, stakeholder 
participation and market power.
The discourse on openness of the international standardization system was 
then examined, including the different concepts of many of the terms examined 
earlier, and their mythological and ideological meanings. In particular, a diverse 
discourse taking place at the 2002 ANSI [AJnnual /( '/(inference was studied, 
providing examples of rhetorical statements and constructions by high ranking 
players from the United States., the European Union, Asia, the Middle East, and
South America. From this discourse, it was possible to identify key discursive 
piactices and terminology that revealed regional, national, and cultural differences, 
including conflicting ideological and mythological constructions about private and 
public roles, trade, regulation, harmonization, and strategic behaviors—all of which 
tied back to theories of the public sphere and political economic motivations. One 
such conflict identified was in the discourse about principles vs. rules, or horizontal 
v.s. vertical standardization. This conflict revealed basic ideological differences 
between U.S. and European culture and practice of standardization.
The driving forces for consortia standardization and its historical roots were 
then examined. Through analysis of historical policy documents, it was possible to 
extract the arguments being made for and against the legitimation of consortia 
standardization for purposes of government procurement and regulation. This 
examination also revealed the underlying mythological and ideological assumptions 
and the differing ways in which meaning is attributed in the discourse. Such terms as 
balance and differing mythological and enthymematic uses of openness, consensus, 
process were highlighted and tied back to notions of the public, to the public sphere, 
and to enclosure. The overinclusiveness argument was then identified and explored. 
This argument, asserting a claim for consortia legitimacy based on instrumental 
rationality, helped prepare through research and analysis for a later exploration of the 
discourse about compatibility and the de-politicization of standardization. Possible 
political economic institutional motivations were also considered.
8.5.3 Claims for Legitimacy
A further examination of the rhetorical and constitutive discourse about 
legitimacy prepared the way for the analysis of two specific policy documents. One 
of these documents was a policy paper, the Paper, supporting testimony before the 
U.S. Congress. The other was an academic report, the Report, to the European 
Commission. Both advocated the legitimation of consortia standardization. The 
study deconstructed these documents in some detail to extract the salient messages 
and claims embedded in them. Several specific mythological, ideological, and 
enthymematic arguments were identified. The Paper’s claim for legitimacy relied on 
mythological and enthymematic re-constructions of consortia. The claim was based 
on a instrumental argument for re-defining open and discarding balance. The 
Report’s assertion was based on an ideological shift to an instrumental and 
depoliticized technocratic meaning for standardization, that of compatibility. Both 
of these documents were examined for their implications for public sphere theory and 
political economic considerations. For example, the mythology of speed as a motive 
for consortia was critically examined and compared with other discourses and 
arguments that traced the issue of speed to other possible political/economic agendas. 
Other counter arguments were examined including a recent policy paper from DIN, 
refuting some discourse similar to that found in the Paper and the Report, and 
proposing alternative meanings and institutional structures.
8.5.4 European and International Responses
Finally, European and international institutional responses to the consortia 
challenge were considered as part of the research. Various discourses were examined
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that proposed certain institutional adjustments, both toward and away from more 
democratic, public, or more enclosed discursive standardization processes. These 
were compared with the Habermasian and rhetorical notions of discourse, of the 
public sphere, democratic legitimacy, and with the enclosure discourse.
8.6 Limitations of the Study
As in any study of this nature, it is important to recognize its limitations in 
theory, method and findings. Sometimes this recognition may be more valuable than 
the study itself. It is hoped that, such is not the case with this study. But limitations 
clearly identify opportunities for further knowledge and understanding of an 
important, yet contentious, topic.
What has been presented in this study is a way of thinking about standards. It 
provides an understanding of the meaning of some basic terms of discourse about 
standards and standardization, framed by the main terms and meanings of another 
discourse about enclosure. This choice of framework provided a set of research 
questions that guided the research and analysis. A different framework could have 
been chosen that would have yielded different research questions and different 
results—perhaps even a different way of thinking about standards. There is probably 
no unified theory of standardization—no grand narrative approach to understanding 
standards—for it is inherently a social practice.
Two specific limitations are suggested by the choice of research questions, 
one of scope and the other of direction. One specific area of inquiry was a form of 
enclosure that was touched upon but not explored. This area is the enclosure of
standards and standardization by private corporations as strategic action. It is an area 
that overlaps consortia enclosure, and while it was noted in the study, it was not 
explored. A second issue was the possibility of the opposite of enclosure—the 
moving of privately or consortia developed standards or technologies into the open 
accredited process. Instances of such, or at least attempts of such, were encountered 
in the study, but not pursued.
Another limitation of this study is the limited and somewhat anecdotal nature 
of its sample. Certainly, much more discourse is available for study, and more is 
being developed every day, but it was necessary to choose documents and discourses 
that were available and representative of certain general arguments. However, there 
is no assurance that these were truly representative, unless much larger surveys are 
conducted. The researcher relied on a personal knowledge of the practice and the 
discourse—introducing a subjectivity, as Habermas has noted, that lies between 
theory and practice. If other documents had been chosen, other meanings or 
interpretations may have been found and other terms may have been identified. Also, 
other practices might have been encountered. In this study one of the criticisms 
offered was of the Report's reliance on two case studies of consortia. The same 
problem should be recognized with this research. As noted earlier, one list of 
consortia contains 255 organizations. More case studies of consortia should be 
conducted in order to make generalizations about their practices and to classify them 
into some taxonomy. This study was only able to address a few terms of discourse.
In a broader study, others may have been discovered.
An additional limitation is the perspective of the researcher. As an involved 
participant in the practice being studied, especially as contentious as it is, a potential 
for bias is introduced. The other side of this issue, however, is that an involved 
researcher knows where to look for the arguments. The exploration of this topic did 
provide an appreciation, on the part of this investigator, of alternative arguments that 
was not initially present; and it did influence the direction of the research in a fruitful 
way and temper its conclusions. Another subjectivity of the study is that the 
interpretation of the discourse and its terms, myths and ideologies depends on finding 
patterns which may be illusionary. For instance, the generalization made earlier 
about rules vs. principles may not be justified in light of a more comprehensive 
cultural study, or, at least, counter-examples might be found. In a much broader 
example, the entire study was based on the enclosure metaphor—a conception that is 
not without challenge. In any case, the foregoing discussion of limitations also 
suggests many opportunities for further study.
Finally, two additional areas that the study encountered, but did not delve into, 
should be noted. One was standards incorporating intellectual property rights (IPR), 
and the other was standards as intellectual property per se, these topics have has 
become among the most significant issues in standardization over the past decade. 
They pose thorny legal and policy problems and could provide rich and important 
opportunities for further research.
In certain areas such as wireless telephony, a sort of “feeding frenzy” has 
developed as the financial stakes rise and participants in the standardization process 
seek to embed their own IPR in the standards and to position themselves to collect
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royalties from users of the standard or to fend off royalty payments by cross licensing
• 3strategies. Often, as a defensive strategy, firms seek to develop patent portfolios that 
can be used in cross-license negotiations. As mentioned earlier in this study, 
consortia may be in a better position to deal with or enforce more elaborate IPR 
policies. SDOs, at least at the working group level, are largely composed of 
engineers and not lawyers. Defensive cross-license strategies may work for large 
corporate participants, but smaller participants without patent portfolios are 
disadvantaged, thus tilting the process and making it more exclusive and enclosed. A 
patent regime that allows claims on algorithms and business practices exacerbates this 
problem. Royalty-free or royalty-cap policies, in response, may go even further 
toward positioning the consortium as a cartel. Partially in response to such cartels, 
China with its a large domestic market, has begun to challenge the system by forming 
its own competing standards in several areas (e.g., 3G, DVD, MPEG, digital TV, Wi­
Fi, etc.), thus tending to further fragment the international system.
A second but related problem is that traditional standards bodies have 
customarily relied on copyrights and their attendant publishing revenues as a primary 
source of income for their host organizations or trade associations. Such reliance has 
become a problem as demand for free or low-cost electronic dissemination of 
standards increases. This reliance has also long posed a dilemma since it conflicts 
with the basic purpose of their standards—their widest possible dissemination and 
use. This property right also conflicts with the quasi-public goods nature of 
standards, particularly in the case of standards that become mandated by law or are
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incorporated into regulatory or administrative rules.4 Such cases pose a legal 
dilemma because they are essentially a form of privatized law.
8.7 Directions for Further Research
The field of standards research is rich in subject matter for theoretical and 
practical studies in standardization discourse and practice. Five areas in particular are 
recommended for further research:
1. Construction of taxonomy of consortia, based on Case studies.
2. Case studies of standards-related technical collaboration (e.g., open source).
3. Studies of other forms of enclosure, including intellectual property issues.
4. Theorization of the rhetoric of standards themselves.
5. Theorizing about the public, democratic deliberation, and institutional 
governance
8.7.1 Construction of Taxonomy of Consortia
Case studies of consortia standardization need to be carried out in a consistent 
manner in order to establish classification criteria and to compare their governance 
mechanisms, rules, procedures, memberships, and openness with the formal 
standardization and accreditation systems. A classification of openness was 
suggested in this research in Chapter 6. A basic classification of governance systems 
has been suggested by Choh (1999), but needs to be developed and expanded. 
Interesting work has been done on the topic of strategic behavior of participants in 
standardization activities such as Global System Mobile (GSM) standardization
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(Bekkers, et. al. 2002). More such work needs to be done in other areas of 
standardization. The topic of IPR is also entwined with standardization, in both 
consortia and in SDOs, and needs further study. Hybrid standardization needs more 
case studies to increase understanding of how consortia and SDOs work together to 
inform policy discourse.
8.7.2 Case Studies of Standards-Related Technical Collaboration
Case studies of open source and other alternative standardization processes 
would also contribute to an understanding of standardization as it is now practiced. 
The area of “peer production” has been described by Benkler (2001,) is closely 
related to the study of innovation, and needs further study.
8.7.3 Studies of Other Forms of Enclosure
Other forms of enclosure of standards and standardization need study and 
better understanding. This study has focused on the transfer of standardization from 
public processes to private consortia. Another form of enclosure is the transfer from 
public to proprietary ownership, or the appropriation of established standards by 
specific firms. Van Howeiling (2002) has described the standards “pollution 
problem,” where public domain standard protocols are enclosed by a process she 
characterizes as “embrace, extend, extinguish.”. Lemley (1998) has discussed the 
notion of standards “pollution” and Lemley and McGowan (1998) have referred to 
“intellectual property ambush,” particularly, but not solely, regarding the practices of 
Microsoft Corporation. Forms of un-enclosure may also be found and would provide 
valuable insight into the process of standardization.
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Two areas of increasing importance in need of research are 1) the relationship 
between intellectual property issues in standards bodies that may be driving consortia 
and cartel formation, and 2) the relationship of intellectual property rights 
(particularly copyright) and the dependence of standards bodies on publishing 
revenues to the problem of privatized regulation or privatized governance.
8.7.4 Theorizing the Rhetoric of Standards
This study has been a study of the rhetoric of the discourse of standardization. It is a 
study of a meta-discourse, or the discourse about the discourse of standards. The 
analytical theory and methodology used in this study could be applied to the actual 
discourse of standards-making itself. Such research could reveal much about the 
process of group collaboration and consensus. It could also explore the role of the 
technical expert and tendencies toward technocracy, an issue that has been noted in 
this study, but not thoroughly explored. Such an exploration could provide a better 
understanding of how the process may be made more public.
8.7.5 Theorizing the Public, Deliberation, and Institutional Governance
It has been noted earlier in this study that the theorization of the public is 
incomplete and needs to be developed. In particular, processes of negotiation are 
beginning to be studied (Lim 2002) in relation to standardization. The subject of 
deliberative democracy has been studied extensively, but not specifically in relation 
to the standardization processes. The topic of “private governance” is beginning to be 
seen in public policy discourse (Mueller 2002), but it needs to be applied specifically 
to standardization practice and institutions.
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8.8 Observations
The process of enclosure of standardization, and of ideas in general, may be 
seen as part of a larger global trend over the past two decades of deregulation, 
privatization and commodification. These trends were propelled in most part by the 
hegemony and endless success of the free market ideology and high technology 
industry springing from the United States. With the sudden economic collapse in
2001 of financial markets and the revelation of severe shortcomings in economic 
institutions, particularly in the United States, there is an opportunity for reevaluation 
of many of the assumptions that dominated policy and standards discourse for mire 
than a decade.
In the late 1990s, things were different. Free market ideology was at its 
zenith. Technology was moving on “Internet time.” There was little patience for 
long-term planning, accountability, and talk of the public interest. As long as 
corporations were making many stockholders wealthy, it was easy to overlook the 
consequences. Now, it is suggested, there is room for a new and healthy skepticism 
about the omnipotence of unfettered markets and of science and technology, and a 
new appreciation of the value of long-term institutions of oversight and continuity.
The mantra of “build shareholder value” has shown to be largely self-serving rhetoric, 
masking the systematic exaggeration of productivity and profits. It is proposed that 
the economics of hypercompetitive consumerism and the destruction of intermediary 
social institutions have now slowed or are being reevaluated.
Writing in the Forward, revised in 2002, Gray (1998, p. xiv)5 suggests that, 
“ ...global laissez-faire is visibly unraveling today,” and, “the events of 11 September,
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2001, confirm [my] central thesis: globalization works to undermine the global free 
market.” He predicts that “America’s infatuation with the global free market is all 
but over,” (p. xix) and the world economy will see a return of trade protectionism and 
to the geopolitical priorities of an earlier age of realpolitik. Gray further predicts that 
global markets will continue to grow, but suggests that American business culture 
will not be copied throughout the world. Rather, he suggests that capitalism will be 
re-interpreted into the various cultural idioms of each developing country and region, 
representing a fundamental separation of capitalism from the free market ideology 
(e.g., China). The implications of Gray’s perspective for the role and practice of 
standardization are profound:
A regime of global governance is needed in which world markets are 
managed so as to promote the cohesion of societies and the integrity of states. 
Only a framework of global regulation—of currencies, capital movements, 
trade and environmental conservation—can enable the creativity of the world 
economy to be harnessed in the service of human needs, (p. 199).
The task of transnational organizations should be to fashion a framework 
of regulation within which diverse market economies can flourish, (p. 235).
It is proposed that the global technical standardization system is one of these 
transnational organizations to which Gray refers. It is one which elsewhere Gray 
calls, an intermediary social institution between human beings and the market.
It is interesting to note that the early market theorist, Adam Smith, would probably 
not disagree with Gray’s assessment. Smith was deeply concerned about moral 
obligations, social justice and stability, and about the potential for monopoly and for 
government policy to favor special interests. The implication for this research is that 
the enclosure o f standardization is slowing, or at least may have some prospect of 
establishing a counter-balancing trend.
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The new millennium has brought many changes. Gray suggests that the 
hegemony of the U.S. economy in the world may be drawing to an end. It has been 
further suggested that any future clash of civilizations will not be “between the West 
and the rest, but between the U.S. and Europe.” Kupchan observes that,
Europe is strengthening its collective consciousness and character and 
forging a clearer sense of interests and values that are quite distinct from those 
in the United States. .. .the EU will surely test its muscle against America if 
the unilateralist bent in U.S. foreign policy continues. ...Despite recent 
deregulation across Europe, America’s laissez-faire capitalism still contrasts 
sharply with Europe’s more centralized approach. Whereas Americans decry 
the constraints on growth that stem from the European model, Europeans look 
askance at America’s income inequalities, its consumerism, and its readiness 
to sacrifice social capital for material gain. ...At root, America and Europe are 
driven by different political cultures. And the cultural distance appears to be 
widening, not closing, putting the two sides of the Atlantic on divergent social 
paths. (2002, pp. 42-43; 2002a).
The observations above have significant implications for the U.S. vs. E.U. discourse 
on standardization mentioned earlier in this research and in the conclusions above. 
These implications lend an additional urgency to clarifying the discourse and the 
policy initiatives that may flow from it.
1 Citing Edwin Mansfield. (1970). Microeconomic Theory and Application. (New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton)
2 For example a special panel: “University Education and Research on Technical Standards,” 
was organized by the International Center for Standards Research (ICSR), supported by ANSI and 
NIST and hosted by the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information (CITI), at Columbia University 
September 9, 2002. Another example is a panel on “Academic Outreach,” conducted at the ANSI 
Annual meeting, Washington DC, September 15-16, 2002.
3 : Such participant firm’s strategies with regard to GSM (Global System Mobile) patents are 
described by Bekkers, Verspagen and Smits (2002).
4 Regulatory standards might include pharmaceuticals, auto safety regulations, food 
classification standards, and agricultural inspection standards, electromagnetic emission limits, 
building codes, fire protection standards, and spectrum allocations. The term regulatory actually refers 
a distinction between voluntary and involuntary compliance requirements. Administrative rules might 
include purchasing or procurement requirements.
5 In the “Forward to 2002 Edition” of False Dawn (Gray 1998)
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10 GLOSSARY 
Organizational and Standards Acronyms
1394 TA—The 1394 High Performance Serial Bus Trade Association, formed to 
commercialize support the IEEE 1394 standard.
3G—Third generation wireless (mobile telephony)
AAP—Alternative Approval Process
ACEA—Advisory Committee on Environmental Aspects (IEC)
ACEC—Advisory Committee on Electromagnetic Compatibility (IEC)
ACET—Advisory Committee on Electronics and Telecommunications (IEC)
ACOS—Advisory Committee on Safety (IEC)
AFNOR—Association Frangaise de Normalisation, French national body
ANSI—American National Standards Institute, U.S. national body
ASHRAE—American Society of Heating Refrigeration and Air Conditioning
ASME—American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM—American Society for Testing and Materials
ATIS—Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
ATM Forum—Asynchronous Transfer Mode Forum
AT&T—American Telephone and Telegraph
BSI—British Standards Institution
CA—Conformity Assessment
CD—Committee Draft
CCITT—Comite Consultatif International Telegraphique et Telephonique (ITU) 
CCIR—Comite Consultatif International de Radiocommunication (ITU)
CEBus—Consumer Electronic Bus, the EIA-600 standard 
CENELEC—Comite Europeen de Normalisation Electrotechnique 
CITI—Columbia Institute for Tele-Information
Committee T1—U.S. standards committee for telephony networks, now administered 
by ATIS
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COPOLCO—Consumer Policy Committee (ISO)
COPANT—Pan American Standards Commission 
CPE—Customer Premises Equipment
DIN— Deutsche Institute fur Normung, Germany’s national body 
DIS—Draft International Standard (ISO/IEC)
DP—Draft Proposal (same as CD) (ISO/IEC)
DS— Dansk Standardisenngsrad, Denmark’s national body 
DSL—Digital Subscriber Line
DVD—Digital Video Disk recording standard format (controlled by DVD Forum) 
E.C.—European Commission 
E.U.—European Union
EASST—European Association for the Study of Science and Technology 
EC—European Commission 
EC—-European Community
ECMA—European Computer Manufacturers Association 
EIA—Electronic Industries Alliance
ELOT—Hellenic Organization for Standardization, Greece’s national body
ETSI—European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EURAS—European Academy for Standardisation
FASB—Financial Accounting Standards Board
FCC—Federal Communications Commission
GAAP—Generally Accepted Accounting Practices
GATT—General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPL—General Public License
GSM—Global System Mobile
IAS—International Accounting Standards set by the IAS Committee 
IBN—Institut Beige de Normalisation, Belgium’s national body 
ICT—Information and Communication Technology
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IEC—International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE 802.3—Ethernet Local Area Network standards committee
IEEE—Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF—Internet Engineering Task Force
IMF—International Monetary Fund
IPR—Intellectual Property Right
ICSR—International Center for Standards Research
ICT—Information and Communication Technology
IS—International Standard (ISO/IEC)
ISA—International Federation of National Standardization Associations (ISO)
ISO 9000— management system standard for quality
ISO 14000— management system standard for environment
ISO—International Organization for Standardization
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 25 WG1—Home Electronic System working group
IT—Information Technology
IT A—Industry Technical Agreement (IEC)
ITI Council—Information Technology Industries Council
ITU—International Telecommunication Union
ITU-T—ITU Telecommunication Sector, formerly called the CCITT
ITU-R—ITU Radiocommunication Sector, formerly called the CCIR
Java™—computer language developed by Sun Microsystems
JTC1—Joint Technical Committee 1 of ISO and IEC on Information Technology
JVC VHS™—Japan Victor Corporation’s Video Home System recording format
MDC—Market-Driven Consortia
MIT—Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MPEG—Motion Picture Experts Group, standard for video compression
MoU—Memorandum of Understanding
NEK—Norsk Elektroteknisk Komite, Norway’s national body
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NFPA—National Fire Protection Association
NGO—Non Governmental Organization
NIST—National Institute for Standards and Technology
NNI—Nederlands Normalisatie Instituut, The Netherlands’ national body
NSPAC—National Standards Policy Advisory Committee
O-member—Observing member
OMB—Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Congress 
OSI—Open Systems Interconnection 
OTA—Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress 
P-member—Participating member
PACT—President’s Advisory Committee on future Technologies (IEC)
PAS—Publicly Available Specification 
PASC—Pacific Area Standards Congress 
PTT—Post, Telephone, and Telegraph 
Q—Question (ITU)
RAND—Reasonable and Non Discriminatory License 
RBOC—Regional Bell Operating Company 
ROA—Recognized Operating Agency (ITU)
SC— Sub-Committee (ISO/IEC)
SC25— Subcommittee 25: Interconnection of IT Equipment 
SCTE— Society of Cable Telecommunications Engineers 
SDO— Standards Developing Organization 
SG— Study Group (ITU)
SIIT2001 2nd IEEE Conference on Standardization and Innovation in Information 
Technology
SIO—Scientific and Industrial Organization (ITU)
SRO—Standards Related Organization
STS Variously as Studies of Technology and Society; or earlier, Science, 
Technology and Society; or most currently as Socio-historical Technology Studies
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TAG—Technical Advisory Group 
TBT—Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO)
TC—Technical Committee (ISO/IEC)
TIA—Telecommunications Industry Association 
TPRC—Telecommunication Policy Research Conference 
TR—Technical Report 
TS—Technical Specification
TSB—Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (ITU)
TTA—Technology Trend Assessment (IEC)
UK—United Kingom
UNI— Enle Nazionale Italiano di unificazione, Italy’s national body
UPnP Forum—Universal Plug 'n Play Forum
VoIP—Voice over Internet Protocol
W3C—World Wide Web Consortium
WD—Working Draft
WG—Working Group
Wi-Fi—Wireless local area network (standardized by IEEE 802.11 committee) 
WTO—World Trade Organization
WTSC—World Telecommunications Standardization Conference (ITU)
WP—Working Party
WRC—World Radio Conference (ITU)
XML—Extended Markup Language
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11 APPENDIX
Appendix 11.1 IEC Technical Committees-2003
Committee Title
TC 1 Terminology
TC 2 Rotating Machinery
TC 3 Information Structures, Documentation and Graphical Symbols
TC 4 Hydraulic Turbines
TC 5 Steam Turbines (in STAND BY)
TC 7 Overhead Electrical Conductors
TC 8 Systems Aspects For Electrical Energy Supply
TC 9 Electrical Equipment and Systems For Railways
TC 10 Fluids for Electrotechnical Applications
TC 11 Overhead Lines
TC 13 Equipment for Electrical Energy Measurement and Load Control
TC 14 Power Transformers
TC 15 Insulating Materials
TC 16 Basic and Safety Principles for Man-Machine Interface, Marking and 
Identification
TC 17 Switchgear and Controlgear
TC 18 Electrical Installations of Ships and of Mobile and Fixed Offshore 
Units
TC 20 Electric Cables
TC 21 Secondary Cells and Batteries
TC 22 Power Electronic Systems and Equipment
TC 23 Electrical Accessories
TC 25 Quantities and Units, and Their Letter Symbols
TC 26 Electric Welding
TC 27 Industrial Electroheating Equipment
TC 28 Insulation Co-Ordination
TC 29 Electroacoustics
TC 31 Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Atmospheres
TC 32 Fuses
TC 33 Power Capacitors
TC 34 Lamps and Related Equipment
TC 35 Primary Cells and Batteries
TC 36 Insulators
TC 37 Surge Arresters
TC 38 Instrument Transformers
TC 39 Electronic Tubes
TC 40 Capacitors and Resistors for Electronic Equipment
TC 42 High-Voltage Testing Techniques
TC 44 Safety of Machinery - Electrotechnical Aspects
TC 45 Nuclear Instrumentation
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Committee Title
TC 46 Cables, Wires, Waveguides, R.F. Connectors, R.F. and Microwave 
Passive Components and Accessories
TC 47 Semiconductor Devices
TC 48 Electromechanical Components and Mechanical Structures for 
Electronic Equipment
TC 49 Piezoelectric and Dielectric Devices for Frequency Control and 
Selection
TC 51 Magnetic Components and Ferrite Materials
TC 55 Winding Wires
TC 56 Dependability
TC 57 Power System Control and Associated Communications
TC 59 Performance of Household Electrical Appliances
TC 61 Safety of Household and Similar Electrical Appliances
TC 62 Electrical Equipment in Medical Practice
TC 64 Electrical Installations and Protection Against Electric Shock
TC 65 Industrial-Process Measurement and Control
TC 66 Safety of Measuring, Control and Laboratory Equipment
TC 68 Magnetic Alloys and Steels
TC 69 Electric Road Vehicles and Electric Industrial Trucks
TC 70 Degrees of Protection Provided By Enclosures
TC 71 Electrical Installations for Outdoor Sites Under Heavy Conditions 
(Including Open-Cast Mines and Quarries) (in STAND BY)
TC 72 Automatic Controls for Household Use
TC 73 Short-Circuit Currents
TC 74 (Transformed Into TC 108)
TC 76 Optical Radiation Safety and Laser Equipment
TC 77 Electromagnetic Compatibility
TC 78 Live Working
TC 79 Alarm Systems (in STAND BY)
TC 80 Maritime Navigation and Radiocommunication Equipment and Systems
TC 81 Lightning Protection
TC 82 Solar Photovoltaic Energy Systems
TC 85 Measuring Equipment for Electrical and Electromagnetic Quantities
TC 86 Fibre Optics
TC 87 Ultrasonics
TC 88 Wind Turbines
TC 89 Fire Hazard Testing
TC 90 Superconductivity
TC 91 Electronics Assembly Technology
TC 92 (Transformed Into TC 108)
TC 93 Design Automation
TC 94 All-Or-Nothing Electrical Relays
TC 95 Measuring Relays and Protection Equipment
TC 96 Small Power Transformers, Reactors, Power Supply Units and Similar 
Products
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TC 97 Electrical Installations for Lighting and Beaconing of Aerodromes 
TC 98 Electrical Insulation Systems (EIS)
TC 99 System Engineering and Erection of Electrical Power Installations in 
Systems With Nominal Voltages Above lkv A.C. and 1.5kv D.C., 
Particularly Concerning Safety Aspects 
TC 100 Audio, Video and Multimedia Systems and Equipment 
TC 101 Electrostatics
TC 103 Transmitting Equipment for Radiocommunication
TC 104 Environmental Conditions, Classification and Methods of Test
TC 105 Fuel Cell Technologies
TC 106 Methods for The Assessment of Electric, Magnetic and Electromagnetic 
Fields Associated With Human Exposure 
TC 107 Process Management for Avionics
rC 108 Safety of Electronic Equipment Within The Field of Audio/Video, 
Information Technology and Communication Technology 
TC 109 Insulation Co-Ordination for Low-Voltage Equipment 
TC 110 Flat Panel Display Devices
JTC 1 Joint Technical Committee for Information Technology 
CISPR International Special Committee On Radio Interference
Committee Title
Appendix 11.2 ISO Technical Committees-2003
Committee Title
JTC 1 Information technology
TC 1 Screw threads—STAND BY
TC 2 Fasteners
TC 4 Rolling bearings
TC 5 Ferrous metal pipes and metallic fittings
TC 6 Paper, board and pulps
TTC Ships and marine technology
TC 10 Technical product documentation
TC 11 Boilers and pressure vessels
TC 12 Quantities, units, symbols, conversion factors
1C 14 Shafts for machinery and accessories
TC 17 Steel
TC 18 Zinc and zinc alloys
TC 19 Preferred numbers— STANDBY
TC 20 Aircraft and space vehicles
TC 21 Equipment for fire protection and fire fighting
TC 22 Road vehicles
TC 23 Tractors and machinery for agriculture and forestry
TC 24 Sieves, sieving and other sizing methods
TC 25 Cast iron and pig iron
TC 26 Copper and copper alloys
TC 27 Solid mineral fuels
TC 28 Petroleum products and lubricants
TC 29 Small tools
TC 30 Measurement of fluid flow in closed conduits
TC 31 Tyres, rims and valves
TC 33 Refractories
TC 34 Food products
TC 35 Paints and varnishes
TC 36 Cinematography
TC 37 Terminology and other language resources
TC 38 Textiles
TC 39 Machine tools
TC 41 Pulleys and belts (including veebelts)
TC 42 Photography
TC 43 Acoustics
TC 44 Welding and allied processes
TC 45 Rubber and rubber products
TC 46 Information and documentation
TC 47 Chemistry
TC 48 Laboratory glassware and related apparatus
TC 51 Pallets for unit load method of materials handling
TC 52 Light gauge metal containers
TC 54 Essential oils
TC 58 Gas cylinders
TC 59 Building construction
TC 60 Gears
TC 61 Plastics
TC 63 Glass containers
TC 67 Materials, equipment and offshore structures for
petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries 
TC 68 Banking, securities and other financial services 
TC 69 Applications of statistical methods 
TC 70 Internal combustion engines
11 Concrete, reinforced concrete and pre-stressed concrete 
Textile machinery and machinery for dry-cleaning and 
industrial laundering 
TC 74 Cement and lime
TC 76 Transfusion, infusion and injection equipment for medical 
and pharmaceutical use 
TC' 77 Products in fibre reinforced cement 
TC 79 Light metals and their alloys
T r  11 Common names for pesticides and other agrochemicals 
IC 82 Mining - STAND BY
TC 8j  Sports and recreational equipment
Devices for administration of medicinal products and intravascular 
catheters
TC 85 Nuclear energy
TC 86 Refrigeration and air-conditioning 
TC 87 Cork
TC 89 Wood-based panels
TC 91 Surface active agents
TC 92 Fire safety
T r  oa StarCh (mcluding derivatives and by-products)
TC 96 Cranesal "" Pr°teCtive dothinS and equipment
TC 98 Bases for design of structures
TC 1 m Chains and chain wheels for P°wer transmission and conveyors
T r  no Contmuous mechanical handling equipment
02 Iron ore and direct reduced iron
TC 104 Freight containers
TC 105 Steel wire ropes
TC 106 Dentistry
TC 107 Metallic and other inorganic coatines
TC 108 Mechanical vibration and shock
TC 109 Oil and gas burners and associated equipment 
1C 110 Industrial trucks
Round steel link chains, chain slings, components and accessories
Committee Title
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Committee Title
TC 112 Vacuum technology
TC 113 Hydrometry
TC 114 Horology
TC 115 Pumps
TC 116 Space heating appliances
TC 117 Industrial fans
TC 118 Compressors, pneumatic tools and pneumatic machines
TC 119 Powder metallurgy
TC 120 Leather
TC 121 Anaesthetic and respiratory equipment
TC 122 Packaging
TC 123 Plain bearings
TC 126 Tobacco and tobacco products
TC 127 Earth-moving machinery
TC 128 Glass plant, pipeline and fittings—STAND BY
TC 129 Aluminium ores—STAND BY
TC 130 Graphic technology
TC 131 Fluid power systems
TC 132 Ferroalloys
TC 133 Sizing systems and designations for clothes—STAND BY
TC 134 Fertilizers and soil conditioners—STAND BY
TC 135 Non-destructive testing
TC 136 Furniture
TC 137 Sizing system, designations and marking for boots and shoes— 
STAND BY
TC 138 Plastics pipes, fittings and valves for the transport of fluids
TC 142 Cleaning equipment for air and other gases—STAND BY
TC 144 Air distribution and air diffusion—STAND BY
TC 145 Graphical symbols
TC 146 Air quality
TC 147 Water quality
TC 148 Sewing machines
TC 149 Cycles
TC 150 Implants for surgery
TC 152 Gypsum, gypsum plasters and gypsum products—STAND BY
TC 153 Valves
TC 154 Processes, data elements and documents in commerce, industry and 
administration
TC 155 Nickel and nickel alloys
TC 156 Corrosion of metals and alloys
TC 157 Mechanical contraceptives
TC 158 Analysis of gases
TC 159 Ergonomics
TC 160 Glass in building
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Committee Title
TC 161 Control and protective devices for gas and oil burners and gas and oil 
burning appliances
TC 162 Doors and windows
TC 163 Thermal performance and energy use in the built environment
TC 164 Mechanical testing of metals
TC 165 Timber structures
TC 166 Ceramic ware, glassware and glass ceramic ware in contact with food
TC 167 Steel and aluminium structures
TC 168 Prosthetics and orthotics
TC 170 Surgical instruments
TC 171 Document management applications
TC 172 Optics and photonics
TC 173 Technical systems and aids for disabled or handicapped persons
TC 174 Jewellery
TC 175 Fluorspar
TC 176 Quality management and quality assurance
TC 177 Caravans
TC 178 Lifts, escalators, passenger conveyors
TC 179 Masonry - STAND BY
TC 180 Solar energy
TC 181 Safety of toys
TC 182 Geotechnics
TC 183 Copper, lead, zinc and nickel ores and concentrates
TC 184 Industrial automation systems and integration
TC 185 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure
TC 186 Cutlery and table and decorative metal hollow-ware
TC 188 Small craft
TC 189 Ceramic tile
TC 190 Soil quality
TC 191 Animal (mammal) traps - STAND BY
TC 192 Gas turbines
TC 193 Natural gas
TC 194 Biological evaluation of medical devices
TC 195 Building construction machinery and equipment
TC 196 Natural stone - STAND BY
TC 197 Hydrogen technologies
TC 198 Sterilization of health care products
TC 199 Safety of machinery
TC 201 Surface chemical analysis
TC 202 Microbeam analysis
TC 203 Technical energy systems
TC 204 Intelligent transport systems
TC 205 Building environment design
TC 206 Fine ceramics
TC 207 Environmental management
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TC 208 Thermal turbines for industrial application (steam turbines, gas 
Expansion turbines) - STAND BY 
TC 209 Cleanrooms and associated controlled environments 
TC 210 Quality management and corresponding general aspects for medical 
devices
TC 211 Geographic information/Geomatics
TC 212 Clinical laboratory testing and in vitro diagnostic test systems
TC 213 Dimensional and geometrical product specifications and verification
TC 214 Elevating work platforms
TC 215 Health informatics
TC216 Footwear
TC 217 Cosmetics
TC 218 Timber
TC 219 Floor coverings
TC 220 Cryogenic vessels
TC221 Geosynthetics
TC 222 Personal financial planning
TC 223 Civil defence
TC 224 Service activities relating to drinking water supply systems and
wastewater systems - Quality criteria of the service and performance 
indicators
TC 225 Market, opinion and social research - PROVISIONAL
Committee Title
Appendix 11.3 Research Gatherings
SIIT2003: 3rd IEEE Conference on Standardization and Innovation in Information 
Technology, (served as organizer and presented paper) Delft University of 
Technology, Delft, The Netherlands, October 22-24, 2003.
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 25 WG1 Standards Meeting (Home Electronic System) (served as 
secretary), IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown, N.Y., September 19-23,
2003.
INCITS (InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards) Executive 
Board Meeting (observer), NIST, Boulder, Colorado, February 10-14, 2003.
Standards Activity Promotion Workshop: How to Promote Voluntary Consensus 
Standards Activities in Korea, (served as invited panel expert and invited speaker on 
“Theoretical Approach to Standards: Academic and Research Activities”) Korean 
Standards Association, Seoul, Korea, December 4, 2002.
International Workshop on Smart Home, (served as invited speaker on “Patents and 
Standards: Do They Fit?”) 1394 Forum and Circuit and System Study Group of 
IEEK, Seoul, Korea, December 5, 2002.
World Standards Day Exhibition and Banquet. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington DC, October 16, 2002.
ANSI Annual meeting, (theme: “Global Competitiveness”) (served as panel 
participant on “Academic Outreach,”) and annual awards banquet. Washington DC, 
October 15-16, 2002.
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 25 WG1 (Home Electronic System) (served as secretary) and 
SC25 (Interconnection of IT Equipment) Plenary Meeting. McLean, Virginia, 
September 23-27, 2002.
Special Panel: “University Education and Research on Technical Standards,” 
organized by the International Center for Standards Research (ICSR), (served as 
organizer and presenter) supported by ANSI and NIST and hosted by the Columbia 
Institute for Tele-Information (CITI), at Columbia University, New York City, 
September 9, 2002.
EASST 2002 (European Association for the Study of Science and Technology), 
presented paper , workshops, etc., York, United Kingdom, July 30-Aug 2, 2002
2002 International Symposium on Advanced Radio Technologies. “Spectrum 
Management in the New Millenium.” National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration/Institute for Telecommunications Sciences, Boulder, Colorado, March 
4,2002
The Regulation o f Information Platforms, Silicon Flatirons Telecommunication 
Program, University of Colorado. January 27-28, 2002
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 25 WG1 Standards Meeting (Home Electronic System) (served as 
secretary), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
January 21-25, 2002.
SIIT2001: 2nd IEEE Conference on Standardization and Innovation in Information 
Technology, (served as organizer and general chair) University of Colorado, Boulder, 
Colorado, October 3-6, 2001.
6th EURAS Workshop: European Academy for Standardisation, “Standards, 
Compatibility and Infrastructure Development,” (presented paper ) Delft, The 
Netherlands, June 28-29, 2001.
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 25 WG1 Standards Meeting (Home Electronic System) (served as 
secretary), British Standards Institution, London, UK, June 4-8, 2001.
SIIT '99: 1st IEEE Conference on Standardization and Innovation in Information 
Technology, (presented paper) Technical University of Aachen, Aachen, Germany. 
September 15-16, 1999.
Appendix 11.4 The Paper
THE ROLE OF CONSORTIA STANDARDS IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENTS IN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECTOR: 
TOWARDS A RE-DEFINITION OF A 
VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS ORGANIZATION
Submitted to the House of Representatives 
Sub-Committee On Technology, Environment, and Standards
277
THE ROLE OF CONSORTIA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
I. Standardization is an essential and growing element in the success of the Information Technology 
industry. The success of the Internet, the World Wide Web, e-Commerce, and the incipient 
wireless revolution are all predicated upon successful standardization. A majority of the standards 
that drive these evolving areas of technology are created in consortia, a form of standardization 
organization that falls outside the standardization regime prescribed by the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI).
II. A definition of both "Information Process” and "consortia” is provided to limit the scope of this 
change to a precise set o f problems.
III. The laws that govern procurement for Federal agencies within the Information Technology sector 
are written and interpreted in a fashion such that consortia specifications are excluded from 
consideration unless the procuring agency requests a waiver from the OMB to permit use o f a 
"non-standard" specification.
IV. An amendment to the Section 12(d) o f Public Law 104-113, the "National Technology Transfer 
and Advancement Act o f 1995" can be used to redefine a "Voluntary consensus standards bodies" 
within the IT sector in order to allow agencies to select from a more complete and realistic set of 
offerings than can be offered under the current law.
THESIS OF THE PAPER
Standardization is essential to the growth of the IT industry. Within the IT industry, well-developed 
consensus consortia standards should be placed on an equal footing with standards developed by ANSI 
accredited organizations. The current Federal procurement practices - as mandated by OMB A -l 19 - 
discourage the use o f consortia specifications. The paper concludes with a proposal for a legislative change 
to permit and encourage Federal use o f consortia-created standards in procurement.
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SECTION I: THE EVOLUTION AND ROLE OFSTANDARDIZATION IN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY
Standardization is an essential element to the growth of the computer industry. Most new Information 
Technology (IT) industry initiatives center around the concept of interoperability, one of the fundamental 
goals of IT standardization (and most standardization, for that matter.) There are no more "homogeneous 
islands o f computing" which marked the late 1980s; today's environment is worldwide, fast paced, and 
completely heterogeneous. The impact of this changing environment on business, society, and culture 
cannot be overstated. Just as the common gauge for railroads changed the face o f the United States in the 
last half of the 1800's, the creation and growth of the standards-based digital economy will have a profound 
effect on the nature and future of life in the United States. Nearly a decade ago. The Economist published 
the following in its Survey of Information Technology:
“The noisiest of those competitive battles (between suppliers) will be about standards. The eyes of 
most sane people tend to glaze over at the very mention of technical standards. But in the computer 
industry, new standards can be the source of enormous wealth, or the death of corporate empires. 
With so much at stake, standards arouse violent passions.”1
This statement - echoed in one form or another in most literature on the subject o f standardization - is even 
more applicable today in the IT industry. With the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web 
(WWW), open standards2 are becoming more and more a part of the "infratechnologies"3, a term used by 
NIST to describe a superset of technologies (the technological infrastructure) which "...provide the 
technical basis for industry standards"4. As Martin Libicki o f RAND notes, "(w)ith each passing month, 
the digital economy grows stronger and more attractive. Much, perhaps, most o f this economy rests upon 
the Internet and its World Wide Web. They, in turn, rest upon information technology standards".5
This fundamental change in the focus o f information technology (from one of homogeneous computing to 
one o f interoperable information sharing) has had a significant impact on the standardization activities o f 
the IT industry. The initial standardization organizations were those that operated under the rules and 
organizational constricts o f the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), following in the footsteps of 
all the other industrial standardization activities in the United States. This was during the period that much 
of the fundamental hardware standardization activities were occurring - from common interconnections for 
the keyboard and mouse to printers and storage systems. The negotiations that created these standards - 
which were complex and confined to a relative handful of providers - were usually under the aegis of one 
or two standardization committees in the United States6. They usually dealt with things that would stay 
standardized for a long time. The formal national bodies under the aegis of ANSI in the U.S., and the
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international bodies under the International Organization for Standardization and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO and IEC) were referred to as Standards Developing Organizations 
(SDOs) and were the source of standardization for the IT industry.
However, in the later 1980s, a different form of standardization activity appeared, beginning with an 
organization called "X/Open".7 Providers began to move technology standardization away from the formal 
ANSI and ISO recognized SDOs to those of consortia, which did not have the intricate processes o f the 
SDOs. The formal processes, which were both time consuming and often Byzantine, were necessary 
because "[m]ost delegates represented] personal, professional, national, disciplinary, and industry 
goals..."8, and managing this vast and sometimes contradictory set of expectations forced these groups to 
create intricate rules to make sure that all voices were heard. Consortia, on the other hand, because they 
usually consisted of groups of like minded participants (either for technical or market reasons), did not need 
to have the lengthy discussions over the mission and intent of the proposed standardization activity - an 
organization's presence was, in many cases, proof of a general agreement.9 The archetypal consortium was 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the group that manages the Internet. The success of this group 
in both keeping the Internet a leading-edge technical architecture leader as well as clear o f greed, 
parochialism, and lethargy is a significant accomplishment.10
This shift was amplified by the introduction and ensuing popularity of the World Wide Web in the early 
1990s. The establishment of the World Wide Web Consortium (W 3C)11 in October 1994 was a turning 
point within the IT industry; after this date, consortia were the logical place to develop joint specifications, 
while before they had been the "alternative place". The generation of IT practitioners who are now leading 
much IT development, which is largely focused on Internet technologies, do not have an awareness of 
ANSI and ISO as sources for standards. Their world is largely bounded by consortia such as W3C and the 
IETF. They see no need for ANSI or ISO standardization - a message that they carry to their companies.12 
With the maturity of the Web, an increasing number o f consortia are being created to standardize Web 
based technology. (Nearly all e-Commerce organizations develop their specifications in arenas that are 
either consortia or consortia-like.)
The reason for the use of consortia lays not so much in the speed of technical development, but rather in the 
willingness o f the consortia to use expedited processes. The IETF has been using the Internet to 
communicate among interested parties, post specifications, achieve rough consensus on technical features 
and functions, and then move forward on standardization. The specifications that the IETF adopts are 
usually based upon extant practice, with at least two implementations required for specifications on the 
standards track, and are available for widespread public review and comment. This practice - using its own 
technology to permit faster standardization o f follow-on technology - is another step that sets the IETF
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apart from its contemporary organizations of the 1980s. The use of its technologies as a basis for its 
standardization practices ensures workable and implementable specifications, but more importantly allows 
the IETF to develop into a truly international organization. When the specification is complete, it is posted 
on the IETF web site with free access for all.
The W3C operates in a similar, though somewhat more formal, manner. W3C is a good model for the 
operation of many other consortia. These consortia realize the key elements are speed and accessibility - 
accessibility to those who are concerned about their work. As The Economist has pointed out, "...the 
Internet has turned out to be a formidable promoter of open standards that actually work, for two reasons. 
First, the web is the ideal medium for creating standards; it allows groups to collaborate at almost no cost, 
and makes the decision-making more transparent. Second, the ubiquitous network ensures that standards 
spread much faster. Moreover, the Internet has spawned institutions, such as the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which have shown that it is possible to 
develop robust common technical rules."13 These features have made the IT community turn to consortia 
and similar structures for their standardization needs, in both hardware and software. The creation of 
highly open, highly visible specifications - widespread in their adoption and use - is essential to the 
continuing evolution of the IT sector and IT industry.
Another aspect of consortia that separates them from the traditional SDOs is their dependence upon the 
market, rather than institutions, for relevance. A consortium succeeds or fails by its ability to attract 
members to accomplish its technical agenda. It receives little or no funding other than what its membership 
is willing to pay; money received from the government is rare, and is usually in return for some exact 
service that the consortium renders to a specific government agency in the role of a contractor.14 While this 
dependence upon its members for financing can be seen as a limitation on the consortium's freedom of 
action, it reflects the state of the market in formal SDOs as well, except that formal SDOs do not shut down 
if all of the commercially important members (those who would implement the specification) walk away. 
There is a delicate balance between an independence that leads to an unused standard and a financial 
dependency that produces a constrained specification.
SECTION II: DEFINITION OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Within the scope of this paper, the term Information Technology shall be the same as the definition found 
in "The United States Code, Title 40, Chapter 25—Information Technology Management, Section 
1401.Definitions, (3) (A) and (B), to include "...any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of 
equipment, that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement,
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control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information ]by the executive 
agency. For purposes o f the preceding sentence, equipment is used by an executive agency if the equipment 
is used by the executive agency directly or is used by a contractor under a contract with the executive 
agency which (i) requires the use of such equipment, or (ii) requires the use, to a significant extent, of such 
equipment in the performance of a service or the furnishing of a product.
(B) The term "information technology" includes computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware and 
similar procedures, services (including support services), and related resources."
SECTION III: DEFINITION OF A CONSORTIUM
The definition of a "consortium" used in this submission derives from several taxonomies developed in the 
previous decade, all of which were focused on the Information Technology sector. Weiss and Cargill 
(1992) identified three separate types that focused on implementation, application, and proof-of- 
technology15; Updegrove (1995) identified research consortia, specification groups, and strategic 
consortia16, while Ketchell (2001) identified specification creating consortia and "fora" (consortia whose 
function was to define user and market requirements for further technical development)17. The three 
taxonomies share enough common definitional concepts to constitute a basis for development o f a model 
for this paper.
Of the varieties o f consortia enumerated, only two general types meet the requirements of the proposal to 
modify the Federal procurement process. Both of these types share a common characteristic - the creation 
of specifications from which products can be developed and implemented in the larger industry. The first 
type can be identified as a group that is focused on creating a specification that acts to bridge a gap left by 
other standards or which fills a small niche market. These groups are "...often formed to develop a standard 
to fill an important niche-industry technical gap that is not large enough to merit the attention of an industry 
standard setting body ..."18. These groups include consortia such as the 10 Gigabit Ethernet Alliance,
Frame Relay Forum, the Small Form Factor Committee, and the WEB3D Consortium, all of which are 
focused on creating specifications that address a niche problem or small portion of a larger problem. These 
consortia are usually small and very focused in the solutions they provide - typically producing robust and 
implementable specifications in a short time. The players in these groups are usually organizations, which 
have an interest (product or service offering) that relies upon completion and wide acceptance o f a 
specification. This type of consortia is especially widespread among providers of hardware interfaces and 
point software solutions. They are characterized by a relatively restricted field of application, and tend to be 
short lived. The work that they do is published and implemented in products relatively quickly, where it 
either will gain adherents and survive or will find no market and disappear.
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The other type of consortia, which Updegrove labels "strategic", deal with systems, architectures, or new 
emerging markets where there is a need for a large number of interrelated and/or continuous specifications. 
These consortia, typified by W3C, the IETF, and The Object Management Group, are usually larger, 
concerned with a broad spectrum of specifications, and tend to be more long lived. Many of the consortia in 
this space are attempting to create, grow, and stabilize a market. They also have a more diverse 
membership, often making consensus harder to attain. As they succeed in obtaining consensus and in 
moving forward, however, their results can be impressive and cause a major shift, sometimes revolutionary, 
in the IT arena.
As noted above, both types o f consortia share a common attribute - the creation of specifications from 
which products or services can be developed and sold. The first and primary requirement of consortia, as 
they are defined for the purposes o f this proposal, is they must create useable specifications. This leads to a 
description of other attributes that a consortium must have.19 Appendix A, Section 2, provides an overview 
of consortia, their rationale, and practice. However, as Updegrove notes "Effective, efficient, and 
representative evolution of standards by consortia is impossible without an appropriate structure of 
administration and technical decision making. When the authors law firm first began representing 
consortia, it performed a wide examination o f possible forms under various jurisdictions, and settled 
eventually on the Delaware not-for-profit, non-stock membership corporation.... This structure has stood 
up extremely well in practice."20
This then, would appear to be a potential second criterion by which a consortium may be judged. In the 
case o f a non-U.S. consortium, however, such a ruling would be inappropriate. What may be sought, 
however, is a structure that indicates some form of reality in law - something that would indicate that there 
is a legal basis under which the consortium operates and which subjects it to some form of governmental 
oversight. The intent is to ensure that the consortium is serious by its commitment to achieve legal 
standing.
"The heart and soul of any consortium may be found in a humble home: its bylaws and charter. Although a 
few important rules may come to rest in a membership application, most of the regulations and rights of the 
organization will be found in these legal documents. Whether or not they are carefully conceived will 
determine whether or not the organization is easily managed, whether it incurs needless exposure to its 
members under antitrust laws, whether its members feel themselves fairly represented and therefore renew 
their membership, and whether or not the organization is sufficiently flexible to evolve and flourish."21 
This is another important criterion - the organization must have a set of governing rules that explain how 
the consortium works, how its merrbers are treated, and the rights and responsibilities of the members. 
Definition of how the consortium creates its technical specifications - including the methodologies o f the
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creating committees - should also be present. While it is acceptable to have various levels of membership, 
the criteria for gaining these levels must be clear and unambiguous. There is also the necessity to ensure 
that there is no exclusivity on joining the consortium; anyone meeting the requisite entry requirements must 
be allowed to join and participate under the same terms and conditions as other members.
Examination of the intellectual property (IP) regime of the consortium is also necessary. The consortium 
must have clear IP Rules (IPR) no less rigorous than those of the ISO - since most consortia operate in the 
international arena. ISO patent policy22 mandates, as a minimum, commitment to reasonable and non- 
discriminatory (RAND) licensing by participants. How RAND is implemented is a matter left to the 
organization, as are any other rules governing IPR. However, the rules must be complete, spelling out the 
requirements of members, the penalties for non-compliance, and remedies available to members for such 
non-compliance. Basically, there must be clear assurance that the holder of IPR will not attempt to treat 
other consortia participants and users o f the standard unfairly.
With respect to participation, ANSI-accredited SDOs cite "balance of participation" (parity between the 
various affected parties, usually providers, users, and others) as one of the criteria forjudging whether an 
organization is legitimate. By definition, a consortium tends to be biased towards those who are interested 
enough to "pay to play", which may be enough to violate the ANSI rule of balance. What mu st be assured 
is that no party is denied the right to participate based upon the nature o f the would-be participant, unless 
the participant is unwilling or unable to meet the common entrance requirements of the consortium.
The key to judging the "openness of the consortia" is one of the major differentiators between the consortia 
and the SDO forms of standardization. Openness has traditionally been viewed as the willingness to admit 
all concerned parties to the table. Consortia typically do not do this. Only consortium members may be 
allowed at the table to discuss specifications. This is why the members are willing to pay - they are trading 
money or other resources for the ability to determine the specification. This is not substantially different 
than the SDOs, where participants trade resources (time and travel budget) for the right to participate. Both 
groups traditionally charge fees - the difference is the amount of the fee charged. Therefore, it is necessary 
to create new criteria for "openness" among consortia.
The primary test for openness should be the outcome o f the consortia -  (1) the specification should provide 
an open (RAND minimum) reference implementation, (2) two or more competing implementations should 
exist, and (3) there should be, if  appropriate, a testing regime to ensure interoperability among the various 
implementations.23 This approach focuses on the rationale for standardization - that is, there should be a 
mechanism by which the users have a choice o f implementations from which to choose, providing 
guaranteed alternative sources for critical products.
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In summary, the criteria for a “good” consortium, for the purposes o f this paper, includes:
1. The consortium must develop technical specifications.
2. The consortium must be some type o f legal entity.
3. The consortium must have a well-defined, legally acceptable set of procedures and processes.
4. The consortium must have a clear and legitimate IPR policy that requires, at a minimum, RAND 
licensing of all IPR included in its specifications.
5. The membership of the consortium must not be arbitrarily restricted. The consortium must not 
restrict participation based on non-economic criteria (e.g. competitors, organizational origin, or 
purpose for joining).
6. There should be reference implementations, competing implementations, and test methods to 
validate conformance as appropriate.
S e c t io n  IV: t h e  r o l e  o f  N a t io n a l  p o l ic y  w it h  r e s p e c t  to  t h e  i t  S e c t o r
In a major Congressional Office o f Technology Assessment (OTA) study completed early in the 1990’s, 
the following comment commands attention:
“Other goods, like education and standards, are impure public goods. These combine aspects 
of both public and private goods. Although they serve a private function, there are also public 
benefits associated with them. Impure public goods may be produced and distributed in the 
market or collectively through government. How they are produced is a societal choice o f  
significant consequence. “ 24 [Emphasis added]
The major contention of this paper is that current legis lation regarding governmental procurement is 
weighted in favor o f the SDOs and does not encourage consideration of the production of standards and 
specifications produced by consortia - except in special circumstances.
The basic law covering Federal Procurement with respect to standardization is Public Law 104-113, the 
"National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act o f 1995".25 The applicable section of PL 104-113 is 
"Section 12 (d) Utilization of Consensus Technical Standards by Federal Agencies; Reports", passed by the 
Congress in order to establish the policies of the existing OMB Circular A -l 19 in law. The first subsection, 
12 (d) (1), states:
“In general. -E xcep t as provided in paragraph (3) o f this subsection, all Federal agencies and 
departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus 
standards bodies (emphasis added), using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy 
objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.”
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This section sets the intent and establishes specific guidance to the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST) to ensure that the Federal agencies and departments are not creating their own 
standards, but are using commercially developed standards to carry out their missions. Sections (2) offers 
guidance on the participation in or the joining of a standards organization, and section (3) provides an 
exception clause, through which agencies can explain why they have chosen not to use commercial 
standards. Section (4) provides a definition of standards as:” the term 'technical standards' means 
performance-based or design-specific technical specifications and related management systems".
The determination o f what is a "voluntary consensus standards body" has been left to OMB. In OMB 
Circular A119, we find the following explication:
4. What Are Voluntary, Consensus Standards?
a. For purposes of this policy, voluntary consensus standards are standards developed or 
adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and international. These 
standards include provisions requiring that owners of relevant intellectual property have agreed to 
make that intellectual property available on a non-discriminatory, royalty-free or reasonable 
royalty basis to all interested parties. For purposes of this Circular, "technical standards that are 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standard bodies" is an equivalent term.
(1) Voluntary consensus standards bodies are domestic or international organizations which 
plan, develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary consensus standards using agreed-upon 
procedures. For purposes of this Circular, ’’voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies," 
as cited in Act, is an equivalent term. The Act and the Circular encourage the participation of 
federal representatives in these bodies to increase the likelihood that the standards they develop 
will meet both public and private sector needs. A voluntary consensus standards body is defined 
by the following attributes:
(i) Openness.
(ii) Balance of interest.
(iii) Due process.
(vi) An appeals process.
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity, and 
includes a process for attempting to resolve objections by interested parties, as long as all 
comments have been fairly considered, each objector is advised of the disposition of his or her 
objection(s) and the reasons why, and the consensus body members are given an opportunity to 
change their votes after reviewing the comments.
b. Other types of standards, which are distinct from voluntary consensus standards, are the 
following:
t h e  Role of Consortia
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(1) "Non-consensus standards, "Industry standards," "Company standards," or "de facto 
standards," which are developed in the private sector but not in the full consensus process.
(2) "Government-unique standards," which are developed by the government for its own uses.
(3) Standards mandated by law, such as those contained in the United States Pharmacopeia and 
the National Formulary, as referenced in 21 U.S.C. 351.26
This definition - specifically with the requirement for "(ii) Balance of interest"27 would appear to limit 
standards to formal (non-consortia) standardization, since, by definition, the participants in a consortium 
are self-selecting for a particular technology specification. At the same time, consortia standards do not fall 
under the conditions set forth in Section 4.b.(l), as they are developed in full consensus and then are 
actually implemented by the industry. Section 4 .b .(l) seems to speak to "proprietary standards", which are 
usually implementation standards - that is, standards based upon a single vendor's implementation, and 
usually described as "de facto" standards.
In section 6 g., however, we read:
" Does this policy establish a preference between consensus and non-consensus standards that are 
developed in the private sector?
This policy does not establish a preference among standards developed in the private sector. 
Specifically, agencies that promulgate regulations referencing non-consensus standards developed 
in the private sector are not required to report on these actions, and agencies that procure products 
or services based on non-consensus standards are not required to report on such procurements. For 
example, this policy allows agencies to select a non-consensus standard developed in the private 
sector as a means of establishing testing methods in a regulation and to choose among 
commercial-off-the-shelf products, regardless of whether the underlying standards are developed 
by voluntary consensus standards bodies or not."28
This section, by reading in light of the previously examined sections, seems to state that "proprietary 
standards" or "de facto standards" are permissible, meaning that the use o f consortia based standards, which 
are open, consensus driven, and lack only the "balance" described in 4.a.(l)(ii) are the equivalent of 
proprietary or de facto standards, which they are not. Consortia standards represent standards that have 
been developed in an atmosphere that is as rigorous - if  not more so - than most SDO standards, yet it is 
deprecated because it does not meet the five voluntary criteria.
The intent o f A119appears to be clear - standards developed in an open process are preferable to those that 
are not. Yet, because of the definition o f a voluntary consensus standard contained in Section 4, the use of 
consortia developed standards is specifically disallowed, while standards developed in proprietary
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environments, or standards that are derived from a product (implementation standard), are permitted 
(Section 6.g.).
In a larger sense, however, for the IT sector the exclusion of consortia developed standards in Section 4.a. 
is flawed. A majority o f standards that are driving the next generation of computing - specifically, those 
from the IETF (the standards o f the Internet), those of the W3C (the standards o f the Web and of e- 
Commerce), the wireless phone standards (those created by the WAP Forum and by ETSI), as well as the 
standards o f the spatial industry (Open GIS Consortium), the Object Oriented technology movement 
(Object Management Group), and of Linux - are all excluded.
We do not agree with those who argue that the problem is not significant. Appendix B provides 
background on one of these issues, while Appendix C argues that the use of proprietary standards in 
procurements appears to be the result o f a policy that recognizes that the formal standards process has 
broken down and that proprietary offerings are as good as, if  not better (in the eyes o f the purchaser) than 
the currently mandated standardization regime.
We disagree with the defense that the current system addresses the problem, and that there is no real issue 
here. This is a serious and substantial issue to participants in the standardization process. The following 
quote, from a leading European standardization site, explains the issue succinctly:
"To us formal ICT standardizers, sometimes consortia are a pain in the neck. We 
recognize they are quick, industry solutions to produce necessary specifications, which 
they call "standards" but we don’t.
These bodies don’t always take full account of the real needs of end users, and it is 
difficult to find information on them and what exactly they are doing."29
While it can be argued that this is not the perception of ANSI, ANSI's strategic plan includes the following: 
“ In successful standards processes
- Decisions are reached through consensus among those affected.
- Participation is open to all affected interests.
- Balance is maintained among competing interests.
- Governments use voluntary consensus standards in regulation and procurement.
- U.S. Government should encourage more use o f the principles embodied in 
accreditation by recognizing the ANSI process as providing sufficient evidence that 
American National Standards (ANS) meet federal criteria for voluntary consensus 
standards;
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- Non-traditional standards organizations should review their objectives to determine 
where closer interaction with the formal system will help add value to their efforts;”
All o f these assertions, if  read from the perspective o f a consortium, would seem to indicate that ANSI is 
focused on maintaining its hegemony and expanding the use of its definition of the "voluntary standards 
process". It does not indicate that there is an attempt to make all standards equal; rather, the above text 
would seem to indicate that ANSI is attempting to position its process as superior - something that 
consortia frequently take strong exception to.
The role o f the government - within the IT sector - should be to equalize the activities o f all o f the standards 
players, so that all legitimate interests are fairly represented in the IT arena. The next section proposes 
legislation to achieve this end.
S e c t io n  V: t o w a r d s  a n  e x p a n d e d  d e f in it io n  o f  a  Vo l u n t a r y  c o n s e n s u s  s t a n d a r d s  b o d y
To unify U.S. standardization activities in the IT sector, a specific amendment to the Public Law 104-113, 
the "N ational Technology Transfer and Advancement Act o f 1995" should be proposed.
1. The proposed legislation would have to contain specific language limiting the intent of this change to 
only the IT community (as defined in Section II).
2. It would deal only with voluntary, market driven IT standardization, and would not impact regulatory 
standards (such as health, safety, or the environment).
3. It would have as criteria for a "legitimate consortia" the items listed in Section III as attributes o f a 
"good consortium".
4. It would not exclude anyone or any organization from seeking either the ANSI or the ISO imprimatur.
5. It would make exceptions to the legislation difficult to obtain.
6. It would put in place and enforce a tracking mechanism to monitor the use o f non-open standards.
7. It may be appropriate to include a directive to NIST to expand the role of the National Voluntary 
Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) in an effort to "train the trainers" if  the private sector 
demands consortia accreditation.
The purpose of the legislation would be to make the formal and structured informal processes equal for the 
voluntary, market driven IT sector and to reunify the quarreling parts of the standardization discipline to 
permit the continued growth of the IT sector in the United States.
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Management summary
Current standards policy appears to be caught up in a polarised discussion about what type of 
organisation best serves the market for democratic and timely standards: standards consortia or the 
traditional formal standards bodies. The general feeling is that standards consortia work more 
effectively, but that they have restrictive membership rules and are undemocratic. The latter is a cause 
of concern for the European Commission, which requires democratic accountability in the standards 
process if it is to refer to such standards in a regulatory context. The Commission's request for new 
input on how to deal with consortium standards is set against this background.
Aim
The Standardisation Unit of DG Enterprise had two objectives when it issued this grant to the Delft 
University of Technology. It sought:
• new case material: the aim was to acquire contemporary case material that illustrates how consortia 
work, why sometimes consortium standardisation is preferred to formal standardisation, and 
whether consortia work in ways that will deliver open standards.
• new policy threads: the aim was to develop a perspective on consortium standardisation that 
clarified its significance for EU standards policy. This required re-examination of current 
understanding of standards consortia, and of the underlying assumptions. Does the way the problem 
of standards consortia is defined - i.e. that their procedures are restrictive and undemocratic, and 
that their standards are therefore unfit as an instrument of regulatory governance - accurately 
describe what is at stake?
Methodology
Two case studies took place: Java standardisation in ECMA, an International Industry Association for 
Standardising Information and Communication Systems, and standardisation of the Extended Markup 
Language (XML) in the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). Data was gathered, foremost, by means 
of participant observation, i.e. attending ECMA standards committee meetings, interviews with 
committee participants, face-to-face and by email, and content analysis of (electronic) documents and 
emails regarding the standards process.
Structure of the report
The report consists of three parts. The two cases are presented in part I. Dominant assumptions on 
consortium standardisation are confronted with the case findings in part II. The current basis for standards 
policy is examined, and new policy threads are developed. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations 
are made in part III.
Conclusions
Why is consortium standardisation sometimes preferred to formal standardisation? Consortia 
successfully market their feats. They are associated with timely standardisation and pragmatic standards 
solutions, despite some critical observations to the contrary. This, and possibly the homogeneity and 
suggested exclusiveness of consortium standardisation, attracts companies. The two cases further show 
that (a) some consortia are used as a stepping stone for formal standardisation, (b) consortia are often 
equally relevant with respect to market co-ordination, and (c) changing a formal standard significantly 
is easier if the standards work is moved to a different setting, i.e. standards consortium.
Does the current definition o f the problem o f standards consortia accurately describe what is at stake? 
No, it does not. A redefinition of the problem is desirable, one which addresses the themes of 
democracy and compatibility.
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• Democracy. According to the dominant view, consortia lack openness and are undemocratic. This 
view underestimates the openness of most industry consortia and overestimates the democratic 
procedures of formal standardisation. The research findings indicate that formal standards bodies 
and standards consortia work in similar ways. Consortia, too, strive for consensus, address minority 
viewpoints, etc.. Although the latter more explicitly target industrial parties, both settings include 
and exclude the same constituencies.
The framework of rivalry merely leads to new hybrid forms of organisation like the CEN 
workshops. Speculating somewhat, these will not lure companies away from consortia but instead 
lead to a shift within the CEN standards domain away from the more formal procedures. Moreover, 
it by-passes the more significant difference between standardising and not-standardising. The real 
issues lie at a higher level.
• Compatibility. The cases further highlight that company and government policies overly emphasise 
the means of standardisation while largely bypassing its aim, namely technical compatibility. The 
latter can also be achieved by other means than standardisation. Among these are the proprietary 
and open source strategies to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) development. In 
certain circumstances, the latter strategies are more effective in achieving compatibility than 
standardisation. A more systematic inventory of compatibility-enhancing strategies is needed to 
supplement those deduced from the findings of the case studies.
Recommendations
The report pleads, firstly, for a European standards policy that bypasses possible rivalry between 
standardisation settings, goes beyond the inclusion of consortium standardisation, and works towards a 
differentiated standards policy. The latter should, on the one hand, reflect a pragmatic view where the 
majority of market standards is concerned (e.g. more exclusive, multi-party committees; focus more on 
standards implementation and market co-ordination). On the other hand, it should give more substance 
to the aim of democratic accountability which is required in de jure contexts. Secondly, a policy is 
desirable that goes beyond the standards process and centres on the objective of compatibility. This 
vantage point puts ‘the consortium problem’ into a very different, and clearer perspective. The 
Commission is therefore recommended to focus its policy on compatibility strategies, and not to restrict 
itself to standardisation. It is recommended that companies and governments re-assess their 
standardisation policy from the de facto compatibility standpoint.
Questions raised
The report raises several questions. An important one concerns a difficult issue in the ICT field, namely 
that the supply-side of the market often lacks the necessary incentives to prioritise compatibility. What 
mechanisms does the public, i.e. the demand-side of the market, have at its disposal to advance 
collective compatibility interests? Would it be desirable legally to anchor compatibility interests in a 
way similar to that of how intellectual property interests are presently represented in regulation?
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1. Introduction
In the past, the European Commission has always been very committed to formal European and 
international standardisation. For the reader who is less familiar with the issue at hand, formal 
standardisation refers to the voluntary consensus standards processes that take place in technical 
committees under the auspices of national, regional (e.g. European), and international standards bodies. 
The procedures that govern these committees express democratic values, aim to be inclusive (e.g. 
Public Enquiry of the International Standardization Organization (ISO) allows all interested parties that 
did not participate in drawing up a standard to comment on the draft standard), and reflect the 
desirability of a technical and politically neutral standards process (e.g. in the approval stage of a 
standard only the negative votes which are accompanied by technical arguments are counted). At stake 
is what could be called a democratic ideology (Egyedi, 1996). Its characteristic features are, for 
example, decision making by consensus; voluntary application of standards; broad constituency of 
(national) delegations; well-balanced influence of national members in the management of international 
standards bodies; and impartial, politically and financially independent procedures.
Formal standards are an important point of reference for European regulation (New Approach, 1985) 
and public procurement. Furthermore, formal standards have been at the basis of a harmonised 
European market. However, in the field of information and telecommunication technologies standards 
have emerged with high market relevance, standards that stem from other sources than the formal 
standards bodies. Examples are Adobe's Portable Document Format (PDF), the Internet standards 
developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the Extended Markup Language (XML) 
recommendation developed under the auspices of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). How 
should these (de facto) standards be dealt with? Should the Commission revise its exclusive focus on 
the formal standards bodies, or should it encourage assimilation of these de facto standards by the 
formal standards institutions?
Questions to this intent are also raised in the European Council Resolution of October 1999 (Article 
14). The Council observes "(...) an increasing tendency of interested parties to elaborate technical 
specifications outside recognised standardisation infrastructures" (Article 7). An important source for 
developing such specifications - and one on which the current research was requested to focus1 - is the 
standards consortium . A standards consortium is defined here as "an alliance of firms and organisations, 
financed by membership fees, formed for the purpose of co-ordinating technology development and/or 
implementation activities (...)" (Hawkins, 1998, p .l) Its outcomes are publicly available, multi-party 
industry specifications or standards. Usually its members are large companies, which indicates that the 
resulting standards are likely to be veiy relevance for the market. These consortia are also referred to as 
'market-driven consortia' (CRE, 2000).
The common feeling is that standards consortia work more effectively than the formal standards bodies 
do But, according to the same sources, their disadvantage is that they have restrictive membership rules 
and are undemocratic. The latter is a cause of concern for the European Commission, which requires a 
minimum degree of democratic accountability if it is to refer to such standards in a regulatory context. 
At first sight, the Commission seems to face a policy dilemma: adhere to a principled approach, one 
that prioritises a democratic standards process, or pragmatically include undemocratic consortia’as a 
source o f standards. The Commission's request for new input on how to deal with consortium standards 
IS set against this background.
Objectives
The scope of this research does not include some interesting, recent phenomena such as the significance of the CEN 
workshops and the meaning of the Open Source phenomenon for standardisation. These settings deserve separate attention 
Other sources of what Bruins (1993) calls grey standards, are trade- or profession-oriented organisations (e.g. IEEE ASE) and
setst* s.. s r rcl" fo~ - “  “ *“,s ’
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7. Conclusions & Recommendations
Beyond Consortia. Current standards policy appears to be caught up in a polarised discussion about 
which category of organisations best serves the market for democratic and timely standards: standards 
consortia or the traditional formal standards bodies. It is an unhelpful discussion, this framework of 
rivalry.
Let us, for a moment, go along with it. In the discussion, consortia are seen as a problem. They lack an 
open and democratic standards process. However, neither recent literature nor the case studies in this 
report can confirm this. The findings show that in theoiy the standards committees of both settings 
strive for consensus and address minority viewpoints, while in practice both largely include and 
exclude the same constituencies. The framework of rivalry merely leads to new hybrid forms of 
organisation like the CEN workshops, which, speculating somewhat, will not lure companies away 
from consortia but instead lead to a shift within the CEN standards domain. Moreover, it by-passes the 
more significant difference between standardising and not-standardising. The real issues lie elsewhere. 
These are discussed below as main threads for standards policy. (For more detail, I refer to the previous 
chapter.)
Democracy: beyond rhetoric. European standards policy shows too little interest in whether democratic 
standards procedures provide the desired democratic accountability or not. Where a de jure need for 
standards exists, that is, where standardisation touches on aspects of health, safety, environment, 
privacy, security, etc., should not the regulator's concern for democratic accountability be given more 
substance? Firstly, more clarity would need to be created about what type of democracy is needed and 
for what purpose -  in practice. This is a political decision. Secondly, the Commission should monitor 
systematically if ’democratic' standards developing organisations follow-up the democratic 
requirements, be they formal standards bodies or consortia. For where democratic accountability is still 
important, insight into the factual democratic course of the standards process is needed. For market 
coordination, on the other hand, the democratic requirement of 'balanced representation of interest 
groups' could be simplified to 'multi-party participation'.
A differentiated standards policy is recommended to better cater to the significance of standardisation 
as a means to coordinate the market and as an instrument of regulatory governance. Differentiation 
prevents a situation where democratic (or other political) ideals are diluted in order to be able to apply a 
market-oriented standards policy to de jure situations - or, as presently happens, vice versa. In this 
scenario, the assignment of a work item to either the multi-party or to the more demanding 'democratic' 
standards environment becomes an important decision. An interesting case for gaining experience about 
problems of assignment would be the ITU-T’s recent introduction of a two-fold track of the Traditional 
and the Alternative Approval Process for de jure and non-de jure standards.
Beyond Standardisation. Standardisation - whether by means of formal standards bodies, hybrid 
workshops or specification consortia - is one means to achieve technical compatibility. There are other 
means to this end as well. In standards policy the vantage point of compatibility should take priority. It 
puts into perspective the distinction between (a) standards and specifications (de facto standards), and 
(b) formal and consortium standards. These distinctions, which may seem very important from the 
standardisation standpoint, take on a different meaning in the light of compatibility aims. In this light, 
both standardisation and software development are specification processes, and ownership and property 
issues (open source/ proprietary) are in principle irrelevant. The primacy of standards’ implementations 
and compatible technologies then comes back into focus. For example, a proprietary multi-party 
specification (e.g. Java) and a standard stemming from a consortium led by a 'benevolent dictator' 
(XML from W3C) can be at least as effective in fostering compatibility as a formal standard. A gap 
appears to exist between outcome-oriented market practices and process-oriented governance ideals, 
which standards policy will need to address. Compatibility can only be measured as an aspect of the 
market, and not as an aspect of the specification process.
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In addressing standardisation, current policy should not overemphasise standards development 
activities; it should focus more on standards implementation and market co-ordination. Furthermore, it 
is recommended that companies and governments re-assess their standardisation policy from the de 
facto compatibility standpoint.
Whether or not the European Commission should involve itself in other compatibility strategies than 
standardisation (e.g. licensed software specification processes) - or even as little as possible in 
standardisation - is a matter for debate. For the moment, this debate should be kept open. It should not 
be closed beforehand with reference to the danger of reinforcing monopolies. The Java case study 
suggests that in certain circumstances, the public's primaiy interest is in solutions that prevent 
unnecessary fragmentation of the market. Since there are few legal means to safeguard the public 
interest in compatibility, if the latter coincides with a company interest, proprietary solutions deserve 
consideration. At the same time, we should not overemphasise the idea of compatibility control: the 
case also shows that even tightly controlled compatibility strategies (e.g. licensing combined with IPRs) 
cannot prevent incompatible developments (Microsoft’s use of Java).
Institutionalisation o f public compatibility interests: coordination o f demand and legislation. In 
particular in the current immature state of the ICT field, the supply-side of the market often lacks the 
necessary incentives to prioritise compatibility. What mechanisms does the public, the demand-side of 
the market, have at its disposal to advance collective compatibility interests? This question has arisen in 
two different contexts: (a) while comparing the effectiveness of different compatibility strategies, and 
(b) in relation to Microsoft's attempts to fragment the Java platform.
(a) Comparing the effectiveness o f different compatibility strategies. The standardisation and open 
source software strategies suffer from the same problem: whether they lead to compatible products 
is not clear. Taking the example of standardisation, compliance to (voluntary) standards cannot be 
enforced. Demand-driven conformance to standards is needed if standardisation is to lead to actual 
compatibility. However, in the post-standardisation phase there are no mechanisms that coordinate 
shared consumer interests in compatibility. This contrasts strongly with the diversity of 
coordination mechanisms used on the supply-side of the market. Discussions about supporting 
users and user coordination during the standards process should be extended to include the post­
standardisation phase with the aim of fortifying demand-side interests in compatibility.
(b) Maintaining the integrity o f a platform. A regulator}' asymmetry exists between IPR interests and 
compatibility interests. Current regulation anchors the primacy of IPR ownership and market 
competition in law, but it hardly recognizes the societal significance of compatibility interests (i.e. 
technical interoperability). Would it be desirable to legally anchor compatibility interests in a way 
similar to intellectual property interests?
Much research remains to be done. Among other things, the actual compatibility effects of - formal and 
consortium - standardisation and the open source approach remain uncertain. For example, little is 
known about (a) the participatory specification process of Open Source Software, which could contain 
leads for improving or diversifying standards development; and (b) whether the process and outcome of 
developing open source software involve problems of compatibility (e.g. upward compatible or stable 
source code). Case studies are needed to throw light on these issues.
A second area of research which this study points to, is the effectiveness of different compatibility 
strategies. A more systematic inventory of the compatibility implications of market strategies is needed 
to supplement the findings of the Java case. O f interest is which other means exist to enhance 
compatibility and how their contribution can be measured (i.e. quantify effectiveness).
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Strategy 
for Standardising 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
4. General Strategy
In conceptual terms, standardisation in information and communications technology primarily 
means safeguarding the cooperation of heterogeneous, distributed systems. In other words: 
interoperability is the main standardisation objective for ICT. This interoperability refers to all 
levels of the OSI reference model (cf. Error! Reference source not found.) as well, 
increasingly, to semantic aspects. However, the latter is causing considerable problems since 
existing systems and processes (cf. product classification in e-business, for example) are 
typically involved bringing standardisation to its limits if 100% solutions are aimed at (cf. 0).
Interfaces (in hardware and software), communications protocols and data objects are 
standardised to safeguard interoperability. This means that interfaces can remain stable in the 
long term in complex distributed systems and investments are thus secured and migration 
made possible. By contrast, the standardisation of product-related aspects plays a very minor 
role in ICT.
However, the standardisation objective of ICT is not limited to interoperability. Much rather, 
the penetration of ICT into all areas of society, especially the consumer area, means that 
issues of relevance to society are also gaining in importance. Security including biometry and 
data protection are in great need of standardisation, as are ergonomic aspects, especially with 
regard to allowing the disabled barrier-free access to new technology ('disability access 
‘design for air). These issues require the participation of the general public and are 
consequently predestined for treatment in standardisation organisations instead of other 
bodies.
4.1 Standardisation Policy Aspects
Standards
The development of specifications and standardisation are methods for technical 
harmonisation called into being and supported by industry -  they all have their own 
justification. This leads to industry’s interest in combining these various methods and their 
products in accordance with their specific strengths and making the competent organisations 
and bodies cooperate purposefully, where this is necessary.
Development processes and voting methods based on consensus are the optimum precondition 
for the general acceptance of the standards and fair competition between rival companies. In 
this connection, to achieve consensus it may be appropriate to aim for a pragmatic “80% 
solution” instead of a perfect “ 100% solution” and to treat the remaining heterogeneity with 
other means (cf. A 4.2.1). However, the search for consensus comes up against its limits 
where market opportunities are jeopardised by the course of time.
In addition to the development process and voting method, revision and updating as well as 
consistency among themselves are also important characteristics of standards. Revision, 
updating and consistency are particularly marked in standards. In the case of standards for 
short-lived products, revision and updating do not play a major role -  specifications that lose
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Standardisation as an Instrument of Government and Policy
Standardisation is an important instrument of (economic) policy. Standards serve
• The technical implementation of the so-called key requirements of European directives in line 
with the so-called New Concept of the European Union in the regulated area;
• The harmonisation of markets and, thus, the dismantling of barriers to trade or -  in a negative 
case -  the isolation of markets by means of the deliberate choice of deviating standards;
• The creation of new markets by achieving advantages of scale;
• The rationalisation of administrative processes (authorities as large-scale users).
Statement A 0.5 Standards and the Statutory Regulated Area
SICT supports the application of the New Concept for technical regulation in the European 
Union in the ICT area, too. Although the co-regulation approach is to be welcomed in principle, 
from the point of view of standardisation it has not convincingly demonstrated its usefulness.
SICT calls for the reference to standards for regulation pursuant to the New Concept. The use of 
other specifications in this connection is rejected.
SICT recommends that the standards organisations offer their services for developing the 
specifications needed for self-regulation to the main parties involved in co-regulation. These can 
also be Workshop Agreements (CWAs, IWAs) if this corresponds to the wishes of the main 
parties involved. A binding application of Workshop Agreements is rejected. Financial support 
for workshops that is not oriented to the interests of the main parties involved is also rejected by 
the European Commission.________
International, European and National Standardisation 
Statement A 0.6 Primacy of International Standardisation
SICT firmly emphasises the primacy of international standardisation because the ICT market is a 
global market. In this connection, persistent efforts are being made for strong impetus for 
international standards to come from Germany.
SICT firmly emphasises that a splintering of international standardisation into further 
organisations other than ISO, IEC and ITU-T would run counter to the goal of uniform 
international standards and vehemently rejects this.
In addition to this strong international orientation, European integration continues to play an 
important role. However, European standardisation only makes sense in conjunction with top 
international developments or pilot applications or with regionally restricted solutions. 
Alternative or rival developments to international standardisation should be rejected. This means 
that SICT recommends that European ICT standardisation should always be assessed from the 
aspect of the ability to transfer and apply the results at an international level. German 
participation in European projects should be primarily based on this consideration.
By contrast, purely German standardisation in information and communications technology is 
not supported unless it expressly and exclusively serves to provide a strong impetus for 
international standardisation.
Statement A 0 7 National Delegation Principle and the Role of National Standardisation 
Organisations
The national delegation principle for participation in international or European standardisation 
allows all concerned appropriate participation in the development and decision-making
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processes. SICT therefore recommends that this principle also be retained in ICT standardisation.
With the increasing supranational character of ICT standardisation, a priority task for national 
standardisation organisations is to give all groups concerned, especially SMEs and consumers, a 
platform for participation at international or European level.__________________________
Statement A 0.8 Language in ICT Standardisation
In information and communications technology, standards are preferably drawn up at 
international level and applied in the original version and language.
The time-consuming development and updating of standards at three levels (international, 
regional and national) does not bring any value added for the groups concerned in the ICT field. 
In the field of ICT, standards should therefore be developed at international level and applied in 
the original version.
It is then necessary or sensible to transfer them into regional or national standards
- if matters relating to safety technology are dealt with,
- if the users cannot use the standard in the original version,
- if technical harmonisation/interoperability cannot be achieved in any other way.
In these cases, too, the transfer and update should be done with as little effort as possible.
Market Orientation
Standards that do not comply with market needs do not develop an effect; developing them is 
a waste of resources. The difficulty is recognising market needs when initiating a project with 
a certain degree of reliability or recognising declining market interest on time. If the players 
in a standardisation project are only economically interested partied, it can be assumed that a 
project meets the market needs. However, the situation is different in standardisation with a 
potentially broad spectrum of players: with the exception of standardisation in the context of 
the New Concept, the market orientation of standardisation projects should be strictly 
reviewed and ensured.
Statement A 0.9 Ensuring Market Orientation
The market orientation of standardisation projects shall be ensured by:
• appropriate criteria for evaluating projects and their strict application,
• respecting minimum participation,
• consistent project management and halting projects if the timeframe is exceeded, 
appropriate involvement of all participants, even in the state sector, in the project costs..
4.2 Standardisation and Remaining Heterogeneity
The previous sections contained clear indications for the fact that the traditional methods of 
standardisation are coming up against their limits in ever more sectors (such as virtual 
specialist libraries) -  in spite of all the improvements to the details of the methods. On the one 
hand, they appear to be indispensable and clearly increase quality and efficiency in some 
areas. On the other hand, they can only be implemented to a certain extent within the context 
of global provider structures and changed framework conditions, against a background of 
rising costs. That is why the previous standardisation concepts should be reconsidered. The 
remaining and unavoidable heterogeneity must be countered by various intellectual and 
automatic methods for subsequent conceptual integration. A new way of looking at the 
remaining call for maintaining consistency and interoperability is needed. It can be described 
with the following premise: standardisation should be thought of from the point of view of the 
remaining heterogeneity. Only with the joint interaction of intellectual and automatic methods
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for dealing with heterogeneity and standardisation is there a strategy for a solution that does 
justice to the current technical, political and social framework conditions.
Only at first glance does it seem to be a contradiction that considerations about deregulation, 
such as the acceptance of the standards that can only be implemented incompletely, will 
simultaneously lead to a strengthening of efforts for integration. However, if standardisation 
is not viewed as an independent or primary process to which all others have to subject 
themselves, but as a method that is thought of from the point of view of the remaining 
heterogeneity and is modelled and implemented in terms of this, conditions for consistency 
and interoperability that can be used under current conditions.
Statement A 0.1 Remaining Heterogeneity
If there is no success in some areas to implement standardisation, or to do so only partially, with 
reasonable time being spent, the consequences of the lack of standardisation and how the 
remaining heterogeneity can be at least approximately countered by automatic or intellectual 
methods should be specifically analysed for every remaining detail. The costs and concessions to 
quality that may result should be compared to the effort and the prospects of success of further 
strengthened attempts at standardisation. ______________________________________
4.2. Operative/Organisational Aspects 
Statement A 0.1 Interdisciplinary Work
ICT standardisation frequently calls for interaction between experts of several specialist areas. 
SICT therefore recommends that the existing fixed structures in the standardisation organisations 
should be supplemented with flexible structures and ways of working that not only support this 
interdisciplinary work, but also encourage it in the long term. The establishment of strategically 
oriented bodies that set targets for cooperation should also be considered.
For example, one solution could be project-related teams that are called by a cross-body board 
and report to it. (ICT SB)________ ________________________________________
Statement A 0 2 Cooperation between ISO, IEC and ITU-T in the Field of ICT
In line with the convergence character of ICT, relevant standardisation work affects the 
traditional field of work of all three international standardisation organisations, ISO, IEC and 
ITU-T. SICT therefore firmly calls upon ISO, IEC and ITU-T to intensify their cooperation in 
the field of ICT standardisation and to cooperate in a pioneering fashion._________________
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Statement A 0.3 Cooperation with other Specification Developers
SICT emphasises (cf. 4.1.1) the need to cooperate with other specification developers in order to 
largely avoid duplication of effort and conflicting solutions. An important aid is the use of the 
world wide web to inform third parties about existing standards as well as projects currently 
being worked on.
The future structure of international ICT standardisation should be one of a cooperative network 
of conventional standardisation organisations and standard developers of a new type. SICT 
recommends that the standardisation organisations in this network should take on the active role 
of a catalyst in initiating standardisation work by identifying need and expressing requirements. 
The standardisation organisations should aid for moderation, especially with apparent conflicting 
recommendations and those with legal consequences.
An infrastructure that supports interaction and documentation beyond language and national 
borders is needed for the assumption of an active role in the desired network of standardisation 
networks. SICT recommends that the standardisation organisations build up the required 
structures on the internet.
The establishment of a cooperation platform structurally based on the ICT Standards Board in 
Europe (ICTSB), for example, should be considered.
SICT recommends that the standardisation organisations review their processes for adopting 
other suitable standards into the set of standards together with other standard developers and to 
design them in such a way that they encourage this adoption and do not hinder it. ___________
Statement A 0.4 Standardisation Alongside Development
SICT views standardisation alongside development as an important instrument for introducing 
trial developments to standardisation. Successful projects in standardisation alongside 
development show that standardisation and innovation are not a contradiction in terms.
Moreover, standardisation alongside development can be used to practise other ways of working 
within a standardisation organisation with a level of consensus deviating from standardisation. 
However, in this connection, attention must be paid to sufficient coordination within the meaning 
of A 4.3.3. 6
Statement A 0 5 Criteria for the Evaluation of Standardisation Areas and/or Individual Issues
SICT recommends that objective criteria be developed, according to which an evaluation of the 
standardisation areas or individual issues with regard to their compliance with the market needs 
can be made at any point in the process. This evaluation should aim at providing decision­
making aids for strategic decisions that need to be made. In particular, these include decisions 
about setting up new bodies and running their secretariats, initiating new projects, choosing an 
appropriate level o f Consensus and/or the appropriate form for publication as well as target data 
(cf. Statement 4.1.1). In this connection, the conclusions in 3.7.6 should also be considered. The 
criteria, the evaluation and the decisions derived from them strictly oriented to market relevance 
must be made transparently at all levels in order to ensure active support for the goals.
Statement A 0.6 Initiating New Issues
The initiation of new issues relevant to the market especially requires that the imminent needs 
within the context of research and development be recognised at an early stage. The support and 
incorporation of research and development in standardisation must be strengthened beyond the 
existing levels of the previous extent within the context of standardisation alongside 
development.________ ____________
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The standardisation organisations should observe technological developments (technology 
watch) on their own initiative in order to be able to recognise trends at an early stage. They 
should take the initiative themselves to review new issues for their need for standardisation.
The new way that the standardisation organisations see themselves as a platform for various 
levels of consensus for standardisation must be made transparent to the consortia and fora in 
particular that are to be involved to a greater extent, with the framework conditions applicable to 
all forms of publication being emphasised: strict project management with time and resource 
planning, milestones, reviews, criteria for abandonment.
As the initiation o f new issues after evaluation of the market relevance on the basis o f objective criteria 
(cf. Statement 4.3.5) also presupposes active perception of the interests, those involved must undertake 
to provide the necessary resources._______________________
Statement A 0.7 Public Relations/Information Policy/Transparency
The transparency of the work of standardisation organisations must be permanently improved. In 
this connection, the instrument of the intemet/WWW/email should be used more intensively. 
This transparency starts with initiating new projects and includes the development of draft 
standards. SICT recommends that interested members of the public be given the opportunity, via 
suitable internet fora, to follow and comment on a development project; the power to make 
decisions, however, will remain with the competent standardisation body._____________
Statement A 0.8 Marketing
Standardisation organisations are in competition with other standardisation organisations in the 
field of ICT (cf. Error! Reference source not found.). However, they cannot assume that the 
need for new standards will be brought to them. Much rather, the standardisation organisations 
must actively try to introduce new interested parties to standardisation and to meet the need for 
standardisation with all of the instruments available (cf. A 4.1.2). To do this, marketing should 
be intensified in the long term._______________________
Aussage A 0.9 Project-Related Work
SICT recognises that the standardisation organisations have already made great efforts to meet 
industry s demands for targeted standard development that is on time. However, more stages are 
needed. Professional project management using appropriate tools should be introduced 
throughout and the staff should be trained accordingly. However, for the effectiveness of the 
project management methods it is also necessary for all involved in the standardisation to be 
prepared to enter into effective obligations to provide resources._________________
Statement A 0.10 Other Products of the Standardisation Organisations
Standards and other standards are addressed to a specialist audience, e.g. product developers or 
testers, who are usually familiar with the state of affairs described in the standard in questions 
and its technical environment. In addition, however, there is a large audience that does not meet 
these requirements and that has a great need for introductory literature, maybe in the form of 
tutorials or recommendations for use. Standardisation organisations, especially those at national 
level, have specialist staff suitable for meeting this need. This and other services by the 
standardisation institutes, such as specialist representation in international and European bodies 
with their own staff, can also help to reduce the great dependence of financing the 
standardisation infrastructure on the sale of standards (cf. A 4.3.11 and A 4.3.12).
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